


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Political Affairs

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New Deputies' Association Formed

91P50272A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 16 Jul 91 p 1

[Unattributed report: "One More Association"]

[Text] The Association of Parliamentarians, AP, was formed on 10 July. Its founders, who are mainly USSR People's Deputies, intend for it to be interrepublican, and to work exclusively through personal contacts and on special projects. The group plans a meeting with U.S. senators on family issues, a conference on the mass media in Eastern Europe and the USSR, research into national security issues in Eastern Europe and the USSR, federal structures, economics, and so forth.

In regard to financing, Konstantin Lubenchenco, one of AP's organizers, said that some funds already exist, and more importantly, the leaders of several funds including the Peace Fund, a farmers' group, and a Russian economic reform group, have expressed their interest. Svyatoslav Fedorov appears to be promising some subsidies by virtue of his personal involvement in the founding of AP and Aleksandr Vladislavlev, cochairman of the Scientific-Industrial Union, made his contribution through his statement: "I'm with you." Chairman of a chamber of the USSR Supreme Soviet Ivan Laptev has similarly blessed AP, calling the association a "channel of social inheritance." He added: "I, as a People's Deputy from the CPSU, will be the first to lose my mandatel..." Assuming that the Supreme Soviet will soon dissolve, Laptev noted the merit of AP's opportunity to pass on experience to a "third wave."

Lukyanov Defends Supreme Soviet, CPD as Stabilizing Forces

914B0294A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 23,
Jun 91 pp 4-5

[Interview with Anatoliy Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, by Igor Karpenko and Vyacheslav Shchepotkin; place and date not given: "Authority—This Is Responsibility to the People"]

[Text] [Correspondent] The new Soviet parliament, Anatoliy Ivanovich, has been working for two years. It is likely that today some results can be summed up for this period—in what way are these notable? What did the new parliament give to social development?

[Lukyanov] First, about the results. I think that in fact a new institution of authority emerged in these two years. This is a continuously operating legislative and control organ, and, moreover, let us not forget, one that is operating in a very difficult situation. It emerged with difficulty, in clashes, in a struggle. But in spite of all the ambiguous assessments of it in society, the USSR Supreme Soviet conducted important work, both in the sense of legislation and in the sense of establishing new management organs, and even, I will tell you, in the sense of unfettering the political interests of the people!

After all, millions of people followed all the discussions! I do not know now exactly, but it seems to me I also spent about 600 hours on the air...

Along with the Supreme Soviet, new very active political figures appeared who were not very well known in the provinces and in the republics, and who even were generally not known at all. It is here in the country's Supreme Soviet that they began to emerge as politicians of a new formation. Some of them have already been assigned to executive work, and some have begun to work as professionals in parliament. These are very interesting people, and one can talk about each of them at great length.

[Correspondent] You already know many of them?

[Lukyanov] I know practically all of them now, a majority of them by name and patronymic, and by biography.

[Correspondent] You have in mind only members of the Supreme Soviet, or also other deputies?

[Lukyanov] The fact is that up to 100 people's deputies who are not members of the Supreme Soviet are usually present at sessions. In addition, not a day goes by that I do not receive one of the deputies. So, I know many of them.

[Correspondent] More than 100 laws were passed in two years. Probably some of them passed with ease, and others with difficulty...

[Lukyanov] You know, the most difficult frequently were not even laws but government programs on economic reform and society's transition to market relations, the complex program for overcoming the crisis, and stabilization of the economy. These three difficult questions, to which the Congress of People's Deputies [CPD] and the Supreme Soviet returned several times, were of a nature that caused very great tension for both the deputies and the leaders of parliament, and for the permanent commissions. Moreover, I want to say that no matter what is written or said, parliament showed itself to be a sober-minded and sensible force. In spite of any passions and any campaign that was undertaken in the press, including about the "500 days" program, the parliament stood its ground. It also introduced, as is well known, amendments to the basic directions proposed by the president of the country.

But the anticrisis program was adopted in exactly the same way, not without doubts and not without debates. Thus, the programs were the most difficult, and here there is no doubt about this. Of course, the adoption of a whole number of laws was very difficult. For example, the law on the general principles of local self-government and the local economy in the USSR. At first, the subject of the law itself was not clear. Then there was thinking and arguing about the forms of financial mutual relations of the soviets and enterprises, and sources of income for local budgets were sought. The draft went

through three readings. It was discussed with great interest in the provinces. Finally, the law was passed; however, amendments also had to be made to it before long.

I would cite the whole range of laws on pensions among those laws around which passions burned very hotly and where there were clashes among various professional groups. They passed with a lot of difficulty, because representatives of every specialty demanded privileges for themselves that were no less than those of others, but also even more, and it was very difficult to pacify passions. I continue to think that parliament did not exercise enough will here to restrain these passions, and therefore the appropriations for pensions are not always tied to the real capabilities of the country.

Now the approach is different, and I hear more and more frequently from the deputies: How much does the law cost, let us calculate, let us see where we could get the resources. But it took parliament a year for such an approach to legislation and legislative acts.

[Correspondent] Anatoliy Ivanovich, you have headed parliament for two years. But this is not the first Supreme Soviet for you. You are an experienced person, and you worked many years with the previous parliament also. Tell us, what has the work in the present Supreme Soviet given you personally as an individual? What kind of an evolution has occurred in your views and ideas?

[Lukyanov] If you want to know, the former and current Supreme Soviet are two different organs. Completely different! The past Supreme Soviet on the average worked about 10 days in a year in two sessions, plus approximately a month that the prebudgetary session lasted. Committees and commissions worked—they were convened once in a quarter. Compare this with the new Supreme Soviet. A completely different organ of authority! More than 320 joint meetings in two years, dozens of meetings of the Soviet of the Union separately and meetings of the Soviet of Nationalities—also separately. If all of this is added up, there are approximately 400 days of work. In two years! This is one thing. Further. More than 300 questions were examined during this time. The main portion concerned the economy. Next, social questions. The third level was individual rights. Probably one-fifth of all of the work of the Supreme Soviet was taken up by questions of interethnic relations. One more trend—international questions, which previously generally were routine, but these days, for example, the crisis in the Persian Gulf was examined three times. Major trips of the leadership of the country and the results of negotiations—all of this is examined in the Supreme Soviet. We heard the minister of foreign affairs several times, but have we really forgotten that it was not long ago that this department was criticized least of all. Fifty treaties were ratified, and, in addition, there were treaties that took a long time to ratify; for example, the treaty with Germany: three months! As a rule not one treaty passed unanimously. There inevitably were both

“against” and “abstentions.” But what fell to the lot of the Ministry of Finance, Gosplan, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, and the KGB was not even mentioned previously.

[Correspondent] Well, this is about the Supreme Soviet. But about yourself?

[Lukyanov] I can say that a lot of time passed before I adapted to the parliament and the parliament adapted in me. The first month of work was a continuous confrontation. Opposition of the parliament to the chairman, opposition of the parliament to the government, confrontation of one wing with another, and so forth. Now, after two years of work, I can say that we understand each other in a majority of cases. I make an effort to see to it that all points of view are explained. This is difficult and complicated, and there are resentments, there is everything, but we basically understand each other. But the main thing I strive for is that ideas come from the hall: I try to support the individual, his amendment, his idea. The parliament was learning, and the chairman was learning, and I do not know which of us has learned better, but at least now a kind of collective has developed that has proved its ability to function.

[Correspondent] But many of the laws and decrees that were passed are deficient, in the opinion of the critics of the Supreme Soviet. Formerly, they say, we knew almost all of the laws, but today we are confused. Therefore, they say, some legislative acts are not working.

[Lukyanov] It is good when there are laws, and when the broad spheres of social relations are regulated, but what can be done when there are many of them. I had occasion in life to study legislation in the post-October period very carefully. This is volumes of decrees, in my opinion, 10 volumes in the first years of Soviet rule! If we take any revolutionary epoch, it is accompanied by a breaking of the former legislation and the quick creation of new legislative acts. Look at what spheres are affected. In the economy, it is laws on property, on land, on leasing, on enterprises, on cooperatives, and on entrepreneurial activity. Acts that in essence change society's economic system. Just take the social sphere. Essentially all pension legislation has been renewed, and new legislative acts and aid programs for women, children, and young people have been established. Or now, a law on indexation and a law on the protection of consumer rights, which did not exist before, have been passed.

Now: Such an important sphere as the defense of individual rights. The law on public associations, the law on trade unions, the law on freedom of conscience, the law on exit and entry, the law on judicial appeal of actions of the administration, and the law on the press. I named only the important ones, and some of them did not exist at all. It is sometimes said now that some laws are not operating. But in such an event, some questions come to mind. Are the laws on enterprises and cooperatives not operating? Are the legislative acts concerning women, families, children, and invalids really not working?

Owing to the new legislation, the development of leased farms and enterprises received a noticeable push. Is the law on the press not really operating?

But, of course, in the abundance of laws there are also difficulties. First, it is necessary to reeducate legal personnel and at the same time prepare new ones. There are 10 times less of them than in other developed countries. The population also must be reeducated

[Correspondent] In other words, not forgetting about the law-creating and legislative aspect, parliament must also turn to the aspect of control over compliance with adopted laws?

[Lukyanov] Yes, over time, the more the activity of the USSR Supreme Soviet must shift to control. Have we done a lot in this? I think that we have done very little. Attention to how the law lives and how it operates should be an order of magnitude greater—there is a lot that we have not done here. I very much expect that two factors will play a big role here: the first is the activation of the activity of the committees and commissions so that control is a basic issue in their plans, and the second is the creation of a USSR Control Chamber. It has already been organized, and a chairman has been selected. Now a dedicated staff will be established. This should be a tool with whose aid the Supreme Soviet will be able to keep all key financial-economic questions under its control.

[Correspondent] We would like once again, Anatoliy Ivanovich, to return to our two-year parliament, to its, let us put it this way, evolution. From one of rallies, as everyone recalls it, it is becoming professional. Moreover, more and more frequently, as the saying goes, it is showing its face and character. It not only sometimes does not agree with the government but also with the president. Is this also an indicator of professionalism?

[Lukyanov] I think that it is rather an indicator of the successful formation of a democratic, rule-of-law state. There was a time when the Supreme Soviet was depicted by the press as a unique appendage to the government and the president. A great deal was especially being said about the Supreme Soviet surrendering its powers to the president, transferring the decisive functions to him, etc. But what was not noted, I think intentionally, was that just as soon as the presidential position was established, the USSR Supreme Soviet immediately set up a whole series of limitations. And how did it turn out? A presidential republic of a soviet type was achieved! With sufficiently substantial parliamentary power with respect to the president. The consent of the parliament is needed for the formation of a government and the appointment of a prime minister and ministers. The president cannot discharge a minister; he has to receive the consent of the parliament. As soon as the authorities of the president were expanded, a norm was written into the Constitution according to which the Supreme Soviet can revoke an ukase of the president. By the way, look at what happened with the Supreme Soviet of Russia. When the

powers of the president were ratified, they followed this very same path. That is, his powers were limited. The USSR Supreme Soviet subordinated the State Bank to itself, and it created a Control Chamber that is subordinate only to it. That is, simultaneously with the strengthening of the powers of the president there was a broadening of the powers of the Supreme Soviet. And there were some at that time, literally blind, who repeated: The Supreme Soviet is surrendering its powers.

Now, with respect to, as you say, face. What can I say? The USSR Supreme Soviet has its own face. It did not develop all of a sudden. And it could not develop suddenly, because the parliament was growing from those vital structures that we had. But, let us look at its relations with other authorities. For a starter, let us look into the government. Repeated hearings of the government, rejection of its programs, the transmission of its draft laws for revision... Not one draft law submitted by the government got through without amendments by parliament. And this means transferring powers to the government? And the nonconcurrence with candidates nominated by the government—you yourself know this very well.

Further. The procurator, one more independent authority... How many times was he heard in the Supreme Soviet, and what kind of instructions did the USSR Supreme Soviet give him? Further, the president. Before your eyes, the parliament introduced very substantial amendments to the president's own program. The program was practically redone anew. There are also substantial amendments to draft laws that the president submits. Hearing the president not only on internal policy questions but also on foreign policy is becoming a practice. Further. In the formation of the government, parliament did not concur with a number of candidates submitted by the president. It is the same with the Security Council.

Thus, the system of checks and balances is working. It is absolutely appropriate in a democratic state. And it strengthens the authority of the president, because if the parliament supported the president, let us say, in the unification of the Union on federative principles, and after this the parliament went to the people and the people voted for a federation, then how much easier the position of the president would be! On strategic questions, the Supreme Soviet supported the position of the president and the government, and it talked. Let it operate, but let it be responsible in full measure for the functions that have been entrusted to it. Now the Supreme Soviet assumes administrative functions less often, and it concentrates more on legislation and control.

[Correspondent] Nevertheless, it is likely that some changes in the activity of the parliament are necessary. If this is so, what kind?

[Lukyanov] I think the first thing that requires very substantial corrections most of all is the nature of the

work itself of the Supreme Soviet, with a shift of the center of gravity to the activity of commissions. How do we work now? The Supreme Soviet meets for three days, the commissions, for two days. From my standpoint it could be this way: the Supreme Soviet for one or two days a week, and the commissions, the rest. Second. Unquestionably, we pay little attention to the separate sittings of the chambers: It is necessary that they work more. Third. It is certainly time to organize the task of training personnel and deputies better. There is one more policy that I place high on the list for this Supreme Soviet. It seems to me that all of the work on facilitating the mutual relations of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Supreme Soviets of the republics should move into a completely new phase. In my opinion, the majority of draft laws, before being received in the Supreme Soviet of the country, should be worked on without fail in the republics. Further. It is necessary to arrange permanent contacts between the committees and commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet and corresponding committees and commissions of the Supreme Soviets of the republics. This, by the way, is already being done.

Next. I think that representatives of the Supreme Soviets of the republics should speak at sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet. In a more active way! Look, we are working on a banking law. A representative of the planning-budgetary commission of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet submitted his amendments, and many of them were adopted. We examined the Chernobyl program. The three representatives of the RSFSR, Ukrainian, and Belorussian Supreme Soviets were very active during the examination. We worked together with them. The law on foreign investments was being adopted. Whose speech was listened to? That of the chairman of the Commission on International Affairs of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. Mutual understanding, continuous contacts, an exchange of experience, and joint work—this is what is needed now. The Supreme Soviet should become an instrument for making interpublic relations much more effective than now.

[Correspondent] But what do you think of the frequently repeated idea that the congress makes the work of the Supreme Soviet more difficult, and that it has become obsolete?

[Lukyanov] The idea of the congress was born at the very beginning of the perestroika processes. The congress is two and a half years old. Is it necessary or not? Well, four congresses have passed. I can say with conviction that an institution such as the congress is necessary in the transition period, in a period of revolutionary break with the past. It will not be needed subsequently. First of all, a broad forum is still necessary now, where the opinion of the population can be made known and, if you wish, to let off steam.

[Correspondent] And simultaneously to verify an idea. This is absolutely necessary in a tense social system undergoing great changes.

[Lukyanov] Second. You can answer me—would all of the strata of the population have been represented in the higher organs of authority if there were no congress? I can speculate that apparently neither Sakharov, Popov, nor our major writers would have been elected to it. There would be almost no women, no veterans, and no young people. But, owing to the elections of deputies from social organizations such a possibility emerged.

And third. You already touched on this question: The congress is a powerful means of both the verification and development of policy. Look, there is one aspect that I have not touched on. What kind? Law creating. The congress is not a forum for the adoption of laws and their elaboration. As a rule, it should not do this.

[Correspondent] And the last question, Anatoliy Ivanovich. In connection with the fact that the system of the presidency has been introduced, a new Union treaty is being created, and voices can be heard that parliament will be dissolved and that there will be new elections. You have worked for two years in the new Supreme Soviet. Has it exhausted its opportunities? What do you think of this idea?

[Lukyanov] Perhaps what is most strange is that voices about the fact that it is necessary as fast as possible to reelect this Supreme Soviet and to dissolve congress, etc., can be heard coming from those newspapers and those people who support a rule-of-law state. This is absolutely incomprehensible to me. A new treaty will be signed. So that it would operate, it is necessary to introduce appropriate changes to the Constitution, or, better, to adopt a new Constitution. This will require time. On the basis of this constitution it is necessary to adopt a law on elections and elect a new Supreme Soviet. This will also require time.

And so: Will there be anarchy all of this time? But, after all, in the transition period authority should also be especially logical and sufficiently firm. This means that it is necessary to establish a continuity from those organs that do exist to those that there will be. This means that the Union organs must maintain their powers. And this has to be envisaged both in the treaty and in legislation.

Moreover, a certain interval of time will pass when new organs will begin to work, and only after this should the old organs yield their powers. Otherwise, law and order will be destroyed. We already learned in these six years how to destroy, without creating, and we saw what this leads to.

Further. Is it really possible to imagine that after signing the new Union treaty it will also be necessary to abolish all of the 110 new laws that were adopted in the transitional period? The new legal base that was created and all of the laws that will not contradict the provisions of the treaty should operate, should be elaborated, and should be carried out.

In addition, a continuity exists in an international respect in the USSR and in the Union of sovereign

republics. And to imagine the Union only as a center, as an aggregate of ministries, makes sense only in that instance when people want to separate from this deputy corps that sticks in their craw. I am convinced of this.

Look at what happened in the rotation of the Supreme Soviet. The congress cut off from the Supreme Soviet both radicals from the right and radicals from the left. That is, the deputy corps itself made itself more balanced.

Undoubtedly, the Supreme Soviet now plays a stabilizing role in the country. Name me one other organ that would stabilize the situation in this way. There is none.

Then, this is an organ in which 23 factions and groups are represented. From Social Democrats and Interregionalists to Anarchist-Syndicalists. However, not all of them like the fact that the Supreme Soviet should become a place where different points of view can be expressed and heard and where mutual understanding can be achieved in the interests of the country. That is why the question is raised about the dissolution of this Supreme Soviet.

[Correspondent] But who has a right to do this? Who will decide the fate of parliament?

[Lukyanov] Only the voters can decide the fate of deputies. And only the congress itself can decide the fate of parliament. No one else. Not one republic, and not one deputation—no one can dissolve the USSR Supreme Soviet.

But I will add in concluding. It must not be forgotten that we are not only answerable to ourselves. We are answerable for the fate of an enormous country. It is this that is the true role of authority, if it—authority—reflects the real interests of the people.

Lukyanov Cites Switzerland as Model for Multinational Federation

914B0291A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Aug 91
Union Edition p 4

Interview with USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov by IZVESTIYA Correspondent Yu. Kosinskiy, Geneva: "Gr/au/utli Receives the Parliamentarians: USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman A.I. Lukyanov Answers an IZVESTIYA Correspondent's Questions"]

[Excerpt] On August 1, the official celebration of the 700th Anniversary of the Helvetian Confederation occurred in the canton of Schwyz, from the name Switzerland originated. Members of the federal and cantonal leadership, parliamentarians, and numerous guests from a number of the world's countries participated in the national holiday.

The anniversary celebrations occurred in the historic valley of Gr/au/utli where the "everlasting" treaty on the union of the three cantons was concluded exactly 700

years ago which laid the foundation of the current Swiss Confederation. The idea of community of the future Switzerland and other European states in a single integrated Europe was particularly stressed in official speeches on the holiday. National Council Chairman Ulrich Bremi stressed that, while defining the future of their state, the descendants of the Helvetians must remember the Gr/au/utli Valley where the idea of the union of cantons was realized but they must also not forget today's renewed Europe that extends from the Urals to the Atlantic. Your correspondent requested that USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman A.I. Lukyanov share his impressions and answer several questions.

[Kosinskiy] Anatoliy Ivanovich, you just heard the speech of Bremi, your Swiss parliamentary colleague, who stressed the idea of the interrelations of historic traditions and decisions made that determine Switzerland's fate at this new stage of its development. What associations does this speech engender in you, specifically, at a time when our country stands on the threshold of the Union Treaty that is determining its fate?

[Lukyanov] The ancients said that even the gods cannot change the past. It is significant that the leaders of the Swiss Confederation, while gazing into their country's future and to the integrating Europe, repeatedly turn to its history. This is very important—how the current confederation took shape, how the union of cantons arose, and how this country moved from the confederation to today's federation. We can see in all of this the great concern of Switzerland's state leaders whom we met—both the leadership of parliament and members of the federal union—to preserve in an integrating and uniting Europe both the country's leading achievements and its many centuries of national traditions, especially those that have withstood the test of time. It is a question of preserving Switzerland's distinctive qualities and character but also of opening to Europe that is rapidly moving along the path of integration. Under these conditions, several of Switzerland's specific features are at issue—specifically, her neutrality which is legally reinforced in the constitution. It is difficult to join Europe while considering the distinctive national quality and historic traditions but the aspiration to preserve its unique and instructive experience, which has become the common property of European and world civilization, is understandable and justifiable.

As for our country, it seems to me, while renewing the Soviet Federation and while creating a renewed union of sovereign soviet republics, that we must also very attentively approach our country's history and consider its specific features. It is important to not lose everything valuable that existed in that union of republics which arose on our country's territory. Specifically, to preserve such achievements of our country and society as the friendship of peoples and internationalism and insuring each nation's right of cultural and language development. So that the citizens of our enormous country do not lose the feeling of equality, regardless of where they live. I think that all of this must lie at the foundation of

the creation and renewal of our federation. It seems to me that the harder we work on the Union Treaty, including in Novo-Ogarevo, at the USSR Supreme Soviet sessions, the more we come into contact with those values that are important for us and that we must not lose. Naturally, we must move ahead and significantly renew the federation, guarantee the sovereignty of the republics, and create all of the possibilities for their development while considering their specific features and peculiarities. But, at the same time, it is also quite important that each republic be concerned about the unity of union interests. [passage omitted]

[Kosinskiy] I want to ask, what made the greatest impression on you and what did you find most interesting in the land of the ancient Helvetians?

[Lukyanov] I would single out the following three specific features. First—is the attentive and considerate attitude of the Swiss toward their history and traditions. The aspiration to preserve them; for example, those, like direct democracy and freedom of the cantons. At the same time, it is the intention to not contradict the desire of the Swiss to become involved in the changing landscape of a renewed Europe. Second is the surprisingly friendly and peaceful, I would say, patient existence of the people who speak various languages and represent various cultures and various faiths. This is all very important. It seems to me that the concept of the Swiss nation, that is distinguished by very colorful traits, takes shape based on mutual tolerance and respect despite the differences of the four cultures that are represented in the country. This is a good example for all peoples. The Swiss experience of building a multi-national federation can serve as a model for many countries that have selected the path of federalism. This experience is also useful for us. And, finally, the third specific feature. With the entire complexity of the problems that face Swiss society—this is the increase of high prices, drug addiction, and other social problems—the people of this country preserve the spirit of good will, the aspiration to understand their interlocutor, and to conduct a dialogue. It seems to me that in the modern world the issues of the quality of relations are especially valuable, we must move away from previous confrontation and embody in practice the ideas of mutual understanding and cooperation, while creating a new community of peoples in which the world will live in future millennia.

Profile of Anatoliy Lukyanov

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[Interview with Doctor of Jurisprudence Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet by Viktor Vodolazhskiy: "Anatoliy Lukyanov"; date, place not specified]

[Text] Usually we encounter Anatoliy Ivanovich this way: 600 hours of live air time, during which we have seen on

our screens how he conducted the sessions of the congresses, and negotiations with leaders of foreign delegations, thus giving everyone the opportunity to get an idea of the volume of his work. Imperturbable, restrained, logical... But what is he like out of camera range? Does everyone know, for example, that the work day of the head of the union parliament begins at 8:30 AM and finishes up at 11 PM, even Saturdays, but true, sometimes little earlier. That everyday he has to review up to 500 pages of various texts. That he receives more than hundreds of letters daily, and sees about 300 visitors monthly. At the start of this conversation, we agreed to talk primarily about what remains out of camera range. So, today's page 13 guest is Doctor of Jurisprudence Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

[Correspondent] Anatoliy Ivanovich, what do you recall first when you hear the words, "childhood, adolescence, youth"?

[Lukyanov] My childhood ended on 28 June 1941, when our house burned to the ground after a direct hit by a bomb. We lived in Smolensk, right on the bank of the Dnepr... It was then in July that I saw my father for the last time; he had come from the front to see us. A combat engineer captain...

I remember well how my grandmother, younger brother, cousin and I made our way from Smolensk through Sukhinichi and Kozelsk to Kaluga... Fascist aircraft strafed the road. Another recollection: the terrible hunger during evacuation. Only tobacco [makhra] could stifle it. That was already in Balashov, in Saratov Oblast. That's where I got into a military plant that reconditioned damaged weapons coming in from the front. They taught me to repair antitank guns. Disassembly, fixing what could be fixed, cleaning—we were boys and we did it all. They trusted us. Even though a lot of us had to stand on a crate to reach the bench carriage.

Later, many years afterwards, during an official trip it seemed that I saw my very own bench. And suddenly I wanted to get up to it! It was awkward; what if I can't do it, if I don't remember how? But my hands touched the metal, and it all worked; my hands remembered.

I graduated from school in Smolensk, earning a gold medal.

[Correspondent] And then, the law faculty at MGU [Moscow State University]?

[Lukyanov] Yes, MGU. During the years right after the war, well-known authors, composers, and performers frequented our dormitory, No. 32 Strominka. Naturally, they were gods in our eyes. But I do think that they found our company interesting, too. Back then I used to see, and was enchanted by, Mikhail Svetlov, the young Yuriy Trifonov, Nikolay Tikhonov, Ilya Erenburg, and Konstantin Simonov. I heard Boris Pasternak give readings. Contact with these people has left a lifelong imprint.

For those who had recently been at the front, and for us, the newly-arrived, a great deal about the capital was totally new. And the Moscow guys would make fun of us: We hadn't read this, we hadn't seen that, we didn't know about something else. Most likely, that in itself became a stimulus: for nights on end I would read Flaubert, Jack London, Kant... And nights I also had to load coal, firewood, and vegetables at the train stations. My stipend R290 was in old money, as they say. We would do loading work, but then the next night go to the conservatory or MKhAT [Moscow Art Theater], the balcony.

Sometimes Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and I reminisce about the same years. What a time it was, a really insatiable devouring of culture, science, books, theater, exhibitions! We attended the lectures of Tarle, Shmidt, Vargi, Nechkina, Nesmeyanov...

[Correspondent] Mikhail Sergeyevich lived in the same dormitory?

[Lukyanov] Yes, our rooms were next to each other. By the way, our dorm room sheltered sixteen men during the first year of coursework, but by graduation time, there were only eight. I still correspond with many of them to this day.

[Correspondent] It is known that you write verses. I have read your anthology. What does poetry mean to you? What is closer to you, the classics or the avant-garde?

[Lukyanov] Who didn't try to write poetry in childhood and adolescence? I started back before the war. I even wrote my school compositions in verse in the 10th grade.

I don't consider myself a poet. But all the same, how can we live without poetry? I have been fortunate enough to have made the acquaintance of Aleksandr Trifonovich Tvardovskiy, Pavel Grigoriyevich Antokolskiy, Margarita Aliger (I am still on the best of terms with her), with Semen Kirsanov, Semen Gudzenko, Sergey Lukonin... I began to collect their books. I have a complete set of Andrei Voznesensky, starting with his first anthologies, "Mozaiki" and "Paraboly." I now have a total of a thousand books of poetry at home. And I collect records and tapes of poets' voices. There is a tape of Bunin, Voloshin, Blok, Yesenin, Mayakovsky, Pasternak, Mandelstam, Gumilev, Kruchenykh, Aragon, Frost, Khinmet, about 300 voices.

You asked what poetry means to me... Sometimes after work, when I'm dead tired, it's hard even to hold a big book in my hands, yet leafing through a collection of favorite poems is relaxation.

Poetry is a force that draws people closer together. It opens an opportunity to speak with people of any nationality in a language they can understand.

At the beginning of the Karabakh disturbances in Armenia, I was to speak in Yerevan, on a square in which about 100,000 people were gathered. Right then I remembered Sayat-Nove, an Armenian who wrote in Georgian, Azeri, and Armenian. I began to recite his

verses on the unity of these peoples. The talk came off not at all as anticipated at first.

[Correspondent] Anatoliy Ivanovich, poetry is marvelous, but certainly it is not your only distraction?

[Lukyanov] I went to the mountains for the first time while I was back at the university, in 1954. By the way, my wife (we met as students, and now she is a professor, a corresponding member of the Academy of Medical Sciences) was also on that trip. Since then, I have trekked in the mountains almost every year.

[Correspondent] What peaks have you conquered?

[Lukyanov] The highest is the Korzhenevskiy glacier in the Tien-Shan range, a 5,000 meter height.

[Correspondent] Do you also think that "the only thing better than mountains is mountains [that I haven't yet conquered]."—Vysotsky quote?

[Lukyanov] Without a doubt... Yes, I have also met Vysotsky, and from the early Taganka, with Yuri Lyubimov. A unique, interesting theater. We all have to get accustomed to different things in art, and accustomed to different things in politics.

[Correspondent] Meaning that when you plan to go to the theater, you prefer the Taganka?

[Lukyanov] Why just the Taganka? I like ballet too. Serious music gives me enormous pleasure. But among the theaters, yes, Taganka takes first place. My wife and I have seen everything there, from "The Good Woman of Szechuan" to the latest productions... Lately the "Sfera" theater has attracted me, and appeals to me as well. They have a unique production of Bulgakov's "Theatrical novel," and a few other things.

It seems to me that art forms spill over from one into another. Well, Scriabin studied light-music; Sibelius knew the color of violin music, the sounds of the bassoon, the drum. Ciurlionis composed music and then transcribed it into a color scale in his paintings... Poetry and architecture are contiguous with this. The synthesis of all arts can be traced. And as a rule, synthesis is unusual and unexpected. It's a pity that our creative unions are locked up within themselves; one of the paths toward discovery is closed that way.

I don't accept mono-typing, or monotony. It seems to me that this is typical for our generation, raised on the 20th congress and the thaw.

Recently I read philosopher Eric Fromm's book, "To Have or To Be." It let me see a great deal in another light. Those same mountains cannot be "had." You have to be in them. To just dissolve! And probably, a person has to be able to dissolve into his own history, his own society, not to have anything from them, but to be able to understand himself in this system, under actual conditions. And with such an approach, there will arise no

careerist, nor despoiler of nature, indifferent to ecological disaster. In my opinion, Rerikh understood this well.

Now I have to study social psychology a great deal. I am re-reading Freud, Fromm, Sartre (I met Sartre, incidentally, as a graduate student). I think that the time will come when our politicians, economic managers, and economists will have to be interested in issues of social psychology not out of pure curiosity, but on a professional basis. This subject casts a light on natural law. It also exists in election campaigns, and in the rally environment. At times we simply do not consider it significant. But these are very serious phenomena, with which our state leaders have not had to reckon until recently, but which at one time the bolsheviks took into careful consideration, and which our opponents today are taking into consideration.

[Correspondent] Anatoliy Ivanovich, I understand that this is a somewhat sensitive question. But tell me all the same, when you are alone with the President or some other member of the "inner circle," what do you talk about? Do you talk only about affairs of state, politics?

[Lukyanov] True, it's not an easy life that has created the impression that leaders talk among themselves only about "special" things. That's not the case. The generation that has now come into the leadership is composed of people of approximately the same age. We are linked by our remembrance of the end of the war, the hard post-war years. We talk about that a lot, too. After all, we grew out of the same experience, out of the same hard years... Meetings with people, their letters give pause for reflection. There is just so much here... Misery, confusion, lines, shortages, deficits, mistrust toward the central authority... Political decisions are sometimes generated by discussing these problems.

[Correspondent] Does that mean that you have a realistic idea of people's everyday concerns? Do you know, for example that it is now practically impossible to buy "hercules" [oat flakes] in the store. Or doesn't that concern you, in principle?

[Lukyanov] How can that not concern me? I hear at night the angry cries "What are you looking at, what are you doing?" And I find out that something has disappeared from the shelves again. My daughter comes on days off and also brings me up to speed on the market prices, the lines.

The opinion about the people now in the leadership, that they are closed up and know nothing about the situation in the country, the republic, the region, is like a spreading cranberry bush, cultivated by the press, among others. Well, just think about it, is it possible to work, to deal with the deputies, without knowing about all the misfortunes and concerns?

I am fully aware that people associate all of today's adversities with the current leadership. I also sense the people's allergy to power, distrust of it. This is a tragedy. Although I do understand that such a breakthrough had

to fall to somebody's lot. The only comfort is that this is an "optimistic tragedy." I am certain that normal life is somewhere up ahead. And a breakthrough has already been made toward it: Society is unfettered, people say what they think. A breakthrough into the future, to the laws adopted by the Supreme Soviet, on property, demonopolization, leasing, entrepreneurship, denationalization, the press, exiting the country.

...Out of this six-year-old mishmash of renewal, we ourselves were born both as political and state leaders, and we shouldn't be made out to be any smarter or dumber than we are. And it should not be said that the opposition, the leftists, the radicals, etc. are interfering with us. We have encountered enormous social inertia, the habit of leveling, stock phrases, and stereotyping. If you don't know that, you can't understand today. Sometimes we encounter the kind of understanding, the kind of "asphalt," that not one sprout could possibly pierce.

It seems to me that some years from now, when they write about this time, it will be described as a trying, difficult, troubled time of a certain national tragedy, but an optimistic time. After all, what we are now changing had to be changed at some point all the same. Even though this is hard for each person, for each fate. It would be nice to jump through this period more quickly.

[Correspondent] During a recent meeting with IZVESTIYA reporters, you said that you know Anatoliy Agranovskiy, Tatyana Nikolayevna Tess, and that you like to read Stanislav Kondrashov. A genuine interest in the newspaper was felt. What drew you to Agranovskiy, for example?

[Lukyanov] I met him near Moscow, where we were preparing materials for a CPSU Central Committee Plenum. I have some books signed by him. The most important thing that struck me about this man is his ability to see the phenomenon in the fact and turn this into big policy. A complex art! I genuinely envied him his "golden" pen; he could make even a free-standing phrase unusual, make it short and intense... I was introduced to Tatyana Tess by her friend Fanna Grigoriyevna Ranevskaya.

[Correspondent] Tell me honestly, as someone who writes poetry, loves mountains and theater, don't you get fed up with listening to speeches and session reports day in and day out?

[Lukyanov] At the beginning of my work as deputy chairman, and then as Supreme Soviet chairman, I did perceive a certain chill, a "draft" between myself and the hall. I myself was probably overly official, a "stuffed shirt." That began to pass gradually. I understood that I had to perceive myself to be an integral part of the collective known as the Supreme Soviet. Then everything became interesting. Behind every deputy was his biography, his view of the problems discussed in the draft laws. I sensed that I must not let that view disappear. And then it is no longer necessary to insist on any one position. Anyway, the position will come from the

hall... My task is also to support a person expressing serious opinions. Solutions are born in the meeting of views and opinions.

There is only one depressing thing—when a meeting of minds yields to a collision of foreheads. When discussion is replaced by squabbling.

It seemed at first that this was just my problem, but later it became clear that this is not the case. I have met with the speakers of the British, Japanese, and Indian parliaments, and I understood we have similar problems.

[Correspondent] Now everyone and everything can be criticized. How do you regard criticism, caricatures aimed at you?

[Lukyanov] Urkho Kenkonnen, with whom I have met, once said, "Let them swear at me, as long as they write about me."

That's not how I feel. I cannot react indifferently to criticism (and I don't know any normal person who could be indifferent to it), especially if the criticism is unjust. Right now, there's no getting away from all the digs at me in the press. Well, just get past the offense and draw something useful from the critical comment. This is quite compatible with my motto, "I never obligated myself not to wise up."

[Correspondent] They say that as a rule, you send your grandson to a regular pioneer camp. Is that true?

[Lukyanov] Now Volodya (going into the 8th grade) is on a trip to the Kola Peninsula with his class group. I think that a man must grow up to be a man. Nor have my wife and I spoiled our daughter. Lena is a lawyer, an instructor at MGU, lecturing on state law.

[Correspondent] What would you like your grandson to grow up to be?

[Lukyanov] He likes technology, electronics. He will probably take that route. In any case, I don't want him to make the acquaintance of a lady called "politics."

[Correspondent] You yourself are a lawyer; how did you become a professional politician? Was it a calling, or an accident? And what was the subject of your doctoral dissertation?

[Lukyanov] The dissertation subject was: "The History and Theory of the Soviets." I researched the natural progression of the development of the organs of state power, legislation on their functions. The dissertation has a chapter on questions of comparative law, Western and our own. I got involved in these issues back in 1954. The "Khrushchev thaw" was gathering strength. I was hired into the government apparatus straight from graduate work. I continued to analyze, to compare foreign legal institutions with our own. So gradually, professional work began a confluence with political work. The attraction of science remained, and quite honestly,

during moments of disillusionment, and, in my opinion, every thinking person has these, I dream of taking up science once again.

[Correspondent] You are also called a conservative...

[Lukyanov] I am what I am. I will never understand people who moan about all that is past. One of the ancients said, "It is not even within the gods' power to undo the past." The past was not solidly black, as many are depicting it now. A portion of my life, my faith was invested in it. Our generation, our parents survived a terrible war, the great joy of victory, the post-war famine, the difficulty of rebirth... When my fellow townsman Yuriy Gagarin flew into space, all of Smolensk, that area where one out of three was killed in the war, was triumphant.

Yes, in this sense, I am a conservative in my attitude toward the past. But as to what political positions I hold now, how I defend them, that must be judged by deeds. In my view, the current Supreme Soviet can hardly be accused of conservatism, if for no other reason than that it made a powerful breakthrough toward a democratic society.

My good friend, the poet Vasiliy Fedorov, upon being asked "What art do you favor," replied, "Leftist, but no further left than the heart." That is how I regard my views of the left, but no further left than the heart. No further left than is possible. It is necessary for the heart to beat, for society to develop on peaceful shores, without moving toward civil war.

[Correspondent] How do you regard the new political movement of democratic reforms, headed by Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, and Volskiy?

[Lukyanov] Calmly. After all, the majority of the theses of the new movement's program practically coincide with the CPSU program statutes. And we must work together in those areas where our aims coincide. But if the movement becomes anti-communist, it will lead not to a consolidation of society, but to even greater opposition. And we have enough of that for today.

[Correspondent] What do you see the fate of the Supreme Soviet to be after the signing of the Union Treaty?

[Lukyanov] If the treaty is signed, then probably serious work will be incumbent upon our parliament, our Congress of USSR People's Deputies. I do not think that there is a need to create any sort of special mechanism to develop the Constitution or electoral law. Why? Because all the republic, both those wishing to unite, and those which will no longer be in the union after a certain time, are represented at the Congress and in the current composition of the Supreme Soviet. This forum cannot be lost. The opinion of all peoples must be taken into consideration.

After new elections, today's parliament will quietly hand over its functions to the new organs of power. If we

respect the law and are progressing toward a rule-of-law state, then there must be continuity: Nothing that was positive in its work should be lost; nothing bad should be forgotten.

[Correspondent] What perturbs you the most, what about our life just drives you crazy?

[Lukyanov] When in a difficult situation, behind some political speech, I suddenly notice, you'll excuse me, a self-centered, personal interest. When I see the grin of egoism behind unobjective information. That deprives me of balance, embitters me.

[Correspondent] Every political career, even the most brilliant one, comes to an end. Upon ending your political activity, what would you like to finish up with?

[Lukyanov] I have many plans. If fate permits it, I will plunge into science again, it's interesting! All the more so now, when besides scientific knowledge in the area of state law, I have acquired practical experience. And of course I'll put my library in order, I'll open the books I haven't opened yet... Perhaps I'll manage to walk more, to see more, to be with people more—with interesting people.

Alekseyev, Yeltsin, Lukyanov on Introduction of Mayoral System

914B0289B Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Aug 91 p 3

[Feature in response to readers' queries quoting S. Alekseyev, B. Yeltsin, and A. Lukyanov: "Mayors and Soviets: Who Does What to Whom?"]

[Text] "A campaign to elect a city mayor came rolling into our city of Kursk. Under what law is a mayor being introduced?" asks T. Zaychenko, one of our readers. Other questions also emerge in the letters. What sort of structural link in city administration is this? What is happening to soviet power when the mayors come in? Prefects and prefectures have been introduced in Georgia—what is that? We decided to give our readers an opportunity to compare the different points of view for themselves.

S. Alekseyev, Constitutional Oversight Committee Chairman

"Taking place in our lives now are very complex, often dramatic, and simultaneously inevitable natural processes associated with the transition from a totalitarian, super-centralized, self-discredited system to a democratic, humane, and genuinely just system. All in all, it can be understood that these processes may provoke people's doubts as to whether they will set our society onto the optimal course of development. This is natural, since on the other hand these processes also apparently contain the stereotypes of our ideas on the structure of society.

"As I conceive it, soviet power is the principle of organization of political life. It comprises certain values

achieved by the October revolution, consisting in the idea that the broadest strata of the population be drawn in to participate in political life. This is the essence of soviet power.

"The principle of people's power gained totally concrete embodiment during the first years of the revolution. Subsequently, unfortunately, it was crossed over; the practices of war communism, totalitarian structure, Stalinism followed... Yet at the same time, externally, through dogma and verbose cliches, the organizational principles of the soviets were proclaimed. We recall that "All power to the soviets!" was the tactical slogan of the revolution. Then their single structure was introduced. Yet the real power belonged to the party apparatus. And the sovereignty of the soviets proved to be a mere facade.

"It was quite natural that when democratization began here, the renaissance of real power of the soviets became its main goal. Unfortunately, this course has led to contradictory results; in particular, dozens of parliaments have emerged: union, republic, city, rayon, and village. And they all have sovereignty; they all talk, resolve, halt the effect of the decisions of superior organs... Or to be more precise, because of sovereignty, they don't reckon with anybody! And this is in lieu of logically realizing the principles of the soviets.

"I am an opponent of rejecting this principle achieved by the October revolution. The principle of soviet power must be preserved, but transformed, with consideration of world experience, into a genuinely democratic constitution. And therefore the steps being undertaken now, the establishment of the institution of mayors and other institutions, is a search for paths toward realization and development of peoples' power. There is a great achievement of civilization in the area of organization of state life that fully corresponds to the principle of the soviets, that is, separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers. Even here, when we proclaimed the sovereignty of the soviets, these organs became both legislative, and executive powers, and at times even started to claim the implementation of judicial power.

"This is precisely where the discord in our society is found. Good laws already exist (and I am fortunate to note that I had a certain relation to their preparation from the very start). Yet neither executive power nor legislative power has really started to work yet, and in that regard, it is necessary to find good, civilized forms of relations with the representatives of the people.

"Unfortunately, in my view, totalitarian tendencies are again being observed in certain republics. And here the weakness of our all-union presidential power is manifested in that the President contacts parliament, but there exists no sort of organizational mechanism through which the President could act in the localities.

"Sometimes people say, it seems our President has grabbed most of the power. What power? I think this is mostly talk. And not just because, from my personal impressions, Mikhail Sergeyevich is not the dictator type

(this is a conviction, and I am prepared to defend it; my personal business interactions with him allow me the basis for such a conclusion). Yet through what organs may the President implement his authority, his directives?

"However quickly we founded the office of the President in the union and in the republics, we must also settle the mechanism for the realization of executive power. Otherwise this institution is of a purely symbolic nature. To my mind, the search for new forms of public structure must be regarded with understanding. The sole condition is that they must be coordinated with the principle of the soviet, that is, with the participation of the people in the adoption and implementation of decisions, in order that people not be aloof from state and public affairs. The search in Moscow and Leningrad is moving specifically in that direction.

Judging by the letters, many readers are worried about how the new forms, particularly the institution of mayors, will be correlated with our Constitution. I do not have the authority to speak on behalf of the entire committee. But my personal opinion is this. The fundamental principle of the soviets is proclaimed in the Constitution, and it is right now, on the threshold of a new Constitution, that we are simply obligated to work on forms of people's power. And as we see, they are already being formed. Mayors and city halls are in the vein of the preparation of the new Constitution. So there is no sense in clutching at dogma."

The Moscow procurator has published a directive for the organs of the city procuracy concerning the activity of city hall in the creation of a new structure of executive power in the capital, and measures for the transfer to the prefects of the authority of the ispolkoms of soviets of people's deputies. The document emphasizes that the status and competence of these officials until the present had not been determined by legal procedure... It is proposed that rayon procurators and departments of the Moscow procuracy implement strict oversight for undeviating observance of the statutes of the RSFSR Constitution..., as well as of the RSFSR Law: "On Local Self-Government in the RSFSR." All illegal acts aimed toward halting activity or reorganizing legal organs of authority and administration, impeding their execution of their authority must be protested immediately... An incident of filing a protest will halt the effect of such acts. In the event that the protests are rejected, court appeal is proposed. (MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, 23 July 1991).

B. Yeltsin, RSFSR President

"...For the purpose of putting into order a system of organs of executive power in the city of Moscow, ensuring the unity of economic management, and the creation of the appropriate conditions for the city's transition to market relations, I resolve:

"1. To consider the mayor of the city of Moscow the lawful successor of the executive committee of the

Moscow city soviet of people's deputies, executive committees of the rayon soviets and the Zelinograd city soviet of people's deputies..." (Ukase No 22, 30 July 1991).

A. Lukyanov, USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman

"Having squeezed out the party organs from the entire chain of power structures, the 'new wave' politicians have demonstrated their astounding inability to rule, or to resolve problems vitally important to people... But some sort of answer must be given for people's deluded hopes. And then there appears the thesis of the total bankruptcy of the soviet representational system, to replace which, they say, it is necessary to create a parliamentary municipal system according to Western models. As you know, this process has begun... And that means that under the flag of strengthening executive power, one way or another the de facto elimination of the soviets and their deputies from the resolution of vital issues of statewide and local life is beginning." (PRAVDA, 30 July 1991).

Kryuchkov Closed Session Speech Viewed

91UF1023A Moscow KURANTY in Russian 4 Jul 91 p 6

[Interview with USSR people's deputies Oleg Kapugin, Vitaliy Vorotnikov and Vladimir Samarin by Correspondent Grigoriy Nekhoroshev: "The Agony of a Dying Regime"]

[Text] KGB Chief Vladimir Kryuchkov recently spoke at a closed session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Journalists did not know exactly what Vladimir Aleksandrovich said to the deputies. But several days later Aleksandr Nevzorov, the anchor man of the Leningrad Television program "600 Seconds," showed excerpts of Kryuchkov's speech to viewers. The KGB chief said that the leaders of perestroika had been bribed by the CIA, and that Western countries are deliberately causing the ruin of the USSR's economy.

Our unofficial correspondent Grigoriy Nekhoroshev asked three USSR people's deputies to comment on Kryuchkov's speech: KGB General (Retired) Oleg Kapugin and USSR Supreme Soviet members Vitaliy Vorotnikov and Vladimir Samarin.

[Correspondent] Oleg Danilovich, last week KGB Chairman Kryuchkov stated that perestroika is the result of a conspiracy between the CIA and Western states aimed at the Soviet Union's collapse. What is your opinion?

[Kapugin] In my opinion, Kryuchkov's statement reflects the position of the leadership of the Russian Communist Party headed by Polozkov, and of that conservative faction of the CPSU in which the notion that everything that has happened in our country is the result of conspiracies either by Trotskyites, or Masons, or Maoists or intelligence agencies continues to prevail.

And being the chairman of the KGB, Kryuchkov picks the intelligence agencies. I think that his assertion is in and of itself absurd, because we all know (as was publicly announced on several occasions) that Western leaders are not interested in the collapse of the Soviet Union. President Bush said so himself, by the way. How can we possibly suppose that the CIA is preparing a conspiracy against the Soviet Union behind Bush's back? That's nonsense. If Bush knew about this, in contrast to the president of the USSR, he would have fired the leader of his intelligence agency long ago. That is, the supposition that the CIA is acting contrary to official policy of the U.S. President is completely beyond the realm of common sense. That he made such a statement might be attributed either to his age, or to the deeply incorrigible, unchangeable nature of conservative communists, or third (this would be more probable because Kryuchkov is not so stupid as to utter such nonsense), to the desire to hold on to what he has. This is essentially self-defense, self-preservation. Instinct sometimes compels people to believe and say absurd things.

[Correspondent] An excerpt from Kryuchkov's speech at a closed session of the Supreme Soviet suddenly appears in A. Nevzorov's program "600 Seconds." How do you feel about this fact?

[Kapugin] I didn't see the broadcast myself, but I heard about it, and I was angered by it because this is a selective approach to journalists (all the more so because all of this story pertains to a department that is still standing quite firmly on its own two feet, and which evokes fear in a part of our society). It is an indication of the scandalous things going on in the Supreme Soviet in relation to the press, and generally to what we refer to as "public relations." But what is even more disturbing (incidentally I very rarely believe what Nevzorov says—we have already persuaded ourselves that he is capable of lying, fabricating, and staging the news) is that this is an indication of Nevzorov's ties with the KGB, and of his readiness to serve this organization and put out its line, at the same time that other correspondents and mass media have no access to what committee leaders are saying.

[Correspondent] Did Nevzorov have the legal right to show the excerpt of the closed session of the Supreme Soviet? Who is responsible for clearing information from a closed session for publication?

[Kapugin] I believe that in this case only Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyankov could have given permission, and it will be our job as people's deputies to determine how, why and on what grounds such an exception was made in behalf of Leningrad's "600 Seconds."

[Correspondent] Today, after the parliamentary crisis of last week, many are saying that we witnessed an attempt at a constitutional revolution. What do you feel about this?

[Kapugin] The fact that Gorbachev, who has found himself isolated, is now trying to extend his hand in the

hope of gaining assistance from democratic forces is obvious. However, it is possible that someone is playing games. We are all aware, after all, that Gorbachev is known for political maneuvering, and for flexibility that sometimes borders on brinkmanship. After B. Yeltsin's election, right-wing conservatives (and I think they are the ones who composed the group that recently spoke at the Supreme Soviet) are trying to take revenge. I think that this is the agony of a dying regime that is departing from the stage of history.

[Correspondent] Vitaliy Ivanovich, what is your opinion of Vladimir Kryuchkov's report at the closed session of the USSR Supreme Soviet?

[Vorotnikov] It was a closed session, and it would be simply unethical for me to report what was said there. Therefore as a member of the Supreme Soviet and as a people's deputy, I cannot allow myself to do such a thing.

[Correspondent] But Nevzorov did show an excerpt of Kryuchkov's speech in the program "600 Seconds." How do you feel about this act?

[Vorotnikov] What can I say? Yes, I myself saw the excerpt, but that's his business, his right as a journalist, and he must take the responsibility for such a broadcast. Therefore I think that you need to direct this question to him.

[Correspondent] But since Nevzorov did not attend the closed session, where did he get the film?

[Vorotnikov] Someone must have given it to him.

[Correspondent] One of the deputies?

[Vorotnikov] You see, given the way things are done today, anyone could have gotten into this meeting. It was all handled on the basis of the honor system. And if someone did smuggle the film out, it's on his conscience.

[Correspondent] Vladimir Ivanovich, how do you feel about KGB Chairman Kryuchkov's idea, stated by him at the closed session of the Supreme Soviet, that some sort of conspiracy exists, and that the course of events is being orchestrated by the CIA?

[Samarin] You know, the same facts, the same materials can be interpreted in different ways. What Kryuchkov presented at the Supreme Soviet session doubtlessly had its grounds. That is, in the West, different circles supported certain political forces, certain processes occurring in our country; they supported them primarily from an ideological standpoint, by way of the mass media, and they expressed their readiness to provide support both materially in some way, and by way of certain economic institutions. But this does not at all mean that these people had been bought and specially put up to it by the West—they were simply expressing their commonplace, normal preference: Every political scientist and every politician displays this preference toward a certain wing or a certain leader in another country. The fact that

preference is shown by certain leaders is interpreted by Kryuchkov in totally distorted form. That's where the problem lies.

It's an old story. KGB organs acted precisely this way in the past, and whenever people spoke in favor of improving economic relations, in favor of democracy and so on, these were portrayed as some sort of special actions by the CIA or other intelligence agencies of the West. But why would Kryuchkov interpret things in the way he described to the Supreme Soviet? He would do so in an attempt to frighten the deputies, and even to sling mud upon the structures of leadership that exist today, including those of both Gorbachev and Yeltsin.

Kuptsov Views Cooperation Prospects for CPSU, Sociopolitical Parties

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[Interview with Valentin Kuptsov, CPSU Central Committee secretary, under rubric: "Topical Dialogues: Who Will Accept the Peace Pipe?"]

[Text] Today we are all witnesses to the dynamic development of the political structure of our society and the growth of the multiparty system. However, democratic renewal has come up against very acute contradictions that will have to be interpreted and resolved. They are the subject of the conversation that our correspondent had with Valentin Aleksandrovich Kuptsov, CPSU Central Committee secretary.

[Correspondent] Valentin Aleksandrovich, the sphere of activity of the department that you head, the Department for Ties with Sociopolitical Organizations, has been attracting people's fixed attention. The confrontation among the political forces in the country has reached such a line that, if we were to cross over it, that would possibly mean casting our very Homeland into an abyss. An acute sense of alarm is overtaking, as one can judge from the magazine's letters to the editor, more and more people in the most diverse social segments: Communists and nonparty members, workers, peasants, the intelligentsia. But can it be that the political situation in society is really not so gloomy?

[V. Kuptsov] That depends on how one perceives what has been occurring. If one considers it to be a disaster that has come crashing down from heaven, then it is inevitable that we have no way out. But we know that there is currently underway a process of the revolutionary breaking up of society, and we are consciously participating in it. Then the sharpened sense of alarm for the Homeland, a country that was created by the labor and minds of many generations of our ancestors, forces one to act, to search for paths not simply for a way out of the crisis, but for creating a new appearance of a socialist society, all the spiritual and moral roots of which go back to the history of our country—that is alarm for the good.

But the situation that has developed is actually extremely serious. The socioeconomic crisis is becoming aggravated in the country, most people's standard of living is falling, crime has increased, and the flame of interethnic conflicts is continuing to burn. All this creates an atmosphere of political instability, of the spiritual embitterment of people, and their dissatisfaction about tomorrow.

Under these conditions the new political forces, having proposed a triune task—the collapse of the USSR, the elimination of the CPSU from political life, and the negation of the people's socialist choice—have openly striven to gain the power. If one traces the situation from the time when our department was created until the present day, one can note how the present situation in the political life of society has been supercharged.

We began our work under conditions of the growth of the multiparty system, when the tremendous potential of the unclaimed social energy that had accumulated in society found an exit into the organizing of a mass of new untraditional sociopolitical formations.

If one speaks succinctly, this is what happened. First there arose thousands of weakly politicized clubs, associations, and unions that were defined by a single concept—the "informal" movement. Then there followed its political differentiation, the intensification of ideological coloration, which led to the appearance of parties and national people's fronts. And, finally, the political formations began to become integrated into blocs and coalitions with clearly expressed goals in the struggle for power.

The organizations laying claim to being union or Russian parties have proven to include the Socialist Party; the Social-Democratic Party; the Republican Party (formed on the basis of the Democratic Platform, which left the CPSU); the Democratic Party of Russia; the Liberal-Democratic Party; the Party of Constitutional Democrats; the Free Labor Party; the Democratic Union; and others. If one casts a cursory glance over the entire ideological spectrum from left to right, today we see parties having an orientation ranging from the orthodox Communist to the monarchist and nationalistic.

The "Democratic Russia" political bloc that was formed at the congress in October 1990 absorbed three political forces: groups of people's deputies from the USSR, RSFSR, the autonomous republics, krais, oblasts, and cities of Russia; various "democratic" parties; and sociopolitical associations. Today that bloc includes approximately 30 parties and political organizations. Ideologically speaking, the leaders of "Democratic Russia" have been united by the failure to set their course on socialist reforms and by the task of eliminating the CPSU from the political scene.

In June 1990 the "Interparty Assembly" bloc of national parties was created in the Ukraine. That bloc set as its goals the change in the social system, the achievement of

the Ukraine's complete state independence, and the creation of the Ukraine's own army and security forces.

In Georgia the "Roundtable—Free Georgia" political bloc came to power. The republic's Supreme Soviet declared a transitional period during which it was planned to dismantle the soviet and socialist structures and to create the conditions for proclaiming the independent state of Georgia. As a start, the coat of arms, the anthem, and the flag were changed, and there was an announcement of the dissolution of the local agencies of Soviet authority, the creation of Georgia's own armed forces, and the "departization" (or, rather, the repartization) of the agencies of administration, public education, and culture.

[Correspondent] Incidentally, in their letters to the editor, our readers write bitterly about these "reforms." The magazine has published several of these letters. For example, the letter by Mikhail Lolua from Abkhazia. He is a labor veteran.

[V. Kuptsov] Hundreds of such letters have been coming to the CPSU Central Committee. Letters expressing anger and pain. One cannot read them with indifference.

But, even so, there are still those who are not pleased with this stage. The leaders of the interregional deputy group have begun undertaking attempts to create a force at a nationwide level that is in opposition to the CPSU. First the hope was placed on MADO [Interregional Association of Democratic Organizations], the congress of which was held in late October 1989 in Chelyabinsk. However, the ideological polarization at that time had not yet reached the degree allowing the creation of a political bloc on an anticommunist basis. Moreover, many leaders of the opposing forces considered it to be beneficial for themselves to remain in the CPSU.

Today there have been created many sociopolitical organizations that call themselves parties (several of which I have mentioned—there are more than 20 of them in the center and approximately 100 in the republics), but the size of each of them is comparatively small: the Social-Democrats, Republicans, and the Democratic Party of Russia each have from 10,000 to 30,000 in their ranks. The others are much smaller. Let's compare: last year 180,000 new members entered the CPSU, and in the first quarter of the current year, more than 46,000.

However, it is not a matter of the size of the political parties, but the influence that their slogans have upon the masses. Certain parties and organizations have managed to put their deputies into the Supreme Soviets and the local soviets, to achieve in a number of regions the majority of seats, and to form agencies of authority. The CPSU committees have to become accustomed to working under conditions of opposition, or at times even hard pressure. This is payment for our loss of the skills needed for waging a political struggle and working among the masses, and for the long period of monopoly in ideology and administration.

Currently the role of the "collector" of the opposition has again been assumed by the "Democratic Russia" movement. Despite the diverse ideological spectrum of the organizations that are part of that movement, its leaders have posed the task of forming a new mass party that opposes the CPSU. The unification of Christians and Social Democrats, and previous Communists from the Democratic Platform with the anticommunists of the "Democratic Party of Russia," the writers of APREL, and the radicals from SHCHIT—that is the latest word in the strategy and tactics of the "democratic" forces. In essence, this is an attempt to unify the social movement, to adjust it to the ideological and political tastes of the leaders of "Democratic Russia."

But I would not discount the probability of the execution of this apparently paradoxical idea. In social awareness the survivals of an authoritarian way of thinking and behaving are still very much alive. Against the background of the economic crisis, they can become more active and call to life a neototalitarianism of anticommunist style.

[Correspondent] Attempts are also being made to create an interrepublic structure of "democratic" forces with the participation of the Russian organizations. In late January in Kharkov, as you know, there occurred the latest in a series of attempts to unite the "democratic" forces—I have in mind the constituent conference of the "Democratic Congress." There was an interrepublic conference of the so-called "democratic deputy factions," which conference was supposed to create a parallel structure to the country's legally elected agencies of authority.

[V. Kuptsov] Not simply an interrepublic structure, but a stable formation. True, those attempts have not yet been fruitful. One can cite an even fresher example. Recently, at a meeting in Dushanbe, the leaders of the Democratic Parties of Russia, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, and Central Asia discussed the idea of creating a union-wide party. But most of the participants expressed the fear of "obtaining a new totalitarian party" and they did not take any action to unite.

In general this is a paradoxical fact of our political history—while proclaiming the ideas of national rebirth and democracy, the separatist forces of various republics attempt to unite. They are consolidated, as I have already said, by their failure to accept the single USSR, their attempt to eliminate the CPSU from political life, and their denial of the people's socialist choice.

The striving to power by the new political forces is largely motivated by the impatience and the undrowned ambitions of their leaders—those who yesterday were "emigrants" from the CPSU, as they are now called, former "partocrats." Today those people can also be found among the ranks of the most violent anticommunists.

The low level of people's political culture and the lack of their practical skills in democracy also exert an effect on

the social atmosphere. Under these conditions the methods being used by the opposition are especially painful and dangerous—the methods of real psychological warfare, total pressure upon people's consciousness, and the exertion of psychological, and sometimes even physical, influence on dissidents and the members of their families. Obviously unparliamentary forms of struggle are put into action, and one hears direct appeals for civil disobedience to the legal authorities. What is the cost, for example, of the openly inflammatory activities during the recent miners' strikes! Because everything was used there: from noisy political actions and crude disinformation to various promises made to the workers. Active functionaries of "Democratic Russia," traveling around to all the plants and mines, called upon the workers to strike, although they should have first thought about the interests of all the workers, about the tremendous material damages to the economy of Russia, and, consequently, to the damages for people. They were even not averse, when striving for their political goals, to speculate on the respect shown by a segment of the population for the Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

It must be noted that the leaders of our opposition do not yet have their own positive programs. Therefore they prefer to construct their policy on disrupting the efforts of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the President, and the union government, using for their purposes the objective difficulties being experienced by the country. And so they succeeded in destabilizing the situation, and even blocking certain anticrisis measures.

[Correspondent] Nevertheless the "democrats" continue to call themselves "leftists"?

[V. Kuptsov] Although it is completely clear that all these parties are "rightist." This camouflage is beneficial for them. It makes it possible, for the time being, to deceive those who have not yet been able to understand their undemocratic essence, or the fact that they set as their goal the changing of the basis of the constitutional system. One should not forget that the "democrats" began with slogans of perestroika and the renewal of socialism. And many people believed them. Today the situation is changing. The masks are being removed more and more frequently. Previously USSR People's Deputy A. Murashov, who is one of the leaders of the "Democratic Russia" block, would not have given his recommendations in such open text: "establish contacts with private businessmen—cooperative members, tenants, small enterprises—we express their interests." And those about whom A. Murashov speaks understand this perfectly. One of the leaders of the Union of RSFSR Cooperative Members told B. Yeltsin at the conference of representatives of "Democratic Russia" in Moscow, "Come to us cooperative members, and get money for political activity, because you are fighting for our interests!"

Or the example with the slogan "All power to the soviets!" Many leaders of parties and movements went to the election under that slogan, as though under a

banner. But that was a political trick. Upon gaining leadership on that wave in a number of union republics and oblast and city soviets of people's deputies, they raised the question of the "desovietization" of the country and the elimination of the soviets primarily as agencies of the will of the people. Herein lies the primary cause of the discussions of the need for more "effective" structures of authority: mayors, prefects, governors, etc. The true meaning and goals of these proposals are absolutely clear. The dismantling of the soviets deprives the working masses of the possibility, by direct legislative means, to exert an influence on the economic, social, and political conditions of their existence.

[Correspondent] But am I correct in thinking that they should not put their hopes on having time itself form the maturity of the parties and movements and acquiring the practical skills needed for civilized, democratic interaction? The situation acutely needs, right now, the search for points of contact, compromises for finding a way to get the country and society out of its crisis, in the name—however bitter this sounds—of saving the Homeland. Incidentally, that opinion is being expressed more and more persistently also in the letters written by magazine readers. This, for example, is what Aleksandr Filippovich Dyadyura, of Dnepropetrovsk, write: "The political arena is not a masquerade ball. The time has come to take off the masks and come out in the open but joint multiparty struggle against the prolonged economic chaos. Today in our country—the USSR—the conditions for this are the most favorable: a broadly extended multiparty parliamentary form of government enables the existing parties and movements equally to demonstrate their rate of participation in resolving the single task—the welfare of the Soviet nation." The author of the letter places his hope here on the CPSU. And that hope is justified: if one looks at the past, it is specifically our party that has had the experience as such an initiator. Moreover, the compromises and the forms of interaction were for completely specific problems and interests: political and economic. You might recall the blocs and compromises with the "legal Marxists," "internationalists," the Constitutional Democrats, the Social Revolutionaries...

[V. Kuptsov] The CPSU must remember its traditions. Although it is the country's largest party, it nevertheless cannot allow itself to have an isolationist policy if it wants to fulfill the role of social leader and the ruling party. That was specifically stated by M. S. Gorbachev in Belorussia in response to an appeal to the party not to yield the initiative in unifying the centrist forces, all the truly democratic parties and movements, that give the priority to the interests of the nation and that act from the internationalistic positions of the unity of the Union.

We are profoundly convinced that, despite the positions of certain leaders, the formations that stand behind them, for the most part, have not been primordially infected with the spirit of confrontation and ruination.

The CPSU is counting on the participation in the coalition of authoritative segments of the workers', peasant, trade-union, young, women's, and veterans' movements. Our party's centrist policy enables Communists to cooperate with all the country's progressive forces within the confines of the work to achieve the democratic renewal of society. It is important only to assure that the idea of civil consent is implemented on behalf of the goals that the majority of the nation will accept. In other words, the logic of political actions must be determined by common sense, by profound revolutionary reforms. And so, when developing the new Program, the Communist Party cannot yield the opportunity to become the integrating factor of all the centrist forces.

I might also recall that in January of this year, at the height of the bitter political struggle for power that had been begun by certain leaders of the "democrats," a decree by the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee that is of fundamental importance under the present conditions was adopted: "The Position of the CPSU in Relations With Sociopolitical Organizations and Movements." In that decree the party confirmed the approach to political pluralism, as being an important factor in deepening the democratic processes in the country, and confirmed its readiness for open dialogue with other parties and movements acting in conformity with the USSR Constitution, and proposed constructive cooperation to them.

There is a serious base for this kind of interaction—the work of carrying out the transition to a socially oriented market economy, the work of providing people with worthy living conditions, the adoption of the new Union Treaty, the settlement of the interethnic conflicts. General consent is completely achievable for such very important problems as the growth of the law-governed state, the moral and spiritual development of the country's peoples on the basis of national traditions and the worldwide humanitarian heritage, and the protection of the environment.

[Correspondent] What are the prospects for cooperation with those parties and movements which, in their attitude toward socialism, stand closest to the CPSU? For example, with the socialist party, with some of the proponents of the Democratic Platform, the leftist Social Democrats, and others?

[V. Kuptsov] The CPSU is ready to enter blocs, to cooperate with movements of socialist and genuinely democratic orientation, and to interact with them in the soviets of people's deputies in resolving the socially important problems. The Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee has formulated and proposed to all the political parties and public movements the principles of honest partnership relations. They are the reciprocal recognition of the rights and freedoms of the individual; respect for the law; respect for cultural and natural traditions; rejection of violence and vengeance as the means and goals of the political struggle; decency in interrelationships and polemics; the competitiveness of

independent and legally equal political forces; and the recognition of the people's choice as the sole source of political power.

The April 1991 united Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and TsKK [Central Control Committee] re-emphasized the vital need to seek ways to achieve public consent, to establish civil peace, and to reject confrontation and political ambitions.

The beginning of the formation of such interrelationships was already laid both in the Center and in the outlying areas. In many Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the union republics, and in republic, kray, and oblast party committees, there have been created commissions that engage in problems of interaction with sociopolitical organizations, and in analyzing and forecasting the development of the sociopolitical situation; discussion meetings and press conferences have become standard practice; and, with the active assistance of the scientific and educational institutions of the CPSU, the appropriate training of the party cadres and aktiv is being carried out.

The USSR Supreme Soviet regularly holds meetings between its leaders and the representatives of the parties and movements that are attempting to save society from collapse and to participate constructively in resolving the vitally important economic, social, and other problems in our country's life.

A dialogue is beginning between Communist deputies and representatives of other parties and movements in the soviets at all levels, and their joint cooperation in implementing the decisions that have been made is being established. Under the aegis of the soviets of people's deputies in Alma-Ata, Volgograd, Donetsk, Kemerovo, Sverdlovsk, and a number of other cities and regions, agreements have been reached concerning the interaction of various social forces when making the transition to market relations in resolving social, ecological, and interethnic problems. A mechanism has been proposed for implementing these agreements and for resolving conflict situations with a consideration of the opinions of all the interested sides. Similar experience has been accumulated in Udmurtia and in Moscow Oblast.

I would like to cite as an example of the practical implementation of this trend the interparty agreement which, under the aegis of the USSR Supreme Soviet, was signed first by 16, but now by more than 60 sociopolitical organizations. It was engendered in the course of consultative sessions at the Council of Nationalities with various public movements to discuss problems of resolving the interethnic conflicts and of preparing the Union Treaty. Subsequently it went beyond the confines of those questions, taking on a broader, more universal nature in the concern for the flourishing of the Homeland and the peaceful method of resolving all its problems. Unfortunately, the distinguished "democrats" in

"Democratic Russia," the Baltic people's fronts, and the Ukrainian Rukh remained outside the confines of that agreement.

But, I repeat, we cannot at this time fail to take into consideration the fact that a number of new organizations that declare their adherence to the principles of democracy are, in the practical situation, bringing the matter to a fierce and destructive confrontation, permitting violence and arbitrariness, provoking national and religious enmity and separatist moods, and clearing an unconstitutional path to power and the restoration of capitalism. It is precisely for that reason that the Politburo at the same time in its decision required the party committees to put up active opposition to the destructive forces, and to reveal any manifestations of political extremism or attempts to disrupt the processes of perestroika.

Despite the fact that 1991 saw the introduction of the USSR Law entitled: "Public Associations" and the Rules for Registration of Associations and Parties, which were developed in conformity with that Law and which open up broad opportunities for the independent activities of public formation, but guard the process of democratization against extremism and complete permissiveness and ban the creation and activities of public associations that are aimed at the overthrow, violent change of the constitutional system, or violent disruption of the unity of the territory of the USSR or the union and autonomous republics, or that propagandize war, violence, or cruelty, or the incitement of social, national, or religious enmity—life provides us with different examples.

The union legislation has been ignored in Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and the Baltic republics. In those areas laws have been enacted, or have been prepared for enactment, to block or ban the activities of organizations and members of the CPSU at enterprises, state institutions, and the educational system, including, in essence, occupational bans, and, in certain instances, for example, in Lithuania, criminal persecution based on political motivations. Such normative acts contradict the USSR Constitution, are a violation of international agreements governing the civil and political rights of the individual, and thus directly promote the heating up in the country of an atmosphere that is fraught with acute social conflicts.

[Correspondent] Valentin Aleksandrovich, you head a permanent sociopolitical commission of the CPSU Central Committee. What tasks have been assigned to that commission and to the corresponding commissions and departments in the local party committees?

[V. Kuptsov] The Commission's main task is to help the CPSU Central Committee, as the party's highest collective working agency, in the development and practical implementation of the strategy and tactics in the sociopolitical sphere. The Commission is not an intermediate link between the departments and the Politburo. It is an organic part of the CPSU Central Committee and,

within the confines of the competency assigned to it, carries out its functions in the area of interaction with sociopolitical associations and work in the soviets.

Its appearance is influenced by the fact that, until recently, the party's political function was dissolved in other economic-administrative functions that are not the main ones. You and I are witnesses as to what this led to. Under conditions of political and ideological pluralism and a real struggle for power, the party was unable to adapt rapidly or dynamically. Many party committees at all levels proved to be helpless in the very first political conflicts with the new social forces that were developing. They yielded the initiative and, not without any fault of the Central Committee, lost the pre-election fights. And so today they continue to lose the leading role in the soviets. Even in those where the Communists constitute the majority.

Why is this happening? Most frequently we hear voices stating that this is the result of the Center's backwardness in working out theoretical solutions and its sluggishness. One cannot deny the justness of that criticism. It is necessary to correct this situation. But not separately by the Center and separately by the local party committees and party organizations. Actually we do not even know today how to learn from our bitter lessons. So the political function has not become the basic or chief one in the activities of many party organizations.

They have become so accustomed to engaging in basic production that, when that sphere to a certain degree left, they proved not to be in charge of affairs, and felt that they were helpless and undefended. That pertains also to the Center. Getting out of that state and helping the party organizations to occupy a dynamic, aggressive position in sociopolitical life, then, is the first and major task both of the Central Committee's Commission and the commissions and departments of the local party committees.

And this is the second task. We cannot allow the party to be in isolation. But that danger exists. You can see that many sociopolitical movements and organizations lend themselves to the influence of ideological and everyday anticommunism and antiparty moods. It is necessary to oppose this. And at the same time to learn political maneuvering and compromises, and to seek allies. The work with sociopolitical formations—and, most important, the work in the soviets, because it is precisely there that the party's basic tasks as a political organization are implemented in a real manner—has come into the forefront. We have already spoken about how that work is being carried out.

Our commission, like the department, proceeding from the CPSU strategy, analyzes the situations and the placement of the political forces, develops the tactics of the party's political activity. It is our sacred duty to summarize the experience gained by the party organizations and to render direct assistance to them.

Wherein does that assistance lie? We help the sociopolitical commissions and other structural subdivisions responsible for ties with sociopolitical organizations and for working in the soviets of party committees to learn how to forecast the development of political processes and how to work out scientifically substantiated recommendations, the fulfillment of which would guarantee the achievement of political goals (for example, in election campaigns, in conflict situations, in coalition activities, etc.), and how to carry out constructive interaction among the parliamentary factions and sociopolitical organizations with regard to the vitally important problems of getting out of the crisis, reinforcing the USSR, and stopping the interethnic conflicts.

Of course, practically experience is only now being gained by these commissions. It is extremely necessary today to have new-generation cadres that know how to think and how to operate in the changed social conditions. Their training is also a very important practical task of ours.

[Correspondent] And now the last question. Today one sometimes hears or reads that our society is in a state of a "cold" civil war. That term is used in order to emphasize that that war is occurring at the level of opposing the political parties, organizations, and movements. What is bad is that there are those who are ready to change the "cold" war into a "hot" one. The time has come today to accept the "peace pipe." Who do you think will accept it?

[V. Kuptsov] The peace pipe. It traveled around the circle when the alarm about the future forced people to forget all the feuds among them. Yes, you are right that we are living through such a time. Who will accept the peace pipe today? I would ask that question in a different way. The only one who will not accept it is the one who does not understand the depth and the tragic nature of the situation, the one who does not want the best for his Motherland, the one who, repeating the words of the famous historical figure, states, "Après nous, la deluge." But there are only a few of politicians like this. And your magazine's reader, Aleksandr Filippovich Dyadyura noted corrected that the political scene is not a masquerade ball. More and more frequently, people recognize behind the masks the real face of those politicians. Therefore they will not succeed, I am convinced, in extinguishing the peace pipe.

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Political Figures Comment on Democratic Reform Movement

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[Comments by Vladimir Tikhonov, president of the Union of Cooperatives and Other Nonstate Enterprises, Uzbekali Dzhanibekov, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Kazakh Communist Party,

Nikolay Travkin, chairman of the Democratic Russia Party, and Vladimir Lysenko, cochairman of the Republican Party of Russia, under the rubric: "Politics Through the Eyes of the Politician: A New Type of Party?"]

[Text] It was no special surprise. We have long been aware of the need for a powerful democratic movement aimed at defending the reforms and bringing perestroika to a positive conclusion. And then the call to unite rang out, directed to all the supporters of democratic reforms. We have in mind the 1 July statement of the group of nationally prominent politicians calling for an association of democratic movements and parties. The statement immediately aroused very understandable interest, and not just within the country. Many political observers assessed it as one of the significant events of present-day political life in the Soviet Union. It is natural that they by no means assess the first steps of the leaders of the new movement in the same way. In general this gives us a fairly serious occasion, even a need, to ask the leaders of a number of political and public organizations to give their opinion about this unusual event.

The questions were: 1. What is your personal attitude toward the new "Democratic Reform Movement"? 2. Will you and your supporters take part in it?

Vladimir Tikhonov, president of the Union of Cooperatives and Other Nonstate Enterprises and Academician of VASKhNIL [All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences imeni Lenin]

1. I have a positive attitude toward any truly democratic movement and am absolutely convinced that under contemporary conditions they must express themselves in fairly strong organizational forms. I think that these forms are necessary to ensure unity of action among the many political parties, groups, and unions that have emerged lately.

Certainly this is hard to do, and it is not possible, of course, in a short time. But we must work and strive toward such unity. From this standpoint I am impressed that the Democratic Reform Movement is arising at the initiative of and associated with such major figures as Shevardnadze, Yakovlyev, and Popov. A start has been made toward unification.

2. Participate or not? I have not determined that yet because I am disturbed by some serious, as I see it, considerations related to the very beginning of the movement.

While I am not an enemy of members of the Communist Party, still I do not trust people who have worked in its leadership apparatus (at the low levels and at the top). And I am afraid that in the current situation the new movement, especially as it grows into a party according to the conception of its organizers, may be overloaded with these people.

It also disturbs me that the slogan "new type of party" has been put forward again in certain statements by the organizers and leaders. I do not know what they mean by this phrase, but I know what the founder of the RSDRP [Russian Social Democratic Worker Party], who made up the term, meant. That kind of party does not suit me at all; it terrifies me. I am more impressed by parties of the "old," that is to say parliamentary, type. I would like every movement and political party to adhere to those proven and traditional parliamentary forms. But in general, obviously, we all have to wait for publication of the conception and very detailed programs of the Democratic Reform Movement.

Uzbekali Dzhaniyev, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Kazakh Communist Party and secretary of the Central Committee.

1. I think that if the new movement is going to promote a consolidation of perestroika forces, implementation of true economic reform, and the establishment of long-awaited peace and tranquility in the country it should be welcomed.

But if it becomes nothing but a camp for unsuccessful reformers aiming at a schism, our attitude toward it is clear—opposed.

In any case, they should have spoken clearly about this long ago, hiding nothing from the millions of communists, in order to finally set themselves apart. In the end, people have to know who is who.

Judging by certain statements of the leaders of the new movement I am forming the opinion that they are somewhat removed from the masses and do not know the real situation in the local areas. You cannot accuse the communists alone of all sins and blame them for the mistakes and omissions made during the years of perestroika with participation by people who now are loudly announcing their departure from the party and forming new movements.

For example, how can you say that we, the local communists, are to blame for the theoretical incompetence of the top party leadership, for the inconsistency in their practice and indecisiveness in actions, for what we have lived through in the last six years?

2. Will the communists of Kazakhstan follow the leaders of this movement? A fairly calm situation has developed in our republic. People are focused on work. The recent session of the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh SSR confirmed this, adopting some very important documents on denationalization and privatization, the Aul socioeconomic program, and the like. I cannot say that anyone in Kazakhstan seriously shares the ideas of this new political group.

The Kazakh Communist Party is in charge of the situation in the republic. Among the issues to be discussed at the upcoming Plenum of the Central Committee of the Kazakh Communist Party, which is planned for 20 July,

the main ones will be our attitude toward the Union Treaty as well as the priorities and directions of communist party ideological work in the period of transition to market relations. We will do everything possible, everything that we can, to see that the proposed plans and outlines are successfully carried out.

Nikolay Travkin, chairman of the Democratic Party of Russia.

1. I take an unemotional attitude toward the formation of the Democratic Reform movement. If anything at all comes of this movement, there will clearly be one plus—it will mean that some kind of schism is occurring in the CPSU. That is a plus, let me repeat.

I do not believe it will be possible to form a fundamentally new democratic-type party on the basis of this movement. It seems to me that this party will be shaped in the structures of those raykoms and gorkoms which do not support the orthodox part of the top CPSU leadership. Of course, a new party can arise on the basis of part of the CPSU. What they will call it, I do not know, democratic, socialist. But it cannot be formed on the basis of existing parties and movements.

2. We do not intend to fight against them; we are doing different things. We are forming a national democratic party, and they are working on a movement. They do not contradict one another. But neither do we cross paths.

Of course, we could start talking about contacts. But contacts can only be maintained with someone definite. Among the nine signatories one says he will form a party opposed to the CPSU, another says he favors a movement that supports the progressive part of the CPSU, and another proposes forming a "Communists for Democracy" party. Some are not talking at all. So we cannot tell yet exactly who there is to work with.

Vladimir Lysenko, cochairman of the Republican Party of Russia and one of the leaders of Democratic Congress.

1. I personally consider the initiative of "The Nine" in forming an interrepublic Democratic Reform Movement to be useful, although the group of founders of the movement is very diverse. Its fundamental idea appears to be organizing a union of the reform-minded part of the apparatus and the democratic movement.

It also seems that the primary positive task which this movement can accomplish in the present phase is to consolidate different forces in society who support the: "New Ogarev agreement" and to support a peaceful, nonviolent transfer of power from the CPSU to the new political parties and movements.

2. The Republican Party of Russia considered it possible to join the organizing committee to form the new movement. But this was on the condition that its founders would not attempt to turn the movement into a new political party and assuming constructive cooperation would be arranged with already-existing democratic

structures: the Democratic Russia movement in the RSFSR and Democratic Congress in 12 Union republics.

Onikov Interview on Democratic Reform Movement, Political Centrism

914B0299A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 8 Aug 91 p 1

[Interview with Leon Onikov, consultant of the Ideological Department of the CPSU Central Committee, by *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* correspondent Valentin Loginov; place and date not given: "Crucial! Straddling the Fence? No, Centrism Is the Policy of Common Sense"]

[Text] *Political life in the country is multifaceted and contradictory. It introduces into our vocabulary many slogans and concepts we have not known before. There are more and more debates about "political centrism." Leon Onikov, consultant of the Ideological Department of the CPSU Central Committee, shares his ideas about it in a conversation with RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA correspondent Valentin Loginov.*

But the conversation began, seemingly, "from a distance"—with the question about the Movement for Democratic Reforms which appeared recently and has evoked the most diametrically opposed assessments in society—from unreversed support to equally energetic condemnation.

[Loginov] How do you, Leon Arshakovich, feel about the new movement?

[Onikov] On the whole, positive. Political centrism, the need for which M.S. Gorbachev expressed resolutely for the first time during his trip through Belorussia, could possibly be transformed from a risky and also dangerous abstraction into a positive reality and acquire organizational substance as well as support.

[Loginov] The "danger and riskiness of centrism..." Is there both risk and danger in this position?

[Onikov] There is! In certain stages of the development of a revolution, centrism is creative and undoubtedly necessary, but in the current stage of the revolution we call perestroika there is a good deal of danger. The main things in any revolution are the question of ownership and the question of power. Is the struggle around these issues not determining the whole situation in the country today?

[Loginov] Yes, this is becoming more and more apparent. But still, in your view, where does the danger lie in centrism?

[Onikov] The danger is not general but in the current, second stage of the development of perestroika. The experience of all social revolutions, and above all the two truly great ones—the French Revolution at the end of the 18th century and ours in 1917—has shown that all of them, to speak generally, go through three basic stages: initial, middle, and final. The role of political centrism is different in each of these stages.

Centrism is absolutely necessary in the first and third or final stage. Especially in the first stage when it is necessary to consolidate and concentrate all forces of the revolution, regardless of the goal each of them ultimately pursues. In this case it is difficult to overestimate the consolidating role of the center. Here they are all one for the time being. In France—from Mirabeau to Robespierre and the future "Enrages." In our country in 1917—from Milyukov to Chkheidze, and, before V.I. Lenin's return, to some of the Bolsheviks. In 1985 after the April Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, that is, in the initial stage of perestroika, everyone spoke out unanimously in favor of it, in favor of a revolutionary renewal of society; everyone was walking on air.

[Loginov] Now we are ruled by different feelings...

[Onikov] And this can be explained. For in the second stage, judging from the experience of past revolutions, the most typical thing is extreme polarization of opposing forces. It is not yet clear which will win. This will be revealed in the third and final stage. But until then, under the conditions of the growing separation of the polar forces, futile attempts to reconcile the extreme wings of the revolution have inevitably doomed the proponents of centrism to defeat—Danton in France (the attempt to reconcile the Montagnards and the Girondes); Louis Blanc, again in France, during the 1848 revolution (the attempt to reconcile the left and the right, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie); and Kerenskiy in our country. He, incidentally, was not as powerful a figure as Georges Danton, but neither was he the empty-headed embodiment of vulgarity which our historians have made of him. He was a typical centrist doomed to the typical failure in the second stage of the revolution.

In the third stage, I repeat, everything becomes clear—who won and who lost. **One of the extremes wins.** In the French Revolution it was the leaders of the Thermidor, and in the October Revolution—the Bolsheviks and Lenin.

The winner from one of the extreme positions shifts to the center, toward the majority, absorbing all who are capable of reinforcing the victory. The clearest corroboration of this is Lenin. The most radical leader from the very left of the party, having brilliantly interpreted the situation after the victory, turned sharply to the right, toward the center.

[Loginov] Are such sharp historical parallels appropriate here?

[Onikov] Of course, to mechanically transfer the model from past revolutions to our perestroika, which is taking place on a socialist foundation, would be just as wrong as to ignore their lessons. A serious mistake made by our scholars and those who have had to follow the development of perestroika every day has been that they have lost sight of and forgotten about the development, the

transition of perestroika as a revolutionary process from the first stage to the second.

In the second stage centrism is dissolved; it becomes politically obsolete. Under these conditions the revolutionary course must change sharply. Attempts to reconcile the irreconcilable poles are known to be doomed to failure. In light of the experience of the great revolutions, in this stage it is necessary to openly **support one of the two polar forces**, by winning over the majority of the people and attracting or at least neutralizing various strata of the opposite pole, and to wage an open battle with them within a constitutional framework. But this absolutely requires a solid organization foundation, and we have not had one.

[Loginov] And the CPSU?

[Onikov] The party itself is experiencing a crisis. It was unable to avoid it, but I am convinced that it would have been possible to absolutely guarantee the avoidance of a crisis if we had given more thought to the way we approached perestroika in the CPSU and not impeded it. But in the current situation, although the healthy nucleus in the CPSU prevails, it has also been affected by polarization: from those who long to apply "in all their fullness, all means of class influence" to those who advocate social democratic vagueness.

There are several schools of thought in the party now. There are neo-Stalinists and reformers and progressives and conservatives. M.S. Gorbachev sees three or four "parties" in it, and when speaking at the July Plenum of the Central Committee, the acting chairman of the CPSU Central Control Commission, Ye. Makhov, counted up to ten schools of thought and platforms. There have also been many attempts to split the party. Recall the actually ominous atmosphere that preceded the last plenum. Thank goodness its participants had enough common sense and political maturity to avoid the "storm."

Of course, I would like to hope that the president's course for the salvation of our country will gain the organizational "fulcrum" it so desperately needs in the new Movement for Democratic Reforms.

[Loginov] Are you acquainted with the leaders of this movement?

[Onikov] The majority of them I have known well for a long time. I am acquainted with A. Rutskoy, A. Sobchak, and I. Silayev. But the point is not whether or not we personally know those who founded the movement. What is important are the ideas they support and their goals.

[Loginov] Leon Arshakovich, will you cooperate with the new movement?

[Onikov] If this means that I will have to withdraw from the CPSU, of course, I will not. If membership in the party is retained as an indispensable condition, I definitely will.

I think one will not be able to finally decide how one feels about the movement until after its congress.

[Loginov] The congress is scheduled for September...

[Onikov] Well, that is not long to wait. But to return to the essence of the position of political centrism, I would like to note this: The person who has chosen it risks more than others, but without it they will not reach any agreement.

Legal Implications of Democratic Union Leaders' Case Investigated

914B0285A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 31 Jul 91 p 1

[Article by S. Sokolov: "The Cobblestone—The Democrat's Weapon?: Investigation Being Conducted in the Case of the Democratic Union Leaders Who Have Called for the Violent Overthrow of the Soviet Authority"]

[Text] Summer 1917. Petrograd. The provisional government creates a special investigative commission for organizing a court to try the leaders of the RSDRP(B) Party, who are calling upon the nation to carry out an armed insurrection and the violent overthrow of the existing system.

Summer 1991. Moscow. Vladimir Danilov and Valeriya Novodvorskaya, leaders of the Democratic Union party, have been under investigation at Lefortovo Prison for more than two months. They are accused of violating Article 70 of the RSFSR UK [Criminal Code]—calling for the violent overthrow, by means of an armed insurrection, of the Soviet state and social system.

I immediately ask forgiveness from all the instructors of party history for any unscientific analogies. I agree that we are talking about different things. Especially since at that time the October coup was carried out, whereas today's affairs, most probably to everyone's relief, have been developing for the people under investigation into a political anecdote. True, an unfunny anecdote. Is it really a laughable matter when, at the end of the twentieth century, a century that has been turned inside out by the countless sequence of armed actions in our country, which, it would seem, has already known everything, we are seeing the appearance of people who have jumped down onto the barricades? Is it laughable when, as occurred on the eve of 1917, the powers that be must once again call to order the admirers of revolutions in Russia, and our democratic intelligentsia continues to remain aloof?

Do you know, for example, what comments were made by the famous Moscow Helsinki Group of Defenders of the Right with regard to the "armed" moods of Danilov and Novodvorskaya, who wrote in an open letter that "from this day on, the nation acquires the right to

overthrow a criminal authority by any means, including with the aid of armed insurrection"? The defenders of the right decided that this was only an inoffensive "method of slapping the public's face," "only a form of social protest against the prolonged policy of terror and violence on the part of the communist government."

Why did the defenders of the right take such a calm attitude toward these appeals? Was it out of a lack of desire to play up to the authorities? But it seems to me that we are no longer living in a time when, while expressing your own position, you thus play into someone else's hand. And it is time, finally, to differentiate among politics, morality, and the Criminal Code, if they contradict one another.

During the interrogations in Lefortovo Prison, Valeriya Novodvorskaya, leader of the Democratic Union party, admitted proudly and without any pressure that she was guilty of violating Article 70 of the RSFSR Criminal Code in its new edition (which refers to "public appeals for the violent overthrow or change of the Soviet state and social system..."). Naturally, the KGB investigators are also convinced that Novodvorskaya is guilty.

But the entirely comic nature of the situation lies in the fact that, whether or not Valeriya Ilinichna [Novodvorskaya] wants it, according to strict judicial gauges her "violent" letter does not contain a *corpus delicti*. A person who is convinced of this, unlike the investigators and unlike Novodvorskaya herself, is her lawyer, Sergey Kotov, who is famous for his successful defense of another member of the Democratic Union, Sverdlovsk journalist Sergey Kuznetsov. He does not find in the letter anything for which a person should be incarcerated for three years. For what? For theoretical reasons? But this is a matter for politicians or philosophers. Moreover, Kotov is undertaking to prove that Article 70 itself, which appeared two years ago, was formulated in a judicially incorrect manner.

He has serious work to do: two months have already passed since the time of the arrest, and the investigation is unjustifiably dragging on. Protesting against this, Vladimir Danilov announced a hunger strike, and he was given forced feeding. Three charges were "tacked onto" Novodvorskaya's Article 70 charge: insulting the honor and dignity of the President; petty hooliganism; and disrespect for the court. Members of the Moscow Helsinki Group demanded the annulment of the cruel and unjustified preventive measure, and demanded the freeing of Danilov and Novodvorskaya.

But, despite all this, when defending, in accordance with the Declaration of Human Rights, the right of these individuals to have an honest and objective court that corresponds to international standards, one should not forget who those individuals are or the "steppe" to which their appeals can extend. What, then, is to be done? How should a society that is attempting to become democratic react to r-r-revolutionary ideas and appeals? Should it

judge people? Fine them? It's been done. And it is doubly senseless in view of the indifferent assumption of those ideas by the intelligentsia...

The most amusing feature, unfortunately, is the fact that I began thinking seriously for the first time about the evil of the violent restructuring of the world a year and a half ago, after a meeting with Valeriya Ilinichna Novodvorskaya (see KP [KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA], 17 June 1990). For several hours in a row the two of us spoke about Zapadnichestvo [Westernism] and Slavyanofilstvo [Slavophilism] [political philosophies of the nineteenth century], about Mahatma Gandhi and his humanistic principles of nonviolence, about the nonviolent acts of civil disobedience that enabled India to achieve independence without a single shot. We spoke about the members of the Narodnaya Volya [People's Will] and the bloody trail that had been blazed for Russian society by their acts of terror. I asked Novodvorskaya whether a consistently moral line in politics is possible. She answers that "morality is possible only in politics that denies violence." I asked her how she understood the idea of nonviolence. And Novodvorskaya replied: as the readiness to throw oneself under the caterpillar treads of a tank to defend democratic freedoms, as the refusal to answer force with force.

Everything that Novodvorskaya had said at that time sounded weighty and convincing. It had been said by a person who had been thrown into the solitary-confinement cell for investigation at Lefortovo at the age of 19 years for having created an underground anticommunist group at In-Yaz [Institute of Foreign Languages]. A person who subsequently had gone through the Kazan Psychiatric Special Prison. A person who then, two times subsequently, in accordance with the decree on state security, was "reindoctrinated" in neuroleptic clinics. She had withstood everything, but... But today it was specifically Valeriya Ilinichna who heads the faction of "liberal revolutionaries" who state in their manifesto that their minimum program is "to kindle the flame of insurrection throughout the country." Today Novodvorskaya asserts: "We will not exchange one barricade for ten roundtables." Why? Because it is easier to get the nation to go up onto the barricades?

The only thing that consoles me is the fact that most of the members of the Democratic Union party take a sharply negative attitude toward Novodvorskaya's "violent" ideas. In response to her revolutionary appeals, several party theoreticians have left the Democratic Union, and 14 persons, including those closest to Novodvorskaya and those who have been uncompromising participants in the unsanctioned rallies in Moscow, have written an open letter containing the following words:

"Gandhi used to say that the only thing more terrifying than violence is cowardice. If we do not behave like cowards and if we do not take up arms, we have a chance to prevent violence and bloodletting. May God help us at

this terrible moment to remain true to the high human ideals of nonviolence and love on which the Democratic Union was built."

According to the lawyer, in her interrogations in the solitary-confinement investigation cell in Lefortovo Valeriya Ilinichna behaves in a very carefully thought-out and ironic manner. She is impatiently preparing for a new stage in her political struggle. She is preparing, as the members of Narodnaya Volya once did, to throw into the face of this regime everything that she thinks about it.

Now, as I was rereading Gandhi, I finally found the quotation that Novodvorskaya referred to a year and a half ago: "The spirit of democracy cannot be established in a single year in a situation of terror by a government or a people. In a certain sense, the people's terror more strongly impedes the development of the spirit of democracy than governmental terror. Since the latter reinforces the spirit of democracy, whereas the former kills it..."

'Word to People' Criticized

PM2607100591 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 25 Jul 91 p 1

[Leonid Lagin article under the "Commentary" rubric: "War Cry on the Eve of the Plenum, or Second Manifesto of Reaction"]

[Text] An appeal to the people was published in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA the day before yesterday. This time, it was not the president, the Supreme Soviet, or the Congress of People's Deputies appealing to the people, but separate individuals, some of whom, moreover, are well known in Russian society: Yuriy Bondarev, Lyudmila Zykina, Valentin Rasputin. The appeal's signatories include two military figures, Valentin Varennikov and Boris Gromov; sculptor Vyacheslav Klykov; Vasilii Starodubtsev, the well known champion of the kolkhoz-sovkhoz system; party functionary Gennadiy Zyuganov; and several others.

Of course, the appeal is timed to coincide with the next CPSU Central Committee Plenum and is intended to rouse its participants to the highest extreme of political ecstasy. And, judging by the vocabulary and the total lack of argument, it was written in a state of impotent malice, when swearing and flashing one's eyes are the only things left to do.

For the benefit of those who were not able to read the "Word to the People," we will reproduce specific combinations of words used by the venerable writers. (The style gives them away—they are authors.) Thus: "Wily, bombastic rulers" "have seized power," are "carving up the country," and "dooming us to vegetate pitifully in servitude." "No! to the destroyers and usurpers," "they are handing the people over to slavery," "we will rise up to unite and to rebuff the destroyers of the Motherland!" "destructive urges," "dragging the country back into the

darkness of the middle ages, to a place where there is a cult of money, power, cruelty, and vice."

These are very serious accusations. But why are these esteemed writers and co-authors getting so carried away with verbs and ignoring the substantives? Exactly which political forces and organs of power have **seized** power, are **dooming** the people to vegetate pitifully in servitude, are **carving up** the country, and **dragging** it into the middle ages? Exactly which of our "party leaders," having "thrown away his party membership card," "is demanding the gallows for his erstwhile comrades"? Tell us! Name names—if not all of them, then at least one or two.

No, their courage stretches only as far as brandishing a ball point pen to place exclamation marks after every malicious and foolish word. It is understandable: After all, although the authors recognize that "thousands" of Union and republic laws are stillborn, they are nevertheless well aware of what a prosecutor demands at a trial for slander or an attack on honor and dignity.

This group's appeal to the people is in fact a call to the workers, peasants, engineers, scientists, Army and Navy servicemen, artists and writers, Orthodox Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, Protestants, parties, young people, old men, internationalist servicemen, and women (that is the order in which they appear in the appeal) to totally oppose the renewal of society. Of course, the authors of this provocative appeal ignore such events as the Russian presidential elections where the same workers, peasants, writers, scientists, Christians, and Muslims voted for presidential power. Clearly, this group does not like the people's choice. They warn: Don't rely on the "new messiahs." And then they raise morale: "Among Russians there are statesmen ready to lead the country to a proud and sovereign future. There are economic experts who can revive production. There are thinkers, spiritual creators, who can clearly see the nationwide ideal."

Well if this is so, bring them out and show them! The democrats—so hated by this group—have not yet resorted to gobbling up a single thinker, creator, expert, or public figure or to sending them to Butyrki. You can produce a list, or you can produce them individually. And whatever the people decide, that will be accepted. Even if they choose a politician like Lyudmila Zykina. We will all rejoice in chorus.

... But in general the soul gets very weary after reading such manifestoes. First we had one Nina Andreyeva, now here is a dozen more. Where are they calling us, and why are they stirring up passions? It passes understanding. Clearly, Russia has really inexhaustible stocks—of public figures, of fools, and of provocateurs.

Deputies Defer Question of Nationality Designation to Republics

914B0297A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 24,
Jun 91 p 5

[Condensed stenographic record of joint session of USSR Supreme Soviet: "The Invincible 5th Point," with separate commentary by SOYUZ correspondent, Vladimir Kovalevskiy. First paragraph, introductory, is in bold type in original.]

[Text] A joint session of the USSR Supreme Soviet discussed the draft of the resolution: **"On the Procedure for Changing Entries on Citizens' Nationalities in Passports and Other Official Documents."** We offer our readers a condensed stenographic report of this session and our commentary.

A. Sebentsov, Member of the Committee on Legislation and Law and Order:

I believe that the most reasonable alternative is to give citizens themselves the opportunity to decide whether they wish to have a nationality entered in their documents and to give people the right to change the entry on nationality if this is a matter of concern to them. Additionally, so that people do not overload excessively state organizations with work on changing the "nationality" entry, a sensible cost can be imposed, which would make citizens consider their decisions carefully. It is this version of the draft that the committee finished working on and is presenting to you at this time.

The draft stipulates that the specific procedure for entering changes in citizens' documents will be determined by the republics. The draft resolution gives citizens the right to a court appeal if their desire to change this entry is denied. This document is of an organizational nature and approaches the problem in accordance with the Constitution of the USSR.

In the course of preparing this draft, there were a number of opinions to the effect that the equality of people's rights, regardless of their nationality, is fixed by international law and can be achieved only by reducing the number of official entries on nationality.

Deputy Sh. Zhanybekov:

I would like to know to what extent this question has been coordinated with the republics. In my opinion, the adoption of these changes in citizens' documents should consider the views of the republics. And a question.... Who is the person who is principally responsible for formulating Point 1 of this draft, which states that a person does not have to indicate his nationality in his passport?

A. Sebentsov:

This question has been raised by the republics themselves for the last ten years. The USSR MVD [Ministry

of Internal Affairs] has hundreds of applications asking that a provision be included in the law which permits change of nationality.

Sh. Zhanybekov:

The speaker is complicating the issue. The first point should be excluded. The procedure, as it exists in the country today, should be left alone.

A. Sebentsov:

I would like to cite an example. Bulat Shalvovich Okudzhava, known to all of us as a Russian poet, is the son of a Georgian father and Armenian mother. But he has all his roots in the Russian language and Russian culture. I do not know what nationality he considers himself to be or whether he sees this as a problem. But only he himself can determine which of the three nationalities applies to him. His father is the son of a Georgian and an Armenian mother; his mother is the daughter of a Ukrainian mother and a Belorussian father. They live either in Russia or Bashkiria, and the child learned the Bashkir language which became his native language. How should he register? Why shouldn't the citizen himself have the right to determine his own nationality?

A. Lukyanov, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet:

Andrey Yevgenyevich, You are not making this question very simple. When comrades from the republics raise this question, each one knows very well how, for example, the demographic composition is taken into consideration in organizing a new office, staffing personnel, accepting students into an institute of higher education [VUZ], and so on.

Deputy Z. Beyshekeyeva:

Comrade Sebentsov, you are offering us a very tempting Article from this resolution. I am categorically opposed to it, and the delegation from the Kirghiz Republic will also vote against it. Please tell us specifically which republic initiated this proposal. You do not have to throw all the republics together. If I, a Kirghiz woman, who is a member of the Supreme Soviet, vote in favor of this law, it would amount to treason against my people.

Deputy Ye. Chilaya:

Let us assume that we issue a passport to a person and no nationality is indicated. Later, this person has a child. This child's nationality is not entered. But when he reaches full legal age he may want to know his nationality. What in your opinion would happen then?

A. Sebentsov:

The law, if it is passed, permits a child, who has attained full legal age, to determine his nationality as he sees fit.

Ye. Chilaya:

You gave the example of Bulat Okudzhava, but I should speak about myself.... For example, I was born a Russian

from a Georgian father, who died when I was very young. It would be a terrible betrayal to refute my own father. In recent years, we have refuted our own history more and more. With this resolution we would legalize a disrespectful attitude not only toward our own history, but also toward our forefathers, our language, our culture, and our people. I shall categorically vote against it.

Deputy Yu. Borodin:

I do not agree with the preceding remarks. In a democratic and legal state which we are striving to achieve, does it matter whether someone is a Georgian, Turk, Russian, or Jew when we are trying to resolve various issues that could affect any number of citizens?

A. Sebentsov:

Not a single international document emphasizes nationality difference—only civil rights and human rights.

Yu. Borodin:

This draft law is very democratic, because it gives each person the opportunity to clarify his status for himself according to his conscience. This law places a trust in the citizen and not in the administrative system or blank forms.

A. Lukyanov:

I had the opportunity to participate in the drafting of the Constitution of 1977. Its drafts included norms on a citizen's right to determine his own nationality for himself. This was Article 44 that was sent to all the republics, and was defeated by an overwhelming majority of the union and autonomous republics. We had to exclude it from the draft. But if the comrades are now proposing a draft.... It seems that times have changed.

Deputy A. Korenev:

Andrey Yevgenyevich, you said that hundreds of applications have been received. Don't tell me that these hundreds of requests will decide a question that affects millions.

A. Sebentsov:

Inasmuch as this remark is phrased in a rhetorical form, I can tell you exactly how many persons have expressed a desire to change their nationality. Around 200,000 people who are registered as Tajiks would like to change their nationality to Uzbek. Around 300,000 people registered as Tatars would like to change their nationality to Crimean Tatar. Around 10,000 people, whose entry reads Mountain Jew, would like their passports to read Tat. Around 100,000 people who are registered as Azeris want their passports to read Meskhetin Turk. Around 70,000 people registered as Azeris want their passports to read Kurd. Around 90,000 people registered as Bashkirs want to be entered as Tatars. Another rather large number of people want to be reregistered as Rusins,

Teleuts, Veps, Germans, and so on. The overall number of people, including refugees, is around one million. This figure is rather significant and requires our serious consideration of this problem.

A. Lukyanov

Andrey Yevgenyevich, Do you understand that people who are registered as Tatars and to whom the unification of Tatars presents an opportunity to register as Crimean Tatars, that these people will become a totally different kind of nationality, having a different profile, and will demand land for themselves, and so forth? You understand, of course, what is behind all this. What does it mean to register as a "Turk- Meskhetin"? It would be an increase in the numbers of these people. Let us not simplify this matter. I am not against approving a democratic draft law, but comrades, we have to weigh all the facts.

Deputy S. Angapov:

If there is no nation, does that mean there are no nationality conflicts? This is an easy, a very easy method....

A. Sebentsov:

That is a gross oversimplification. The basis for nationality conflicts has nothing to do with being registered as a certain nationality. The basis for conflicts lies in people's national consciousness. This law would indeed facilitate the smoothing over of nationality conflicts.

A. Lukyanov:

Here is an incident that took place: One republic, on the basis of reregistration, announced that there should not be any autonomy because no such nationality exists there. During the reregistration period a total of only four people were registered.

Deputy K. Usenbekov:

I am perplexed. Why has this question been raised? To whose benefit is it that nationalities would not be listed in documents in the Soviet Union? After all, aren't we proud of our multinational state? Don't we call ourselves internationalists and not some kind of cosmopolites? If a person is not proud of his belonging to some nationality, can he be an internationalist? We point to the West, but don't we understand that America does not need nationalities, that it is rich because it exploits other peoples, the same as France and Great Britain? But our state exists on a multinational basis and friendship for the great Russian people, whom we call our elder brother. Does it mean that there are no Russians either? Let us write: Nationality exists in the USSR; cosmopolite

A. Sebentsov:

One cannot present only one side of a question: To whose benefit is it that we would not have nationalities entered? And to whose benefit is it to have it? I shall

answer: It is of benefit to have a person registered as belonging to a specific nationality, a nationality from which he cannot be torn away even by the most democratic or the most progressive forces.

B. Safarov:

I think that the question has been presented very correctly and at the right time. This document should definitely be approved. We are not speaking about the privilege of some nation, but about human rights. And on what basis are we supposed to interfere with young people determining for themselves to which nation they belong? Even if I am the father, what right do I have to force my son or daughter? That is their right (noise in the hall).

A. Lukyanov:

Attention, comrades....

Deputy A. Khusanov:

I am categorically opposed to Safarov's views. I agree with the opinion of the Kirghiz deputies. If they find out about this resolution in the republics, there will be all kinds of false rumors. They will say that the Center is pressuring us again. If we pass this resolution, we shall give an opportunity to some to betray their homeland, to engage in profiteering, and to manipulate the various problems that come up in their lives.

I. Laptev, Chairman of the Soviet of the Union:

Respected colleagues! This situation is apparently tied not only to the text of this resolution and not only to the very essence of the question under discussion, but also to what our general attitude is toward the problem of human rights and how we understand the right of each person to act in a certain way. Secondly, we have apparently forgotten when we speak about the mandatory aspect of this registration that in absolutist tsarist Russia there was no passport entry on nationality. The country existed and there was order, and the national composition was taken into account, and everything moved normally, but there was no such entry in the passport. Thirdly, we have also survived, thank God, the situation when instead of entering our parents' names, we wrote a dash. But this did not result in indignation and was considered normal. Today we are speaking about the right of every person to somehow determine who he is. He will not change his nationality if he truly belongs to it. In addition, the first point of this resolution does not take away a person's right to register his nationality three times if he wants to, in the same passport. If he wants to do it four times, let him do it four times. Everything is left to his discretion. And lastly, I would like to introduce the following proposal: Notwithstanding the fact that I am a true supporter of this resolution, that I believe it is humane in nature, that it fully fits into our policy of defending human rights and respecting the rights of every individual, I am nevertheless proposing that this resolution not be passed today. I

propose that it be sent around to all the republics and receive the relevant conclusions from them. In addition, we cannot ignore the fact that we are now at the threshold of signing the Union treaty. If we decide on this question today, it would mean that we would—one way or another—touch upon that treaty. I believe that we should wait for a while....

Commentary by the 'Soyuz' Parliamentary Correspondent

I interrupted the stenographic report at this point. Yes, the deputies continued going up to the microphone, which, it seemed, literally heated up from the fiery speeches. One deputy even declared that there is no such nationality as Turk-Meskhetin. The fire of the dispute nearly flamed up with new force, but A. Lukyanov did not allow it to spread. He put I. Laptev's proposal to a vote, which resulted in 209 deputies voting "for," and 61 "against." Thus, the draft resolution will be sent to the parliaments of the republics for discussion. Even though prognosis is, as is well known, a thankless task, I shall permit myself to speculate that the majority of the republics, alas—as in 1977—will reject the draft resolution.

The invincible "fifth point".... No, we have not matured yet; we have not grown up yet.... In my opinion, the discussion in the assembly hall became a kind of apotheosis to appease a large group of deputies from Leningrad, who appealed to the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and the RSFSR, to the President of the USSR, and to the Chairmen of Supreme Soviets of the USSR and the RSFSR. Here are just the first few lines of this appeal: "We ... are disturbed by the violation of the rights of citizens of the USSR who are of Russian nationality and who are now residing within the territories of other republics of the Union.... Today these Russian people are denied the opportunity to exercise their right to vote for the President of the RSFSR"....

"Our side" is being beaten; save "us".... We hear these words at a time when all civilized countries are raising the question of the survival and saving of all mankind and, in general, the saving of all life on our planet.

Analysis of Interethnic Conflicts Offered

91US0661A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Jul 91
Second Edition p 3

[Article by A. Zharnikov under the rubric: "Law and History: Interethnic Conflicts: Variation of a Political Science Study"]

[Text] The study of any crime begins with the basic questions: Who benefits from it? Who is the perpetrator of it? How was it done and using what means? The interethnic conflicts shaking the country long ago took on the elements of a crime. The time has come for a political science study, along with a legal one. Its focus should obviously be those same questions. The article presented

below is an attempt at this; it does not claim to be the final truth. This is one variant which in no way negates the possibility of others.

The causes and preconditions leading to large-scale interethnic conflicts are always diverse, but their combination in each particular case is usually distinctive. All the same, in addition to everything else, the existence and interaction of at least three factors is necessary in this case.

The first of them involves the level of national self-consciousness. It must be sufficiently high to ensure that the people or peoples can recognize the abnormality of their status, if such exists. And, the state of national self-consciousness itself should be appropriate, that is, prepared to accept particular ideas. Secondly, a dangerous, "critical" mass of real problems and deformations which put pressure on all aspects of national life must have accumulated in society. Thirdly, concrete political forces able to take advantage of the first two factors are needed. That is how a persistent, dangerously explosive mixture is created.

National Self-Consciousness. The worldwide trend toward its growth certainly did not bypass our country. In fact our country had all the preconditions for it: rapid increase in the proportion of the national intelligentsia, urbanization, shifting of the centers of national culture to the cities, professionalization, and so on. However, the process also had its Soviet features. One of them was that the growth of national self-consciousness encountered layers of painful problems, deformations, and real inequality in the area of national relations. As a result, the position in which many Soviet peoples found themselves began to be interpreted by them more and more often as abnormal. By the end of the 1980s, this imperative had begun to dominate.

Another feature was that the deformed nature of the social structures of our society could not fail to have an effect on the growing national consciousness and began to deform it as well. So, the policy of "indigenization of the apparat" in local areas, which had long ago fulfilled its purpose, was preserved almost everywhere. As a result, in many places professions appeared which in fact became the privilege of a particular nationality. This situation could not fail to arouse dissatisfaction among some and a sense of exclusiveness in others. Irrational impulses have also sharply increased in the country's social consciousness since the second half of the 1980s: mystification of national consciousness and growth in ethnocentrism and nationalist sentiments have emerged.

Problems and Deformations. Their mass has really become critical. This means "unifier" policy, twisted, distorted federation, an emasculated principle of national self-determination, and many other things. A qualitatively new, potentially volatile situation emerged.

Political Forces. By the start of perestroika, the power structures in both the Center and in local areas represented an interesting and in some ways paradoxical

phenomenon. First, they seemed to be inverted. That is, the real power actually passed from the representative "elective" organs to the executive organs. Since they were the most professional part of the political establishment, it was they who concentrated in their hands the real rather than ornamental power. Secondly, the apparats in the republics (both party and state apparats) became more and more mononational. And while the representative organs, which were in the public eye, should have if only formally reflected the region's national and social structure, the main part of the apparats were formed on other principles (political loyalty, devotion, professionalism, and the like).

Finally, despite the rigidity of the political centralization which reigned in the country, the apparat structures were fairly autonomous in the republics, even in relation to the Center. The representative organs bore formal responsibility for the state of affairs but in fact it was a small group of high officials (the political leadership). They were the main ones who were monitored and, where necessary, punished. The apparats, which were the real "subsidiary" branches of the central command-administrative system, had long ago paid tribute to it, for the most part with external manifestations of loyalty.

In this way, a state of "forces standing at the ready" and "slumbering elements" arose before the perestroika reforms began. In order to put them in motion a trigger or detonator was needed. The first serious economic failures filled this role. Under their impact the discord in the central structures of power intensified. The split could not be resolved in the "embryonic" period; it spilled out.

Each of the factions which presented its model of further development began to appeal to the public. Soon the idea of applying "acceleration" to the economy by radical reformation of the basic political structures emerged. This led to rapid formation of a new political elite. It immediately (after the First Congress of People's Deputies) became involved in the struggle for its share of power with the old traditional structures. The situation in the country began to go out of control.

In these conditions, the forces in power in the republics had to work out for themselves a political equation with certain unknowns. Which of the opposing central factions should they support and for how long? What was preferable for self-preservation: help the central authorities reestablish control over the situation or the opposite, take advantage of the moment and try to break away from them and acquire complete sway? Which internal republic forces and resources should be relied upon if the situation in the country became catastrophic, and would it be a good idea to decide to separate from the Center?

Why the different political groupings in our republics responded to the questions posed above in different ways is another topic. Today it is more important to understand something else: what mechanism of survival and further consolidation was used by those of them who

said "No" to the Center. And the mechanism of survival and further consolidation was built from start to finish on appeal to the national idea.

The souls of politicians by no means overflowed with love for the "little homeland." It was simply that the factions which started the struggle against the Center and its followers in local areas had no other real weapon in their hands. But a national intelligentsia who were sincere and ached for their people existed. They were the ones primarily used to initiate broad actions, for those who stood behind them were in no hurry to appear on the stage. For it was easy to push the national intelligentsia into action. The weight of the problems and distortions which really existed had already in themselves generated loud protest.

As a result, events in some republics took on a definite logic. In conducting their "reconnaissance in force," the national intelligentsia at the same time prepared the appropriate bases of mass support. The popular fronts, which in the first stage favored "defending perestroika and humane socialism," were those bases. The country's public and the higher political leadership were initially disoriented by the sincerity of the first wave of the national upsurge. There was enough time to give events a large-scale character as well as to direct them onto an altogether different track. Then the factions which were standing behind the scenes placed their bets on separation from the Center. They had already openly moved to the newly created noncommunist structures of power and professionally removed the intelligentsia to the political periphery. The process moved into the phase of open political split.

But in those republics where similar extremist groupings revealed their intentions ahead of time without worrying about initial camouflage or creating bases of mass support, the political split did not develop into an open phase. And it was neutralized not so much by the Center as by the joint efforts of other political factions which had taken a good look at the impending catastrophe.

In order to kindle the fire, you have to know which end to set on fire and which branches will burst into flame faster and get the fire going. The same is true in interethnic conflicts. In relying on the nationalists in the struggle for power, one must know which strata of the population will accept it more easily and carry it to others. The intelligentsia is not suitable right here: because of their level of education and respectability they will not accept cave-man nationalism. But then if not them, who?

Let us look at the social and national structure of the republics. Large-scale changes whose consequences could not fail to have an effect have occurred there in recent decades. Let us take the Baltic Region. First, the percentage of the indigenous population has fallen sharply in those republics, especially in Latvia and Estonia. The construction of enterprises without labor resources from among the local nationalities promoted

that to a considerable extent. The industrial and construction proletariat there consisted of 80-85 percent "nonindigenous," for the most part Russian-speaking, population. But the representatives of the indigenous nationalities began to move from the sphere of industry and construction to the so-called "middle strata," management, the services sphere, the mass information media, the field of culture, and so on. This new "middle class" in fact became the rich soil on which one of the split-away ruling factions grew into a ruling national elite.

At first the population is taught to view everything that is happening through the prism of dividing people into "ours and not ours." And this division is exclusively on ethnic rather than some other, say social, grounds. The peak of the propaganda hysteria is characterized by mass, nationalistically slanted rallies and further evolution of slogans: "The Nation Is the State," "One Nation, One State," and finally, "One Nation, One State, One Leader." The probability of interethnic tensions developing into conflicts with means of force rises to the limit.

It was suggested long ago that the stronger the hysteria of an opposition movement, the more likely it is that concealed behind it is a phenomenon similar to what is being condemned. In the republics where new ruling groups came to power on a crest of ethnic conflicts, this is confirmed in full. The formation of political regimes of a very definite type began there to shouts of democracy and a struggle against totalitarianism. The country's public, set on the wrong trail, overlooked this process and even now, when the facts are there to see, the cover-up continues.

Involved in the struggle against the apparatchiks, the local public did not notice the most important thing: the rapid increase in executive power in the local areas, the personal apparatus of the leaders. The only difference is the "national apparatchiks" occupy the place of the "party apparatchiks" in them.

The large-scale conflicts which are engulfing the country today are not ethnic but political and social. Only the form is national in them; the essence is something altogether different, the struggle for power. No people is guilty of the crimes on interethnic grounds. All the blame here lies on those political cliques which use their own peoples in the struggle to survive, for, in the words of the Orwellian hero, "Power is an end in itself." In the end everyone suffers.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Selkup

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["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko: "Selkup"]

[Text] Self-designation: **Sel-Kup, Chumyl-Kup or Shol-Kup**, which means "person of the taiga" or person of the

earth." There is no common self-designation for all Selkup groups. In pre-revolutionary publications, like the Ugri of the Ob, they were called "Ostyaks." In ethnographic publications, the term "Ostyako-Samoyed" was used. The term "Selkup" appeared in the 1930s.

According to the 1989 census, 3,612 Selkup live in the USSR.

The Selkup language is part of the Samoyedic group of the Finno-Ugric branch of the Uralic language family.

The Selkup are people of the taiga. They inhabit Kargasoksiy, Verkhneketskiy, and Kolpashevskiy Rayons, Tomsk Oblast, Krasnonselkupskiy Rayon, Yamalo-Nenets Okrug, and Turukhanaskiy Rayon, Krasnoyarsk Krai.

The origin of the Selkup has still not been clearly established.

In their way of life, the Selkup resemble neighbors—the Khanty and Mansi; linguistically, they are closer to their more northern neighbors, the Samoyeds.

Some researchers believe that the Selkup are the descendants of the vanguard of the Samoyeds who migrated from the south to the tundras of the north with their reindeer herds. According to others, conversely, the Selkup belong to the part of the Samoyeds which remained in the forest area and adopted the characteristics of taiga culture.

The main occupation of the Selkup is fishing. They have fished since times immemorial, winter and summer, using a variety of methods.

The oldest method is a trap made of osiers interwoven with cherry bark.

This torpedo-shaped trap could be set anywhere in a river.

The old seines could also be made of pine rods held together with cedar roots. These nets were the most

popular fishing tools. Initially they had been made of nettle threads. The nets could be stationary or floating, depending on the type of fish—ide, crucian, peled, and others.

The Selkup built dams of various types on the rivers, dropped hooks, and used other methods. Fish was the main staple for humans and dogs.

Fish skin was used for clothing and covering the windows of old earthen huts; glue and fish soup were boiled and game furs were treated with fish skins.

In the winter the fish was frozen in ice; in the summer it was melted for fat and poured in birch utensils. Fish innards and eggs were mixed with berries to make "varku" which was a delicacy tasting like fruit fudge. Some of the fish was smoked and some was dried. Well-dried fish was ground into flour which was stuffed in leather bags and cylindrical birch-bark containers. Pigs were fed in the winter with this flour which was also used as bait for fur game.

The Selkup considered the bear a sacred animal and bear hunting involved an entire set of rituals. Most of the clothing was made of reindeer and elk hides. The tendons were used to make rope and cylindrical bones were used for a variety of objects, such as arrowheads.

The Selkup had become virtuosos in the manufacturing of a variety of wooden objects. Wood was the basic material from which everything necessary was made, including canoes, noted for their lightness, strength, and elegance.

The Selkup boughs were famous not only in the taiga but in the tundra areas as well. They were complex and deadly. Finally, also in demand by their neighbors were skis to which bits of fur were glued, and without which the life of a taiga hunter was inconceivable.

The Selkup were shamanists. They have preserved a number of ancient cults related to their industry, veneration of ancestors, and cults of sacred places.

Fundamentals of Criminal Legislation of USSR, Republics**Text of Fundamentals**

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Union Edition pp 2-3

[Text of "Fundamentals of Criminal Legislation of the USSR and the Republics"]

[Text]

Section 1. Criminal Law**Article 1. The Tasks of Soviet Criminal Legislation**

The criminal legislation of the USSR and the republics has as its tasks to protect the individual and his rights, freedoms, and property, the natural environment, public and state interests, and law and order from criminal offenses; as well as to help preserve the peace and security of mankind. Criminal legislation helps prevent crimes and indoctrinate citizens in the spirit of observing the USSR Constitution, the constitutions of the republics, and Soviet laws.

In order to carry out these tasks, criminal legislation of the USSR and the republics fixes the fundamentals and principles of criminal responsibility, determines which socially dangerous acts are crimes, and establishes the punishments which will be applied to persons who have committed crimes.

Article 2. Principles of Criminal Legislation

Criminal legislation of the USSR and the republics is based on the principles of legal order, the equality of citizens before the law, and the inevitability of responsibility, personal and culpable responsibility, justice, democratism, and humanism.

A person who has committed a crime is subject to criminal responsibility regardless of his origin, social, official, or material position, race or nationality, political convictions, sex, education, language, attitude toward religion, type and character of pursuits, place of residence, and other circumstances.

No one may be considered guilty of committing a crime and subjected to criminal punishment other than by verdict of a court and in accordance with the law.

No one may bear criminal responsibility for one and the same crime twice.

Article 3. Criminal Legislation of the USSR and the Republics

The criminal legislation of the USSR and the republics consists of these Fundamentals which define the principles and establish the general provisions of criminal legislation of the USSR and the republics and of the all-Union laws which envision responsibility for particular crimes and the criminal codes of the republics.

All-Union criminal laws define responsibility for crimes against the peace and security of mankind, crimes against the state, and military crimes, as well as crimes envisioned by international treaties of the USSR. All-Union criminal laws may establish responsibility for other crimes as well, if they impinge on relations whose regulation, in accordance with the USSR Constitution, is in the exclusive jurisdiction of the USSR or touch upon economic, ecological, or other rights and interests of two or more republics.

Criminal legislation of the USSR is subject to correlation with the principles of international treaties of the USSR, while the criminal legislation of the republics is subject to correlation with the criminal legislation of the USSR and the principles of the international treaties of the USSR and the republics.

Article 4. The Operation of Criminal Laws of the USSR and the Republics in Relation to Crimes Committed on USSR Territory

Persons who have committed crimes on USSR territory are subject to responsibility under the criminal laws in force at the place where the crime was committed.

When a crime is committed on the territory of two or more republics, the law of the republic where the crime was completed or stopped is applied.

The question of criminal responsibility of diplomatic representatives of foreign states and other citizens who, in accordance with laws and international treaties in force, are not subject to the criminal jurisdiction of Soviet courts, is resolved through diplomatic channels, if a crime is committed by such persons on USSR territory.

Article 5. The Operation of Criminal Laws of the USSR and the Republics in Relation to Crimes Committed Outside the Borders of the USSR

USSR citizens, as well as stateless persons living in the USSR, who have committed crimes outside the borders of the USSR are subject to responsibility under criminal laws in force in the republic on whose territory criminal proceedings against these persons are instituted or where they are bound over to court if they did not undergo punishment under sentence of the court of a foreign state.

Foreign citizens, as well as stateless persons, who do not reside permanently in the USSR are subject to responsibility under Soviet criminal laws for crimes committed outside the borders of the USSR in cases envisioned by the international treaties of the USSR and the republics.

Article 6. Effect of a Criminal Law in Time

The criminality and punishability of acts are determined by the law in force at the time that the act is committed. The time a socially dangerous act (or omission) was carried out is considered to be the time of commission of the act, regardless of when the consequences set in. A law which removes the criminality of the act, lessens the

punishment, or in some other way betters the position of a person has retroactive effect; that is, it applies to persons who committed the corresponding act before this law took effect, including persons who are serving sentences or have served out their sentences but have a criminal record.

A law which establishes the criminality of an act, increases punishment, or in some other way worsens the position of a person does not have retroactive effect.

Section 2. The Crime

Article 7. The Basis of Criminal Responsibility

The commission of an act which includes all the elements to make up a crime envisioned by criminal law is the basis of criminal responsibility.

Article 8. The Concept of a Crime

Committing a socially dangerous act (action or inaction) prohibited by criminal law under threat of punishment is considered a crime.

An action or inaction which, even though formally it includes the elements of some act envisioned by the criminal law, still by virtue of its insignificance does not represent a social danger is not a crime.

Article 9. Classification of Crimes

Depending on their nature and degree of social danger, crimes are subdivided into crimes which do not represent a great social danger, less serious crimes, serious crimes, and grievous crimes.

Crimes which do not represent a great social danger include intentional crimes for which the law envisions punishment in the form of imprisonment for a term of no more than two years or some other more lenient punishment, as well as crimes committed out of negligence for which the law envisions punishment in the form of imprisonment for a term of no more than five years or some other more lenient punishment.

Less serious crimes include intentional crimes for which the law envisions punishment in the form of imprisonment for a term of no more than five years, as well as crimes committed out of negligence for which the law envisions punishment in the form of imprisonment for a term of more than five years.

Serious crimes include intentional crimes for which the law envisions punishment in the form of imprisonment for a term of no more than 10 years.

Grievous crimes include intentional crimes for which the law envisions punishment in the form of imprisonment for a term of more than 10 years or the death penalty.

Article 10. Forms of Guilt

Only a person who has committed a socially dangerous act intentionally or out of negligence can be considered guilty of a crime.

Criminal responsibility for a crime committed out of negligence ensues only in cases when it is directly envisioned by criminal law.

Article 11. Intentional Commission of a Crime

A socially dangerous act committed with specific or general intent is considered an intentional crime.

The crime is considered committed with specific intent if the person recognized the socially dangerous character of his action or inaction and foresaw its socially dangerous consequences and wanted them to occur.

The crime is considered committed with general intent if the person recognized the socially dangerous character of his action or inaction and foresaw its socially dangerous consequences and, although he did not want them to occur, still he consciously allowed these consequences to occur.

Article 12. Commission of a Crime Out of Negligence

A socially dangerous act committed out of overconfidence or carelessness is considered a crime committed out of negligence.

The crime is considered committed out of overconfidence if the person foresaw the possibility of socially dangerous consequences of his action or inaction occurring but recklessly figured they could be averted.

The crime is considered committed out of carelessness if the person did not foresee the possibility of the onset of socially dangerous consequences of his action or inaction, even though he should have and could have foreseen them.

Article 13. The Age at Which Criminal Responsibility Ensues

The age at which criminal responsibility ensues is established by the criminal codes of the republics, but it cannot be less than 14 years.

Article 14. Incompetence

A person who while committing a socially dangerous act was in a state of insanity, that is, he could not recognize the significance of his actions or control them because of chronic mental illness, a temporary mental breakdown, feeble-mindedness, or other morbid mental disorders, is not subject to criminal responsibility.

The compulsory medical measures envisioned by Section 7 of these Fundamentals may be applied to a person who is considered incompetent.

Article 15. Limited Capacity

A person who while committing a socially dangerous act was in a state of limited capacity, that is, he could not fully recognize the significance of his actions or control them because of a morbid mental disorder, is subject to criminal responsibility.

The state of limited capacity can be taken into account when imposing punishment and serves as the basis for applying compulsory medical measures.

Article 16. Responsibility for a Crime Committed While in a State of Intoxication

A person who has committed a crime while in a state of intoxication is not released from criminal responsibility.

Article 17. Making Preparations for a Crime and Attempt To Commit a Crime

Locating and adapting means or weapons or in other ways intentionally creating conditions for committing a crime is considered making preparations for a crime. Criminal responsibility ensues only for preparations for a serious or grievous crime.

Intentional action or inaction aimed directly at committing a crime where the crime is not carried out because of circumstances beyond the person's control is considered an attempt to commit a crime.

Responsibility for preparations for a crime or an attempt to commit a crime ensues under the same criminal law as for a completed crime.

Article 18. Voluntary Abandonment of the Intention To Commit a Crime

Voluntarily stopping an action or inaction aimed directly at committing a crime, if the person was aware of the possibility of carrying the crime to a conclusion, is considered voluntary abandonment of the intention to commit the crime.

The act which the voluntary abandonment involves does not entail criminal responsibility. A person who has voluntarily refused to carry the crime to a conclusion is subject to criminal responsibility only if the act actually committed by him includes all the elements of a different crime.

Voluntary abandonment by an organizer, abettor, or accomplice precludes criminal responsibility, if the person took every measure he possibly could to prevent the commission of the crime.

Article 19. Complicity in a Crime

Intentional joint participation of two or more persons in committing an intentional crime is considered complicity in the crime.

Organizers, abettors, and accomplices are considered accessories to a crime along with the perpetrators.

A person who directly committed a crime or directly participated in committing it along with other persons or a person who committed the crime by using other persons who by virtue of the law are not subject to criminal responsibility is considered a perpetrator.

A person who organized the commission of a crime or supervised its commission is considered the organizer.

A person who has abetted the commission of a crime is considered an abettor.

A person who helped commit a crime with advice or instructions or provided the means or eliminated obstacles, as well as a person who promised ahead of time to conceal the crime, the weapon, or the means for committing the crime or clues of the crime or objects obtained in a criminal manner, as well as a person who promised beforehand to obtain or sell these objects is considered an accomplice to a crime.

Other accessories do not bear responsibility for an act committed by the perpetrator which did not involve the criminal design of the accessories.

Article 20. Commission of a Crime by an Organized Group

A crime is considered to be committed by an organized group if it is committed by two or more persons who joined beforehand into a stable group for this purpose.

Responsibility for the commission of a crime by an organized group ensues only in cases envisioned by criminal law.

A person who organized a group or managed it bears responsibility for all the crimes committed by the group if they involved his criminal design. Other participants in the organized group bear responsibility for crimes in whose preparations or commission they took part.

Article 21. Repetition of Crimes

Commission of two or more crimes envisioned by one and the same article of a criminal law is considered repetition of a crime. In cases envisioned by the legislation of the USSR and the republics, commission of two or more crimes envisioned by different articles of criminal law may be considered repetition.

A crime is not considered repeated if for crimes committed earlier the person who committed them was released from criminal responsibility or from punishment or the criminal record for these crimes was canceled or quashed in the manner established by law.

Article 22. Cumulation of Crimes

Commission of two or more crimes envisioned by different articles of criminal law, neither of which the person has been convicted and sentenced for, is considered cumulation of crimes. In this case, crimes for which a person was released from criminal responsibility for reasons established by the law are not considered.

Article 23. Recidivism

Commission of another intentional crime by a person who has a criminal record for an intentional crime is considered recidivism.

In cases envisioned by the criminal codes of the republics and on the basis of the sentence of the court, a person who has a criminal record for an intentional crime and is again sentenced for an intentional crime to imprisonment for a term of at least five years may be recognized as an especially dangerous recidivist.

When deciding the issue of considering a person an especially dangerous recidivist, the criminal record for crimes committed by this person while under 18 years of age or a criminal record that has been canceled or quashed in the manner established by law is not taken into account.

The articles of criminal laws which envision responsibility for commission of a crime by an especially dangerous recidivist are applied in cases where, before he committed the crime, the person was considered an especially dangerous recidivist by the sentence of the court which had gone into force.

Section 3. Circumstances Which Preclude the Criminality of an Act

Article 24. Justifiable Defense

Each citizen has the right to self-defense. This right belongs to a person regardless of the possibility of avoiding offenses or appealing for aid to other persons or organs of power.

An act committed in a state of justifiable defense, that is, when protecting the person and rights of someone defending himself or another person or the interests of society or the state from socially dangerous offenses by doing harm to the offender, if in so doing the limits of justifiable defense were not exceeded, is not a crime.

When the defense is clearly out of proportion to the nature and degree of danger of the offense, it is considered to exceed the limits of justifiable defense.

Article 25. Apprehension of a Person Who Has Committed a Crime

An action which, even though it fits the elements of an act envisioned by criminal law, is aimed at apprehending a person at the moment or directly after he has committed a crime for the purpose of handing the person apprehended over to the organs of power is not a crime if in so doing the measures to apprehend him were clearly not out of proportion to the nature and degree of social danger of the person who committed it and the circumstances of the apprehension.

Article 26. Extreme Necessity

An action which, even though it fits the elements of an act envisioned by criminal law, was committed in a state

of extreme necessity, that is, in order to eliminate danger threatening a person and the rights of this person or other persons or interests of society or the state, is not a crime if this danger under the given circumstances could not be eliminated by other means and if the damage inflicted is less significant than the damage prevented.

Article 27. Justified Occupational and Economic Risk

An action which, even though it fits the elements of an act envisioned by criminal law, represents a justified occupational or economic risk in order to achieve a socially useful goal is not a crime.

The risk is considered justified if the action committed corresponds to contemporary scientific-technical knowledge and experience, the goal posed cannot be achieved without risky actions, and the person who took the risk took all possible measures to prevent harm to legally protected interests.

The risk is not considered justified if it was knowingly accompanied by the threat of ecological catastrophe or danger to people's lives or health.

Section 4. Punishment

Article 28. Punishment and Its Purposes

Punishment is a measure of coercion administered on behalf of the state by sentence of the court to a person deemed guilty of committing a crime and ending in the deprivation or restriction of rights and freedoms of the convicted person.

Punishment is administered in order to rehabilitate convicted persons as well as to prevent the commission of new crimes by both convicted persons and other persons.

Punishment is not meant to cause physical suffering or degrade human dignity.

Article 29. Types of Punishment

The following basic punishments are applied to persons who have committed a crime:

- 1) a fine;
- 2) deprivation of the right to occupy particular posts or to engage in a particular activity;
- 3) corrective labor;
- 4) restriction of freedom;
- 5) arrest;
- 6) deprivation of freedom.

In addition, punishment in the form of restricted duty or assignment to a disciplinary battalion may be applied to military personnel.

In addition, punishment in the form of an obligation to make restitution or perform socially useful work as well as limits on leisure time freedom may be applied to minors.

In addition to the basic punishments, the following additional punishments may be applied to persons who have committed a crime:

- 1) loss of a military or special title;
- 2) confiscation of property.

A fine or deprivation of the right to occupy particular posts or engage in a particular activity may be applied not only as the primary punishment but also as supplementary punishment.

The criminal codes of the republics may specify types of punishment other than those indicated in this Article.

Article 30. The Fine

A fine is a monetary penalty imposed by the court in cases and within the limits established by law. The maximum amount of the fine is established by the criminal codes of the republics.

The amount of the fine to be paid by the guilty person is set contingent upon the nature and gravity of the crime committed. The court takes into account the material position of the defendant when fixing the fine.

A fine in the form of supplementary punishment may be fixed only in cases envisioned by law.

Substitution of deprivation of freedom for a fine or of a fine for deprivation of freedom is not permitted.

Article 31. Deprivation of the Right To Occupy Particular Posts or Engage in a Particular Activity

Deprivation of the right to occupy particular posts or engage in a particular activity can be imposed by the court for a term of no more than five years as the primary punishment or for a term of no more than three years as supplementary punishment.

Article 32. Corrective Labor

Corrective labor is specified for a term of no more than two years and is served on the basis of the sentence of the court at the convicted person's place of work or in other places in the rayon of residence of that person.

An amount established by the sentence of the court but no more than 20 percent is deducted into the income of the state from the earnings of the convicted person.

Instead of corrective labor, detention in the guardhouse for a term of no more than two months may be imposed on regular-term military personnel. Instead of corrective labor, restricted duty for a term of no more than two years may be imposed on military officers, warrant officers, and extended-term military personnel.

Time spent serving corrective labor is not included in the general term of service. On the petition of a social organization or labor collective, a judge may include time spent serving corrective labor in the general term of service after the convict has served out this punishment.

The group of persons to whom corrective labor is not applied is determined by the criminal codes of the republics.

Article 33. Restriction of Freedom

Restriction of freedom consists of keeping a person under supervision with compulsory performance of labor at places determined by the organs controlling execution of the sentence.

Restriction of freedom is established for a term of no more than four years.

The group of persons to whom restriction of freedom is not administered is determined by the criminal codes of the republics.

Article 34. Arrest

Arrest consists of keeping a person under strict isolation.

Arrest is fixed for a term of no more than three months.

The group of persons to whom arrest is not applied is determined by the criminal codes of the republics.

Article 35. Deprivation of Freedom

Deprivation of freedom is specified for a term of up to 10 years.

Deprivation of freedom for a term of more than 10 years but no more than 15 years is specified for crimes whose commission in accordance with Part 1 of Article 1 of these Fundamentals permits the application of the death penalty, as well as for other grievous crimes in cases envisioned by all-Union laws and the criminal codes of the republics.

Where on the basis of a pardon deprivation of freedom is substituted for the death penalty, the term may be fixed for 20 years.

Persons who have reached the age of 18 at the moment the sentence is passed are sentenced to serve punishment in the form of deprivation of freedom in correctional colonies, general, reinforced, strict, or special-regime colonies, or prison.

The grounds for sentencing the convicted person to a type of correctional institution and the type of regime of the correctional colony are established by the criminal codes of the republics.

The type of correctional institution or type of regime is changed by the court on the grounds and in the manner established by USSR legislation and the criminal codes of the republics.

Article 36. Restricted Duty

Restricted duty is applied to military officers, warrant officers, and extended-term military personnel for a term of no more than two years when imposed instead of corrective labor, as well as in other cases envisioned by law.

An amount determined by the court but no more than 20 percent is deducted into the income of the state from the pay of the convicted person who is sentenced to restricted duty. While he is serving his punishment in the form of restricted duty, the person convicted may not be promoted or receive a higher military rank and the term of punishment is not counted in his term of service for attaining the next rank.

Article 37. Assignment to a Disciplinary Battalion

Assignment to a disciplinary battalion is applied to regular-term service personnel for a term of no more than two years when the court, taking into account the facts of the case and the character of the convicted person, finds it advisable to employ assignment to a disciplinary battalion for that same term rather than deprivation of freedom, as well as in other cases envisioned by law.

Article 38. Loss of Military or Special Title

When a person with a military or special title is convicted of a serious or grievous crime, he may be deprived of this title by sentence of the court.

Article 39. Confiscation of Property

Confiscation of property consists of taking, on a compulsory and uncompensated basis, all or part of the property owned by the convicted person into state ownership.

Confiscation of property can be established by law for grievous and serious crimes, as well as for less serious mercenary crimes.

Confiscation of property can be fixed by the court only in cases envisioned by law for this crime.

Article 40. The Exceptional Penalty—Death

Application of the death penalty—by firing squad—as a form of exceptional punishment is permitted for state treason, premeditated murder under aggravating circumstances, rape of minors under aggravating circumstances, or kidnapping of a child which involves grievous consequences, as well as for grievous crimes against the peace and security of mankind.

The death penalty cannot be employed against persons who committed the crime when under 18 years of age or against women.

Section 5. Imposing Punishment

Article 41. General Principles of Imposing Punishment

The court imposes punishment within the limits established by the articles of the law which envision responsibility for the crime committed. The punishment must correspond to the principles of these Fundamentals and the criminal code of the republic. When imposing punishment, the court takes into account the character and degree of social danger of the crime committed, the motives of the person who committed it, the character of the wrongdoer, the nature and extent of the harm done, and circumstances which mitigate or aggravate responsibility.

A just punishment should be imposed on the person who committed the crime, a punishment which is necessary and sufficient for his rehabilitation and the prevention of new crimes. Punishment in the form of deprivation of freedom can be imposed only under the condition that its goals cannot be achieved by a different, more lenient punishment envisioned by law.

Article 42. Circumstances Mitigating or Aggravating Responsibility

The list of circumstances mitigating or aggravating responsibility is established by the criminal codes of the republics.

If one of these circumstances is envisioned by law as an element of a crime, it may not be considered again when punishment is imposed.

When imposing punishment, the court may consider circumstances not indicated in the law as mitigating circumstances.

Article 43. Imposing Punishment More Lenient Than That Envisioned by Law

The court, taking into account exceptional facts of the case which fundamentally reduce the degree of social danger of the action, as well as the character of the wrongdoer, and considering it necessary to impose on him punishment below the statutory minimum envisioned by law for the given crime or to change to a different, more lenient form of punishment, can permit this mitigation of the punishment, provided it gives a mandatory explanation of its reasoning.

On the same grounds the court may decide not to impose supplementary punishment which is mandatory according to the law envisioning responsibility for the crime committed.

Article 44. Imposing Punishment for an Aggregation of Crimes

Where crimes are aggregated, the court imposes punishment for each crime individually and finally determines punishment by merging less severe punishment with more severe punishment or by fully or partially merging

punishments within the limits established by the article of the law which envisions more severe punishment.

The court may add supplementary punishments imposed for crimes the person was found guilty of committing to the basic punishment.

A punishment is imposed under the same rules if after the sentence on the case is delivered it is established that the convicted person is guilty of yet another crime committed before the sentence on the first case was delivered. In that event the punishment served under the first sentence is counted in the term of the punishment.

Article 45. Imposing Punishment for an Aggregate of Sentences

If after the sentence is passed but before he has served out the punishment the convicted person commits another crime, the court adds all or part of the unserved part of the punishment imposed under the previous sentence to the punishment imposed under the new sentence.

The final punishment for an aggregate of sentences should be more than either the punishment imposed for the newly committed crime or for the unserved part of the punishment under the previous sentence.

Under cumulative sentence for an aggregation of sentences, the total term of punishment should not exceed the maximum term established for the given type of punishment. For cumulative sentence in the form of deprivation of freedom, the total term of punishment should not exceed 10 years, and for crimes for which the law permits imposing deprivation of freedom for a term of more than 10 years, it should not exceed 15 years.

Article 46. Rules for Aggregating a Cumulative Sentence and Deducting Preliminary Confinement

Where sentences are added together for an aggregation of crimes and sentences, one day of deprivation of freedom corresponds to:

- 1) one day of arrest or assignment in a disciplinary battalion;
- 2) two days of restriction of freedom;
- 3) three days of corrective labor or restricted duty.

Punishments in the form of a fine or confiscation of property, as well as deprivation of the right to occupy certain posts or engage in particular activities, when they are aggregated with deprivation of freedom, assignment to a disciplinary battalion, restriction on freedom, arrest, corrective labor, or restricted duty are carried out independently.

The court counts preliminary confinement in the term of punishment. In this situation one day of preliminary confinement corresponds to one day of deprivation of freedom.

Article 47. Suspended Punishment

If in imposing punishment the court, considering the nature and degree of social danger of the crime, the facts of the case, and the character of the wrongdoer, draws the conclusion that it is possible to rehabilitate the convicted person without his serving out the punishment, it may decree that the punishment is not to be applied:

- 1) on the condition that the person does not commit another crime during the probationary term;
- 2) on the condition that the person performs the obligations given to him by the court for the probationary term.

The grounds and conditions for not carrying out punishment are envisioned by the criminal codes of the republics.

Section 6. Release From Criminal Responsibility and Punishment

Article 48. Release From Criminal Responsibility or From Punishment

A person who has committed a crime can be released by the court from criminal responsibility or punishment or paroled from serving out the punishment imposed by the court only in cases envisioned by criminal law. The grounds and procedure for release are envisioned by the criminal codes of the republics.

A person who has committed a crime that does not represent a great social danger may, in cases envisioned by the criminal codes of the republics, be released from criminal responsibility with the application of measures of social influence. The grounds and procedure for applying measures of social influence are determined by the criminal codes of the republics.

A person who has committed a crime can be released from criminal responsibility if it is acknowledged that at the time of the court hearing, because of changed circumstances, this person is no longer socially dangerous.

In cases envisioned by USSR laws and the criminal codes of the republics, a person who has committed a crime can be released from criminal responsibility by the court if after committing the crime he turned himself in, repented, and made restitution.

Release from criminal responsibility is not permitted if the person who has committed the crime objects to it.

Article 49. Release From Criminal Responsibility Because the Statute of Limitations Has Lapsed

A person is released from criminal responsibility if the following periods of time have elapsed since the day the crime was committed:

- 1) two years for commission of a crime which does not represent great social danger;

- 2) four years for commission of a less serious crime;
- 3) seven years for commission of a serious crime;
- 4) 10 years for commission of a grievous crime other than in the case envisioned by Part 6 of this Article.

The criminal codes of the republics may fix lower statutes of limitations for certain types of crimes.

The running of the statute of limitations is counted from the day the crime was committed until the moment sentence is passed and is not interrupted by institution of criminal proceedings.

The running of the statute is interrupted if before the period indicated in the law expires, a person who committed a serious or grievous crime commits another intentional crime. In this case, the period of prescription runs from the moment the new crime is committed. In other cases if the person commits another crime before the period of prescription is up, the statute of limitations for each crime runs independently.

The running of the statute is temporarily suspended if a person who has committed a crime hides from the investigation or the court. In these cases the statute of limitations begins to run again from the moment that the person is apprehended or when he turns himself in. In this case the period of prescription envisioned by Part 1 of this Article doubles but may not exceed 15 years.

The question of applying the statute of limitations to a person who has committed a crime for which the death penalty may be imposed is decided by the court. If the court does not find it possible to apply prescription to him, deprivation of freedom rather than the death penalty is imposed.

When a crime is committed against the peace and security of mankind in cases envisioned by the laws of the USSR, prescription does not apply.

Article 50. Release From Punishment Because the Statute of Limitations for Execution of the Sentence Has Lapsed

A person is released from punishment if the sentence is not carried out in the following periods of time, counting from the day it went into legal effect:

- 1) two years—for a sentence of deprivation of freedom for a term of no more than two years or punishment not involving deprivation of freedom;
- 2) four years—for a sentence of deprivation of freedom for a term of no more than five years;
- 3) seven years—for a sentence of deprivation of freedom for a term of no more than 10 years;
- 4) 10 years—for a sentence of more severe punishment than deprivation of freedom for a term of 10 years.

The criminal codes of the republics may fix lower statutes of limitations for certain types of crimes.

The running of the statute of limitations is interrupted if the convicted person evades serving the punishment. In that event prescription begins to run again from the moment the convicted person turns himself in to serve the punishment or from the moment he is apprehended. In this case the term of the statute of limitations envisioned by Part 1 of this Article doubles but may not exceed 15 years.

The question of applying prescription to a person sentenced to death is decided by the court. If the court does not find it possible to apply prescription to him, deprivation of freedom is substituted for the death penalty.

Prescription does not apply to persons convicted of crimes against the peace and security of mankind in cases envisioned by USSR laws.

Article 51. Parole From Punishment and Substitution of More Lenient Punishment for the Unserved Part of the Punishment

Parole from punishment or substitution of more lenient punishment for the unserved part of a punishment may be applied by the court to persons who have served punishment in the form of deprivation of freedom or corrective labor, as well as assignment to a disciplinary battalion or restricted duty. In this case the person may be released from supplementary punishment as well.

Parole from punishment as well as substitution of more lenient punishment for the unserved part of the punishment may be applied to a convict who has shown exemplary behavior and a conscientious attitude toward work or studies.

The terms of the punishment after which the convict may be paroled or the unserved part of the punishment applied to him replaced with more lenient punishment and the procedure for parole and substitution of the unserved part of the punishment are established by the criminal codes of the republics.

When restriction of freedom or corrective labor is substituted for the unserved part of deprivation of freedom, they are applied within the limits established by the law for these types of punishment and should not exceed the unserved part of the term of deprivation of freedom.

If the person who was paroled commits a new crime while the unserved part of the punishment is running, the court imposes punishment on him under the rules of Article 45 of these Fundamentals.

Article 52. Release From Punishment Because of Illness

When a person who has committed a crime becomes mentally ill and loses the ability to recognize the significance of his actions or control them before the court passes sentence, he is not subject to punishment.

A person who becomes chronically mentally ill and loses his ability to recognize the significance of his actions or control them after the sentence has been passed is subject to release from punishment or continued punishment.

The court may apply compulsory medical measures envisioned by Article 56 of these Fundamentals to persons mentioned in parts 1 and 2 of this Article. If such persons recover, they may be subject to punishment.

When after sentence has been passed a person contracts some serious illness which prevents him from serving out his punishment, he may be released from punishment or continuation of the punishment. In resolving this question, the court takes into account the gravity of the crime committed, the character of the convicted person, and other circumstances.

Article 53. Release From Criminal Responsibility and Punishment Based of an Act of Amnesty or Pardon

On the basis of an act of amnesty or pardon, a person who has committed a crime may be released from criminal responsibility or completely or partially released from both basic and supplementary punishment and his criminal record may be quashed.

On the basis of an act of pardon, a person convicted for a crime can be completely or partially released from both basic and supplementary punishment or more lenient punishment may be substituted for the unserved part of the punishment and his criminal record may be quashed.

Article 54. The Criminal Record

The criminal record has legal significance when a new crime is committed, as well as in other cases envisioned by law.

A person is considered to have a criminal record from the day the sentence of the court goes into legal effect.

A person released from punishment by the sentence of the court is considered not to have a criminal record.

The period of cancellation and the procedure for quashing the criminal record are determined by the criminal codes of the republics.

The cancellation or quashing of the criminal record terminates the action of all limitations related to the criminal record.

Section 7. Compulsory Medical Measures

Article 55. The Purposes of Applying Compulsory Medical Measures

Compulsory medical measures may be applied to persons who have committed socially dangerous acts and are suffering from mental disorders in order to prevent socially dangerous acts on their part, to protect their personalities, and to treat them.

Article 56. Application of Compulsory Medical Measures to the Mentally Ill

The court applies compulsory medical measures to persons who have committed socially dangerous acts envisioned by criminal law in a state of incapacity or who have become mentally ill and lost their ability to recognize the significance of their actions or control them before or after sentence has been passed, if these persons represent a threat to society in terms of the nature of the act they committed or their mental state.

When there are no grounds to apply compulsory medical measures, the court may hand the mentally ill person over to the health care organs to resolve the question of treatment on general principles or send him to a social security establishment.

The time during which compulsory medical measures are applied to a person who became ill after committing the crime is counted in the term of punishment.

Article 57. Application of Compulsory Medical Measures to Persons Who Have Committed a Crime in a State of Limited Mental Capacity

The court may apply compulsory medical measures to persons who have committed a crime in a state of limited mental capacity when treatment of them is necessary. For those persons sentenced to deprivation of freedom or restriction of freedom, the treatment is conducted at the place where the punishment is being served.

Article 58. Application of Compulsory Medical Measures to Chronic Alcoholics, Drug Addicts, or Toxic Substance Addicts

If a chronic alcoholic, drug addict, or toxic substance addict commits a crime, compulsory medical measures may be applied along with punishment.

Article 59. Determination of the Types of Compulsory Medical Measures and the Conditions and Procedure for Their Application

The types of compulsory medical measures and the conditions and procedure for their application or extension, modification, or termination are determined by the criminal codes of the republics.

The criminal codes of the republics may envision application of compulsory measures of a medical nature for persons who have committed crimes and suffer from other illnesses as well.

The court extends or terminates the application of compulsory medical measures or modifies their type on the basis of the findings of a medical commission.

Section 8. Special Features of the Criminal Responsibility of Minors

Article 60. General Provisions

Criminal responsibility for persons who have committed a crime while under 18 years of age arises in accordance with the provisions of these Fundamentals with consideration of the rules envisioned by this Section.

A person who has reached the age set by law but as a result of retarded mental development unrelated to mental disorder is unable to recognize the actual nature or social danger of his actions or control them is not subject to criminal responsibility.

A person who committed a crime for the first time when under 16 years of age and the crime did not represent great social danger is not subject to criminal responsibility.

Article 61. Types of Punishments

The following types of punishment may be applied to minors:

- 1) imposition of an obligation to make restitution;
- 2) a fine;
- 3) involvement in socially useful work;
- 4) restriction of leisure-time freedom;
- 5) corrective labor;
- 6) arrest;
- 7) deprivation of freedom.

Imposition of an obligation to make restitution, involvement in socially useful work, or restriction of leisure-time freedom may be applied instead of punishment not involving deprivation of freedom which is envisioned by law for a crime committed by a minor.

The legislation of the republics may also establish types of punishment other than those indicated in this Article, in accordance with the principles and general provisions of these Fundamentals.

Article 62. Imposition of an Obligation To Make Restitution

Performance of an obligation to make restitution means directly and by one's own efforts eliminating the harm done or compensating for material losses with one's own means, or a public apology to those who suffered or to members of the collective in a form set by the court.

Article 63. The Fine

A fine is applied to minors who have independent earnings.

Article 64. Involvement in Socially Useful Work

Socially useful work consists of the minor performing work within his abilities which does not damage his health and does not disrupt his studies. Such work is imposed in amounts from 20 to 100 hours, lasting no more than 4 hours a day, and served by the convicted person without pay in nonstudy time.

The types of socially useful work and the procedure and conditions to serve them are determined by the criminal codes of the republics.

Article 65. Restriction of Leisure-Time Freedom

Restriction of leisure-time freedom involves imposing an obligation on the minor to observe a certain procedure in the use of time away from study or work.

The court may introduce restrictions on the minor's visiting certain places, spectacles, entertainment, or other events and oblige him to be home at a certain time of day and periodically appear for registration at the organ carrying out the punishment. The criminal codes of the republics may establish other types of restrictions as well.

The term of restriction of leisure-time freedom may not exceed six months.

Article 66. Corrective Labor

For minors who have reached the age of 16, corrective labor is applied at their place of work for a term of up to one year.

An amount established by the sentence of the court but not exceeding 15 percent is deducted into state income from the convicted person's earnings for the corrective labor.

Article 67. Arrest

Arrest is applied to a minor who at the moment the sentence is passed has reached the age of 16 and is fixed for a term of no more than 45 days.

Article 68. Deprivation of Freedom

Deprivation of freedom of a person who has committed a grievous crime when he was under 18 years of age cannot exceed 10 years. The criminal codes of the republics may set maximum terms of deprivation of freedom lower than those envisioned by Article 9 of these Fundamentals for persons who have committed less serious crimes and serious crimes when under 18 years of age.

Persons who have not reached the age of 18 by the time the sentence is passed are to serve out the punishment in general- or reinforced-regime educational colonies.

Punishment in the form of deprivation of freedom is not applied to a person who first committed a crime when he was under the age of 18 and the crime did not represent a great social danger.

Article 69. Release From Punishment

If the rehabilitation of the person who committed a crime which does not represent great social danger or a less serious crime while under 18 years of age is possible without criminal punishment, the court may release him from punishment and apply compulsory educational measures which are not criminal punishment to this person.

The types and procedure for applying compulsory educational measures are determined by the criminal codes of the republics.

Article 70. Parole From Punishment and Substitution of More Lenient Punishment for the Unserved Part of Punishment

The court may apply parole from punishment or substitution of more lenient punishment for the unserved part of the punishment to persons who are serving punishment in the form of deprivation of freedom or corrective labor for a crime committed while under 18 years of age.

The procedure for applying parole from punishment or substitution of more lenient punishment for the unserved part of the punishment to persons who committed a crime while under 18 years of age is determined by the criminal codes of the republics in accordance with Article 51 of these Fundamentals, but under more preferential conditions.

Article 71. The Criminal Record

A person who has served punishment for a crime which does not represent a great social danger or for a less serious crime committed while under 18 years of age is not considered to have a criminal record.

[Signed] President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics M. Gorbachev

Moscow, the Kremlin, 2 July 1991.

Resolution Enacting Fundamentals

91US0659B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Jul 91 Union Edition p 3

[Text of USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution: "On Enacting the Fundamentals of Criminal Legislation of the USSR and the Republics"]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet decrees the following:

1. To enact the Fundamentals of Criminal Legislation of the USSR and the Republics starting 1 July 1992.

2. To enact Article 40 of the Fundamentals of Criminal Legislation of the USSR and the Republics, which envisions the possibility of applying the death penalty, from the moment these Fundamentals are published.

Substitute deprivation of freedom for a term of 15 years in place of the death penalty for women convicted and sentenced to death as well as men convicted and sentenced for a crime the commission of which does not envision, in accordance with Article 40 of the Fundamentals of Criminal Legislation of the USSR and the Republics, the possibility of applying the death penalty. This provision does not extend to men convicted and sentenced under Article 2 of the USSR Law of 25 December 1958: "On Criminal Responsibility for State Crimes."

3. Existing criminal legislation is applied from the moment the Fundamentals of Criminal Legislation of the USSR and the Republics go into effect until the criminal legislation of the USSR and the republics is brought into line with these Fundamentals, since existing criminal legislation does not contradict the Fundamentals of Criminal Legislation of the USSR and the Republics.

4. Within six months time the President of the USSR must introduce proposals to the USSR Supreme Soviet on the procedure for realizing the provisions of the Fundamentals of Criminal Legislation of the USSR and the Republics not envisioned by existing criminal legislation, including proposals on the procedure for applying measures of punishment determined for persons convicted and sentenced before 1 July 1992 in accordance with the provisions of the Fundamentals of Criminal Legislation of the USSR and the Republics.

5. The General Procurator of the USSR and the USSR Supreme Court must formulate jointly with the USSR Ministry of Justice and the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs a draft of the Federal Criminal Code of the USSR, as well as a draft of the legislative act on responsibility for socially dangerous actions of persons who have not reached the age of criminal responsibility, and introduce these bills to the USSR Supreme Soviet for review before 1 March 1992.

6. The legislative acts as appended are considered out of force as of 1 July 1992.

[Signed] Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, A. Lukyanov.

Moscow, the Kremlin, 2 July 1991.

State Interest in MVD Needs Increases

91US0631A Moscow SYN OTECHES'TVA in Russian No 9, 1 Mar 91 p 4

[Column by Vladimir Yanchenkov, press service leader: "In the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs"]

[Text]

Facts

In an interview with a BBC correspondent broadcast on 26 February, USSR Supreme Soviet Deputy Alan Gagloyev stated: "...the Ossetians are arming themselves rapidly and very successfully. The only thing keeping them from a large-scale civil war now is the cold and rainy weather, and as soon as it gets warmer the people will go out into the forests and mountains and protect Tskhinvali down to their last drop of blood."

Frankly, the prediction is ominous. But the reports coming in from South Ossetia convince us that the situation in the region actually continues to be extremely tense.

Moseshvili, a militiaman from the regiment for protecting state objects and institutions of the internal affairs administration of the city of Tbilisi, was killed and two other militiamen from the same regiment were wounded on 25 February in the village of Avnevi in Znaurskiy Rayon when some unknown individuals fired on a militia post.

As before, explosions and shots ring out in Transcaucasia. Thus on 24 February there was an explosion from an unknown device in front of a scheduled bus traveling from Yevlakh to Lachin. The driver, Z. Aliyev, and a worker of the Khodzhalinskiy militia department, B. Bakhshaliyev, were injured.

On 25 February in Mardakertskiy Rayon of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast a group of about 40 unidentified individuals coming from the direction of the village of Borsunlu in Mir-Bashirskiy Rayon in Azerbaijan fired automatic weapons at residents of the village of Talish.

Practically every day reports come in about the theft of firearms. It is not only the Ossetians, as People's Deputy A. Gagloyev stated, but also criminal elements and regular criminals who are arming themselves.

In the city of Kaspiysk in the Dagestan ASSR on the territory of a precision mechanics plant on 23 February a criminal broke into the office of the chief of the militarized guard, hit him on the head, opened the weapons room, and made off with 15 revolvers, 108 cartridges for them, and six carbines.

On 24 February in the city of Tuymazy in Bashkiria criminals broke into the office of the physical education instructor of Secondary State Vocational and Technical School-49 and stole a small-caliber TOZ-8 rifle and about 500 cartridges for it.

Operational investigations are being conducted on all cases of theft of weapons.

This Is Useful To Know

Workers of the Academy of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs conducted an analysis of more than 500 criminal cases involving robbery of drivers of state

means of automotive transportation (taxis, service vehicles) and the owners of private vehicles. As a rule, they were committed in poorly lit, uncrowded places, in the evening or at night, and in the absence of witnesses.

In more than 70 percent of the cases, when preparing for the crime the criminals developed a plan, got hold of the implements for the crime, selected accomplices, and assigned the roles. Moreover, 20 percent of the crimes were committed by a single individual, more than half—by two people, and 23 percent—by three or more people.

In terms of the mechanism for the robbery, in 19 percent of the cases the victims were struck from behind with a knife or some other weapon. In almost 30 percent of the cases bodily harm was caused by a string, a rope, wire, or some other means. In more than one-third of the cases the criminals resorted to threats with edged weapons or firearms and 13 percent of the drivers were killed.

The largest number of crimes are committed by individuals from 18 to 35 years of age. More than 80 percent of the accused had previous offenses and more than half of them had committed similar crimes before.

The Problem

As we know, technically, the equipment of the Soviet militia is as bad as it can be. They are short of the most necessary things—motor vehicles, handcuffs, special equipment, and so forth. How is this problem being solved? V. Yakubovskiy, first deputy chief of the Main Administration for Material and Technical and Military Supply, says:

"Recently the state and society have been paying considerably more attention to the needs of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. Last year alone 3.4 million rubles' [R] worth of transportation-technical equipment and property were delivered to the ministry. Additional expenditures on material and technical supply for the personnel exceeded R1 billion. The Cabinet of Ministers adopted a decree concerning another significant increase in monetary support beginning 1 March. Additional payments and compensations are being introduced to replace the food rations for class qualifications and special working conditions.

"But still there are many unsolved problems. At the beginning of this year 15 percent of the previously concluded agreements were not fulfilled. GAZ [Gorkiy Motor Vehicle Works], UAZ [Ulyanovsk Motor Vehicle Works], and AZLK [Moscow Motor Vehicle Works imeni Lenin Komsomol] are refusing to conclude agreements for the delivery of the necessary quantity of motor vehicles and delaying the coordination of agreements for the manufacture of bullet-proof vests."

While interdepartmental problems are being "shaken loose," the criminals are not standing idly by. And only the high degree of conscientiousness, faithfulness to duty, and courage of the militia workers can explain the

fact that under these difficult conditions the organs of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs are stemming the tide of legal violations.

Union-Controlled Internal Forces Needed

91UN2312A Kiev *RABOCHAYA GAZETA* in Russian
5 Jul 91 p 2

[Interview with Major General V.N. Sanin, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy and chief of the military and political department of the internal forces of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Ukraine and Moldova, by P. Karlov and V. Korkodim; place and date not given: "Who Is Placing the Cart Before the Horse, or Is It Appropriate To Force the Transfer of Internal Forces to the Jurisdiction of the Republics"]

[Text] As we know, it is written in the Declaration of the Sovereignty of the Ukraine that the "Ukrainian SSR has its own internal forces." In this connection, today people at various levels are discussing the possibility of transferring to republic jurisdiction some of the internal forces of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs that are stationed on its territory. Such a decision would essentially mean taking federal law enforcement armed forces out of the jurisdiction of the country's president and Cabinet of Ministers. Yet the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet has never once brought up for discussion any draft law which would call into question the presence of internal forces under Union jurisdiction and the need for them to participate in maintaining public order on the territory of the republic.

In order to clarify the situation, our correspondents went to Major General V.N. Sanin, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy and chief of the military and political department of the internal forces of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Ukraine and Moldova, and asked him to express his attitude toward this difficult problem.

[Sanin] Many people think that transferring the internal forces to republic jurisdiction is a simple and easy step. But, to put it tactfully, that idea does not come from a deep understanding of life.

First of all, I want to speak about not the political but the economic side of the matter. Today the troops cost the Union budget many tens of millions of rubles. With the scarcity of the most necessary things in the Ukraine today, it would be immoral to heap on the shoulders of the taxpayers even more immense expenses for the maintenance of troops and their material and technical supply. This would only worsen the standard of living of the people and would have a negative effect on the solutions to many social problems. Therefore I, as a Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, would not like to put the people who elected me in such a position. Let me note in passing that, under Union jurisdiction, the internal forces are considerably less expensive to keep both for the state and for each person individually.

Now about certain other aspects. The life and activity of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs are regulated in detail by Union laws. The basic one is the USSR law adopted on 26 March 1990, "On the Duties and Rights of Internal Forces of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs for Maintaining Public Order." Article 1 of this law states that "in their activity they are guided by the laws of the USSR, the ukases of the USSR president, the decrees of the USSR Council of Ministers, and general military regulations."

Nor should one forget that the internal forces are the same as the Army but with specific assignments. Our regular units are staffed by the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces on the basis of the law on universal military obligation and the provisions for the service of officers and warrant officers. During the time of their service the military personnel acquire one of the 300 necessary military training specialties, and after they are released into the reserve, the military commissariats register them in the reserve of the Soviet Army and place them in formations for mobilized deployment.

Now let us imagine for a moment that the internal forces of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs on the territory of the Ukraine were transferred to republic jurisdiction. They could not function according to Union legal acts and there are no republic acts. Where would this lead? First of all, it would have a negative effect on troop training and their ability to carry out their assignments successfully. At the same time a person who belongs to these forces would end up completely socially unprotected.

The experience of perestroika has taught us more than one lesson when we have hastily broken down the old and tried to create the new without having prepared the appropriate base, and this has only exacerbated the political and economic crisis, made the people's life worse, and impeded their forward progress.

Of course, a person might agree or disagree with the present status of the internal forces, but one cannot escape the realities of the present day. Problems of strengthening law and order in the Ukraine, as in the country as a whole, must be solved calmly, without haste, in a well considered way, and on a legal basis. Legal acts have not yet been adopted for the internal forces themselves and therefore we should not place the cart before the horse.

[*RABOCHAYA GAZETA*] Vasilii Nikiforovich, where is the way out of this situation?

[Sanin] The problem must be solved along with others and in the objective course of development, so that this will have a positive effect on the strengthening of public order both in the Ukraine and in the country as a whole. An immediate separation of part of the internal forces from the overall mechanism would not achieve this end and would only impede the activity of the sovereign state for strengthening law and order in the republic. To force events is the approach of a dilettante. I personally am not

convinced that now is the time to divert forces and funds to the formation of the republic's internal forces.

As many people correctly understand, the most crucial and the primary thing in this stage is the signing of the Union treaty, which should reflect the functions of the central organs and the sovereign states included in the federation which delegate to the USSR president and the Union government questions of collective defense, the fight against organized crime, and the leadership of the common internal forces.

[RABOCHAYA GAZETA] Why, in your view, are other republics not demanding that some of the Union internal forces be turned over to them?

[Sanin] Apparently they were ahead of the Ukraine in deeply analyzing the situation, they made their calculations, and came to the conclusion that, in the first place, the troops could not be taken out without preparing the corresponding base and legal foundation, and, in the second place, the maintenance of their own forces would place a large burden on the budget, and the effectiveness of the activity of the units for strengthening law and order would decrease significantly.

[RABOCHAYA GAZETA] Then perhaps the calls for transferring the internal forces to the Ukraine are being heard because now the troops are not carrying out their assignments in the interests of the republic.

[Sanin] No, there can be no complaints against the internal forces from this standpoint. In the Ukraine they guard corrective labor institutions and especially important industrial facilities, and they maintain public order in the large cities. The majority of military servicemen in the special motorized units of the militia (SMChM), which consist, incidentally, of a number of residents of the republic, carry out their assignments in close interaction with local internal affairs organs.

Plans for the use of personnel are directly coordinated with the Ukrainian SSR foreign affairs minister and the chiefs of the oblast administrations, and I especially want to emphasize that they never go against republic legislation on maintenance of law and order.

In keeping with the regulations of the internal forces (probably not all readers know about them), which went into effect in 1987, the republic minister of internal affairs and the chiefs of the oblast internal affairs administrations have real rights with respect to internal forces, being their senior operations chiefs. For example, they determine the volume of service-combat tasks for the units and subdivisions and enlist military units of internal forces to work with internal affairs organs in providing for reliable isolation of convicts, protection of facilities, maintenance of order, and prevention of mass and group violations in population points in the places where the units are permanently stationed. In a word, they evaluate the completeness, promptness, and quality of the performance by the subdivisions of the tasks assigned to them.

[RABOCHAYA GAZETA] Vasilii Nikiforovich, but as early as the sixties the internal forces administration was placed under the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs...

[Sanin] But even then our troops were not taken out from under the jurisdiction of the center; they were controlled by the USSR Council of Ministers through the republic government and were subject to Union legislation and staffed by the General Staff. Military servicemen of the internal forces were transferred to the reserve of the Soviet Army, and, just as they are today, internal forces on the territory of the Ukraine performed assignments in the interests of the republic.

[RABOCHAYA GAZETA] As far as we know, today the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Ukraine is also interested in having the internal forces transferred to its jurisdiction. Is this possibly linked to the shortage of forces and funds for fighting crime?

[Sanin] Let me remind you again that the leaders of the internal affairs organs are the operational chiefs with respect to military units and have the right, depending on the situation, to use the forces and funds allotted to them. If the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs must have militarized detachments in its system in order to maintain public order, it seems possible to create them according to the OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment] type. On a professional basis from internal forces who have already served in the Soviet Army.

It is time to turn the convoy service over to professionals who would be under the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and use the released active military servicemen and officers for service in maintaining public order in the cities of the republic.

As you can see, this issue must not oversimplified. Before beginning the "divorce process" with the center for dividing up internal forces, in my view, it is necessary to consider all factors carefully.

Eastern RSFSR Crime Situation 'Critical'

91UN2117B Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 11 Jul 91 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed report: "Without a Retouch"]

[Text] Novosibirsk—The operational situation in the eastern regions of Russia is seen as critical, fraught with large-scale complications and emergencies. This conclusion was reached at the recent Novosibirsk regional conference of high-ranking public security officials.

The galloping growth of crime has especially aggravated the situation in Yakutia, Maritime Kray, and Kamchatka, Omsk, Sakhalin, and Sverdlovsk Oblasts. Lt. Gen. A. Anikiyev, first deputy minister of the RSFSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, named turmoil, the generation of excessive paperwork, sloppiness, and sluggishness among the factors that diminish the effectiveness of the

militia. The conference used the requirements of the RSFSR Law: "On the Militia" as the criterion in its analysis of the problems of combating crime and maintaining public order.

Organized Crime Leader Apprehended

91US0687A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 22 May 91 p 6

[Article by N. Modestov: "The 'Godfather' Has Been Apprehended: Is the Domestic Mafia Immortal?"]

[Text] At 1600 hours in the "Vstrecha" Cafe, as a result of the realization of operational information, agents of the Moscow Criminal Investigation Department and the Sixth Administration of the USSR KGB apprehended N. Suleymanov, the leader of an organized criminal ring, and his accomplices for extortion of 2,500,000 rubles [R] from the director of a joint enterprise.

During the searches of the suspects' premises the following were discovered and removed: four cars (three Mercedes's and one Volvo) for personal use; two pistols, which fire capsules containing paralytic nerve gas; two guns; \$8,000; R24,000; property worth R280,000 was inventoried. (From the operational summary).

Have the arguments about whether we have a mafia or organized crime, as it is commonly put now, receded into the past? Almost every day the newspapers report cases of extortion with torture or intimidation of the victims; they describe shooting in broad daylight, and they publish interviews with "thieves within the law," as if they were popular artists or political leaders.

On the subject of "thieves within the law." According to operational data from the USSR MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs), the country has about 500 of these people. But although they are the "cream" of the criminal crop, this is still not a mafia, of course. They are only "generals" in the criminal world. But the genuine masters of this army remain in the shadows. One can only guess their strength and the scale of their deals, because neither the level of police facilities and equipment nor the legislative base makes it possible to reach the "top" of organized crime in the near future.

According to A. Gurov, head of the USSR MVD's Main Administration for the Struggle Against the Most Dangerous Crimes, Organized Crime, Corruption and the Drug Business, criminal clans did exist and continue to exist, and it will hardly be possible to destroy them in the foreseeable future. And who, if not the leader of the renowned "sixth administration" would know their real strength and potential?

"A consolidation of the criminal organizations is taking place," says A. Gurov. Major rings are swallowing up smaller ones. The tendency of organized crime to enter the international arena is becoming increasingly noticeable. One can judge this by the fact that our colleagues in other countries are now appealing to us to conduct joint

operational-investigative actions. There is a proposal to work with similar services in Germany, Austria, Poland and Bulgaria to establish mixed brigades in the near future.

"I would note especially the politicization of crime," continues Aleksandr Ivanovich Gurov. "This concerns not only bribery but also the direct participation in criminal organizations of officials at various levels, and even some people's deputies. We are talking about 'lobbyism,' and we need to talk about this openly. It is very difficult to prove lobbyism. But it is obvious to all who are guided by elementary logic. Organized crime is penetrating the legal spheres of the economy. There are specific criminal cases but the interests of the investigation do not permit us to talk about them at present. In addition, the active division into spheres of influence continues. This matter has gone very far. Even state enterprises are being subjected to a cruel racket."

Moscow is a choice tidbit for criminals of all levels—it was divided into spheres of influence long ago. Hard-currency stores, restaurants, markets, gas stations, flower and dry-goods kiosks, prostitutes, card-games—all of them have been "under somebody" for a long time, that is, they pay for the opportunity to engage in their legal or illegal business. I advise those who doubt this to go to the Old Arbat and try to sell something while standing next to dozens of people trading in water colors, wooden knickknacks, souvenirs, and inexpensive jewelry items. They size up a stranger right away. They might not touch you the first time: they will look you over and get acquainted. But the second time, you can be certain they will not leave you in peace. And they will not stand on ceremony with a defenseless "merchant."

Everyone "comes across," and everyone knows that. But no one wants to admit it, much less go to the police. My good friend, who is president of a commercial scientific-production company (I omit his name for understandable reasons), confessed:

"They came to my office two days after the sign went up. We came to an amicable agreement: I give them five percent every month. I do not even know them, who they are or where they come from. This is a 'protection' tax."

The racketeers are sometimes called wolf-nurses. They take, so they say, from those who have extra or themselves have sticky fingers. It is possible that in some cases this logic is justified. And have such arguments arisen from our primitive understanding of justice or our nonacceptance of everything related to private property? But these thick fellows in leather jackets with heavy jaws and bull-like necks do not at all remind one of unselfish Robin Hoods. They can "selflessly" beat out a "debt" from a worker who is behind with his payments, having forgotten the time. That is how it was with the director of a Moscow joint enterprise. They abducted him at Sheremetyevo Airport, took him to a private apartment and tortured him for several days, trying to force him to transfer a large sum to the account of a fake cooperative.

The story of Zhenya the "Lyuberetskiy," the "cashier" of a criminal ring, is instructive. His ill-fated career in racketeering began in the renowned Lyuberetskiy ring. However, Zhenya, who also goes by the name Intrigan, did not share something with his Moscow friends. They promised to deal with him and Zhenya ran for help to a college acquaintance (also a dropout, as was Zhenya) named Ruslan, one of the big shots in another ring. Intrigan fit in here. Moreover, he "held" all of the Park of Culture imeni Gorkiy. Zhenya had his own stall near the entrance, and on certain days cooperative members, handicrafts people and speculators brought him the "protection tax." Today Zhenya, Ruslan and other members of the ring give themselves up to their recollections sitting on their plank beds in prison.

The criminal case involving the leaders of the so-called Lazanskiy ring, Atlangeriyev, Nukhayev and Lobzhanidze is one of the successes of the Moscow police in the struggle against organized crime. All three are recognized leaders in the criminal world. Their manner was confident, and they did not admit to even one of the accusations; they denied the extortion of more than 60,000 from a Moscow area cooperative member. True, these three were only a link between those who collected the money and those who received it. One can only guess about the latter. One of the criminals—Lobzhandize, explained to his victim:

"We need money for those 'up above.'"

Incidentally, unprecedented measures were required to ensure that the case of Atlangeriyev, Nukhayev and Lobzhandize did not "fall apart." Operational surveillance was maintained for nearly a year by agents from the Moscow Criminal Investigation Department. The only witness (the workers at Petrovka 38 were amazed at his courage) was guarded from the moment the criminals were arrested until they were sentenced by the court. While the case was being heard, plainclothes operatives were stationed in the courtroom and outside the building. Do not think that these security measures were superfluous. The racketeers' friends who were free appeared more than once at the home of the witness; they would threaten, ask him to retract his testimony and offer him money. And if it had not been for the operational measures taken by the police, the case would not have reached the court.

Our law enforcement organs should not be accused of impotence against the mafia. In its homeland, in sunny Italy, the situation is not much better. I had occasion to

talk with an official from a department of the Italian criminal police, E. Belgiorno. According to her, during the long history of the struggle against the mafia they have managed to hold only one large trial. More than 600 people took part in it; the criminal case was heard by the mayor of the city of Palermo. One must not forget that in Italy it was not so long ago that a special law was adopted on the mafia, and the police have better facilities and equipment than ours do.

"In four to five years the operatives have come to know everyone who holds a 'top spot,'" says G. Chebotarev, the deputy head of the USSR MVD's Main Administration for the Struggle Against Organized Crime. "They know who is paying whom. But to put a criminal in the dock, it is not enough just 'to know.' A program to combat organized crime is necessary, including coordinated actions and the urgent adoption of appropriate laws. I think that in terms of the level of organized crime today we have already passed that criminal superpower, the United States. And if we take its estimates as a basis, then we have passed it quite handily. Of course, we worked out an excellent draft law to combat organized crime, as well as a whole series of other laws. But as of now they have not been adopted."

"We are receiving some alarming information," continues G. Chebotarev. "Mafia organizations may be using the territory of our country for the illegal burial of radioactive and highly toxic wastes. Shipments of these wastes may be getting through the border under the guise of exported goods being sent to commercial firms controlled by organized crime. These are very frightening things."

I will conclude with the arrest of Suleymanov. After all, this is the first time since a real threat from organized crime emerged in our country that the staff at the Moscow Criminal Investigation Department and USSR KGB have succeeded in apprehending such a major figure. It is possible that this case will be the first real blow against the domestic mafia, although there is only a little hope that this blow will be a crushing one: too many problems have accumulated within the law-enforcement organs. Nonetheless, one does not like to think that for us the future will be, as sociologists frequently claim, a repetition of the Western experience with "godfathers," gang wars, vendettas and bloody battles. However, time will tell.

As for Suleyman's criminal ring, we will report to our readers the results of the investigation.

New Press Minister Outlines Policy

LD2407002291 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1712 GMT 23 Jul 91

[Text] Moscow, July 23 (TASS)—To regulate, to coordinate and direct the activities of all the links in book publishing and in the printing sphere, and to monitor how the law on press is being implemented—these are the tasks of the newly created Ministry of Press and Information of the USSR, according to ministry chief Mikhail Nenashev. He held his first news conference in his new capacity today.

The minister stressed that what he fears most is that the time when people had many obligations and no rights may reappear. He stated that the ministry does not intend to use command methods in its activities, or hold a monopoly position as it used to, but it aims to deepen the process of democratic reforms which has started in that sphere. He noted that publishing and printing enterprises have received commercial and creative independence, and are now united in professional associations. In addition, the first joint stock companies have emerged, based on the old publishing.

Cuts in the volume of printed material remain alarming. Because of uncontrollable paper price increases, and shortages of print equipment, 500 million copies of books, including 100 million books for children, have not been supplied to readers. There is the danger that periodicals—newspapers and magazines—may end up in the same way, although the ministry has already made attempts to prevent possible complications by establishing fixed GOSZAKAZ prices for paper used for noncommercial publications.

Turmoil at Novosti Press Agency Viewed

Reorganization Carried Out 'By Old Methods'

914B0229A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 12 May 91 p 6

[Article by Vitaliy Tretyakov: "'Tomb of the Unknown Journalist' Becomes a Tomb in and of Itself: Foreword by NAZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Chief Editor, a NOVOSTI Employee from 1976 to 1988, to the Article by Marina Khachaturova and Robert Tsfasman"]

[Text] In the fall of 1989, for the first time, the USSR Supreme Soviet was to confirm the state budget more or less openly. Officials of the three major Soviet propaganda agencies—TASS, the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, and the NOVOSTI Press Agency—were very worried. People's Deputies could demand a precise answer as to how taxpayer money appropriated to those de facto ministries via the union budget was being used. And we are talking about considerable sums of money, including foreign currency. Their worries were in vain: The people's deputies got caught up in something else, and behind-the-scenes maneuvers

enabled the officials to divert the deputies' attention from those expenditures altogether.

Today, at a time when almost every step taken by the leadership of the former State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, and now the All-Union State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company, is being scrutinized—albeit ineffectively—by public opinion, it would be wrong to fail to point out that the NOVOSTI Press Agency (the APN, now renamed the NOVOSTI Information Agency, or IAN) is being reformed by the same methods, though much more quietly and in a way much more hidden from all, including the taxpayers. Now NOVOSTI is a "presidential" agency (it used to be a "public" agency, which merely meant that it was directly subordinate to the CPSU Central Committee). All employees of the former APN have been dismissed. Personnel for the new NOVOSTI Information Agency have yet to be selected. Thousands of people are living and working in fear for their future, for the reform process (and the sharp personnel cutbacks accompanying it) is being carried out by old methods: from above, in secret, and by people for whom cozy jobs have already been arranged in foreign bureaus (so their conscience doesn't bother them).

After beginning my stint at the APN as an intern after graduation, I worked under the leadership of four board chairmen: Tolkunov, Naumov, Falin, and Vlasov. Each one of them, on coming to the agency, initiated a reform. And each one failed to carry it to completion, confining himself instead to the dismantling of what had been created before him. Not once during this time was leadership of the agency entrusted to a staff member who who had acquired journalistic and administrative experience within the agency itself.

Most of the people with whom I worked in the agency are still working in the building on Zubovskiy Boulevard, unable to bring themselves to leave it of their own accord. Some are reluctant to do so on account of their age, others on account of a fear of having to go into "open" journalism (as opposed to journalism intended for foreign consumption), and still others by force of habit. The agency is dying along with these people. Meanwhile, certain others want to get rid of these people as ballast, while simultaneously looking out for their own interests. The "tomb of the unknown journalist," as the APN has been called all these years, is becoming a tomb in and of itself.

I myself could say quite a bit about the APN. About how propaganda was made prior to 1985 and thereafter; about who was sent abroad and nominated for leadership positions; about the secret and quasi-secret editorial boards; about the APN style of journalism, which was once more unfettered than the domestic press (for example, NOVOSTI wrote about religion in a positive light, something that was absolutely taboo within the country); about the reforms initiated by each of the chairmen and about what each chairman "squeezed" out

of the APN for himself. But let these stories be told by those who are still working at the APN today. That is their right.

I became a journalist at the APN, and despite the fact that I, like others, grumbled about the weaknesses of the "office," I loved it. Today, as I watch the APN die and see the suffering of its employees (some on account of idleness, some on account of impotence), when I know that there nonetheless exists a staff of thousands of highly skilled employees, extensive ties within the country and abroad, dozens of bureaus throughout the world, a communications system, publishing facilities, and much more, I am saddened that our all-union system has stupidly chosen as its victim my second professional alma mater, after Moscow State University. Why the system is operating through the person of Albert Ivanovich Vlasov, who was among the progressives during the years when he, working in the CPSU Central Committee, was responsible for the APN, is a separate question, as is the question of why NOVOSTI journalists themselves are keeping silent. Among them are hundreds of acquaintances and dozens of friends. They have no faith in the system, but they can't bring themselves to rise up against it.

My wife still works for the APN. Like all the agency's other employees, she has been dismissed from the APN. And like the absolute majority of all those employees, with the exception of two or three top officials (A.I. Vlasov, his first deputy, and that's about it), she has yet to be taken on by the NOVOSTI Information Agency. Needless to say, however, my wife is not the issue; I write about this because this subject will certainly come up when M. Khachaturova and R. Tsfasman's article is discussed by those who know of my "personal" ties with the agency. The point is that the agency, which was created with public funds and through the efforts of thousands of my colleagues—an agency that, if even semiglasnost were permitted there and it were placed at last in the hands of professionals, and not functionaries parachuting from the Central Committee—could begin functioning like a truly worldwide news agency overnight. We who created NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA from absolute scratch see this more clearly than many others.

Today, on those rare occasions when I walk through the APN's half-empty corridors, which are jammed with Western-made equipment and covered with Soviet marble, I want to at least try to help my friends and colleagues. And to do so in the way I can—by giving them the floor in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA's pages.

Continued Ties to Central Committee Alleged

914B0229B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 12 May 91 p 6

[Article by Marina Khachaturova and Robert Tsfasman: "From Soviet Information Bureau Reports to Imported Beer: On the Fate of the NOVOSTI Press Agency and Its Employees"]

[Text] Employees of the NOVOSTI Information Agency, which was known during the war years as the Soviet

Information Bureau and was later renamed the NOVOSTI Press Agency (APN), jokingly refer to their "office" as the "tomb of the unknown journalist." There are a great many highly professional journalists among those fighting on this front, which is unseen by the Soviet reader. But they are unknown because they work for foreign countries, where many of them are known and valued. Even in the times when the Soviet Union was known in the West as the "evil empire," APN journalists managed to create a rather attractive image of our country and its people, thanks to which consumers of the agency's output throughout the world, perhaps, had kind feelings toward us.

You might ask: How did they manage to do that without lying? First and foremost, we tried not to equate the regime with people. We told about our fellow countrymen, who not only profess universal human values, but are themselves multiplying those values. The thinking foreign reader was able to understand that even under those conditions, people are still people. In a certain sense, the APN of that time was ahead of the domestic press, allowing free thought—within certain limits, of course. It's no accident that the agency commissioned articles from such authors in disfavor in those times as Yuriy Karyakin or Aleksandr Tsipko, for example, and published articles about "underground" artists that were completely off limits for the domestic press.

Today times have changed. The domestic press is scoring points with each passing day, while the agency is sinking deeper and deeper into a quagmire of stagnation.

Every APN employee knew what had to be done: It was essential to look for new constructive ideas and ways of realizing them, to remake the managerial bodies, which had become swollen to the point of indecency, to abolish their attendant structures, and to trim the truly ministerial apparatus of party-appointed officials, which was absurd for a creative organization. And finally, to grant genuine independence to the agency's editorial boards, which have a rather high degree of intellectual potential.

Cutbacks were initiated—first of all among the journalists. The main editorial board for union information was disbanded, and the wholesale dismissal of journalists covering international affairs got under way, even those who were the pride of the APN—experts who spoke rare foreign languages and who had an excellent understanding of the subtleties of events and the fine points of world politics in such areas as the Middle East, Latin America, and others.

When NOVOSTI Information Agency Chairman A.I. Vlasov was asked if the current reorganization wasn't going to follow the 1976 pattern, in which 27 percent of all employees were dismissed, he answered on the pages of the newsletter ZHURNALIST IAN: "As far as I know, what happened then was not a certification process, but

an arbitrary gutting of the APN, one that no one explained then or at any time since." The chairman is cunning, oh how cunning! We can attest to this as direct participants in events both then and now. We have a strong suspicion that A.I. Vlasov talks about a "gutting" only because in 1976 he himself was sacked as the APN's first deputy chairman.

The new structure cut creative employees to a minimum. Of 25 new subdivisions, only 10 could be considered creative by any stretch of the imagination. But what modern names they had! How Western! The editorial board was replaced by a directorate, the editor by a chief editor, and APN by the odd-sounding abbreviation IAN, which sounds like the wretched cry of some stubborn beast.

As an organization on the cutting edge of the "ideological front," the APN was always supervised by the CPSU Central Committee, and by two of its departments simultaneously, the international information department and the propaganda department. Valuable directives were sent from Staraya Ploshchad to the agency almost daily, and in response the APN issued endless reports that were rapidly assembled with the help of its high-capacity computer center, on whose equipment considerable sums of foreign-currency rubles were spent. On what was that foreign currency spent? On the capability to report to the APN's strict overseers that during any given week, the agency had prepared and distributed so many dozen or so many hundred articles under the rubrics "Marxism-Leninism," "communist education," "counterpropaganda," "socialist construction," and so on and so forth. This gross-output index was used to evaluate the efficiency and ideological reliability of the APN leadership. In those days, there was nothing more frightening for journalists than the Central Committee ideological department, where everything could be decided instantaneously—to execute, or to pardon.

The same old revolving door continues to operate in the NOVOSTI Information Agency, hidden from the public, which supposedly directs the agency: Propaganda cadres, screened via questionnaires and other data, migrate to the Central Committee apparat, and after a while return—with a promotion. For example, a Central Committee department instructor becomes a deputy chairman of the agency board, and in extreme cases a chief editor of main editorial board. APN Board Chairman A.I. Vlasov himself was transferred from the Central Committee apparat, as was his first deputy, V.B. Tulinov, and deputies Ye.A. Rumyantsev and V.A. Kuznetsov, and personnel chief V.F. Yudin. True, there is a certain new aspect to this usual revolving door. It used to be—and quite often—that the transfer of a Central Committee apparatchik even to a good managerial post in the APN amounted to exile for him: He had done something wrong and so had been transferred to the "subsidiary farming operation," his prospects for a happier future blighted. But today, sensing the precariousness of apparat omnipotence and the uncertain future

of "general party work," Central Committee functionaries are starting to look for comfortable jobs in the agency on their own initiative, and not by order of their bosses. There they can sit things out for a year or two (maybe things will suddenly get better and there'll be a return to the good old days), travel to the developed capitalist countries (maybe they'll land a IAN job in one of them), and send their children abroad.

However, people have to be told what's going on in order to keep them from getting worked up, for the sake of order. For example, they must be told that the NOVOSTI Information Agency doesn't need journalists. First deputy chairman V.B. Tulinov, who recently embarked on the thorny path of supervising foreign political propaganda, at a meeting with journalists of the main directorate of union information, which had been completely eliminated, sadly shrugged and said: "What can be done? You have to cut your coat according to the cloth." But Comrade Tulinov himself, a neophyte to journalism, isn't doing that; on the contrary, he's prospering—he's meeting his needs at the state's expense.

Here's an example. A photojournalist did a brilliant job at Manezh Square, capturing the most impressive scenes of a thousands-strong rally organized by Democratic Russia. The photos' quality was good enough for LE MONDE or LIFE—they'd grab them out of his hands. But even in our uncensored time, that subject matter failed to clear the deputy chairmen, as the final deciding authorities. Now had the photojournalist garishly covered a rally not for but against Yeltsin, he'd have gotten the green light, the explanation being that "we're a presidential agency." In other words, there can be no question of objective information, not to mention such a luxury as pluralism of views.

Functionaries accustomed to prohibitive measures know their work, and they have no need to even ask professional journalists what they think with regard to ways to productively restructure the organization's operations. In our opinion, getting in to see the country's President is not a whole lot harder than getting in to see the chairman of the NOVOSTI Information Agency; arrogance has always been a strong suit of the agency's officials.

What exactly do those officials propose to do? "To engage in economic activity," said A.I. Vlasov at a general meeting. That's possible, of course, but what does it have to do with the information agency, and with Comrade Vlasov as its director and his state-paid salary? In that case, we're dealing with a completely different organization, and he needn't use this to pull the wool over his own eyes or those of others. All this is just a game intended for simpletons. The journalists working in the NOVOSTI Information Agency know full well that not a single kopek in state funds should be spent on the agency in the form in which it is now constituted. What we see is an effort to promote personal and group interests at the expense of the state budget.

"You've gotten used to living in comfort," Comrade Tulinov told the journalists unabashedly. "You've got to earn your money." Incidentally, he himself hasn't spent his whole life working in economic-accountability brigades either. Needless to say, it is necessary to commercialize the agency, there's nothing wrong with that. There are quite a few ways to earn money in the mass media—and who knows this better than the journalists working for foreign countries? But we are against extremes. We are against the agency's succumbing to the fashionable pursuit of business and getting involved in activities alien to it. Such as, for example, the purchase and subsequent resale of imported beer, as was done in the young people's editorial board.

One could spend a lot of time discussing such unseemly incidents, but we want to make a long-urgent and concrete proposal: Isn't it time to pull away the shroud of secrecy from everything going on under the NOVOSTI Information Agency's roof, and to ask an authoritative and independent commission of Deputies to look into the agency's affairs? To find out how its generous state appropriations—including foreign currency—are being spent and on what, and how state interests are being served there? Incidentally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and TASS underwent such a probe not too long ago.

Yes, it remains for us to call only for such an investigation, because renewal has not only not come to the agency; on the contrary, under the guise of democracy, protectionism has become even more [illegible], candidates for assignments abroad are being selected in an increasingly arbitrary fashion, and officials' perception that all is permitted them is exceeding all bounds. The overall atmosphere is oppressive. However, this is of little interest to the reader—for he doesn't know any of our protagonists. But wait, there is one person who has acquired very wide acclaim. He is Sergey Sergeyevich Ivanko, former first deputy chairman of the IAN board and now head of the IAN bureau in the United States, and the hero of Vladimir Voynovich's satire *Ivankiada*. We think he had some major bad luck—in the sense that the talented writer lived next door to him. Many of Sergey Sergeyevich's colleagues merit equally satirical treatment. Unfortunately, however, there's not enough Voynovich to go around for all of them.

Commercial Activities, Personnel Decisions Defended

914B0229C Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 4 Jun 91 p 6

[Article by Sergey Ivanko, NOVOSTI bureau chief in Washington: "Letter to NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA: Much Can Be Seen From Far Away: Once More on the NOVOSTI Press Agency and Its Employees"]

[Text] It was not without interest that I read the articles by V. Tretyakov, M. Khachaturova, and R. Tsfasman on the fate of the NOVOSTI Press Agency and its employees (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, May 12, 1991). It is good

that this discussion has finally begun. The fate of the NOVOSTI Information Agency and its employees is not without interest to myself. In one capacity or another, I've worked for the agency for nine years now. I came to the agency in May 1983 as first deputy chairman of the board—not of my own accord, but by resolution of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo.

Judge for yourselves whether there were grounds for my appointment. I've been in journalism since 1945, having worked my way up from the bottom. I was secretary of the editorial board of a division newsletter, literary correspondent and deputy managing secretary of the journal NOVOYE VREMYA, managing secretary and head of the international department of the newspaper LITERATURA I ZHIZN, head of the editorial board for Eastern literature (I am a China expert by training) in the State Literature Publishing House, director of the UN publishing service, and a member of the collegium and chief editor of one of the main editorial boards of the State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade. By the time of my appointment, I had written and published one brochure and four books. Three of them were published not only in the USSR but also abroad (*The United States and China* was published in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the United States in 1975; *Portraits of American Writers* in the Bulgarian People's Republic in 1984; and *Dreiser* in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in 1987). In addition, I have translated into Russian seven novels and a dozen stories by Chinese writers and written dozens of articles, including articles for the APN. I write about this not in order to boast, but only to show that I am familiar with the basic aspects of the APN's operations—its press work, publication of journals, publishing activities, and translation work—not by hearsay, but on the basis of my own, by no means always positive and pleasant experience.

In contrast to V. Tretyakov, I worked in the central NOVOSTI Press Agency apparat under not four, but only two of its board chairmen—P.A. Naumov (from May 1983 to March 1986), and V.M. Falin (from April 1986 to October 1988). Therefore, I can venture judgments about the work of both the agency and its chairmen only during that period. P.A. Naumov was often ill, missed work for several months at a time, and undertook no reorganizations of the agency. He was a very cautious man and did everything in his power to avoid conflicts with officials of the Central Committee departments that supervised the NOVOSTI Press Agency.

With V.M. Falin's arrival, the NOVOSTI Press Agency's prestige in the international arena rose sharply. He was not afraid to give numerous interviews to foreign mass media, in which he often expressed an unorthodox viewpoint. His articles and interviews were widely reported and commented on in the world press. He played an active role in such APN initiatives as the

publication in the United States of the book *One Day in the Life of the USSR*, which became a bestseller. Incidentally, within the APN that initiative met with dogged resistance, and it was only thanks to the chairman's persistence and firmness that the project was carried out. He also offered many interesting ideas for the book *Day of Peace*.

V.M. Falin did not undertake any major reorganizations of the agency. He tried to strengthen it. The audio-visual information directorate was set up under him, and the directorate's photo information service was upgraded. V. Tretyakov is wrong in asserting that "not once was leadership of the agency entrusted to a staff member who had acquired journalistic and administrative experience within the APN itself." (Footnote 1) (This is the only place in S.S. Ivanko's letter with which I would like to take issue from the outset. It is senseless to list the deputy chairmen, for it was not they who ran the APN. Real power rested only with the board chairman and his first deputy. And no one from the APN has been appointed to these posts in the recent past. A. Vlasov and V. Falin came from the CPSU Central Committee. L. Tolkunov and P. Naumov had been chief editors of the newspaper IZVESTIYA and the weekly NOVOYE VREMYA (if I am not mistaken in citing these facts from memory). The current first deputy chairman, V.B. Tulinov, is from the CPSU Central Committee, and nor is S.S. Ivanko a product of the agency, as he himself writes.—V. Tretyakov.) Between 1983 and 1988, a large number of APN personnel were promoted to managerial work within the agency. For example, G. Gerasimov was named a deputy chairman of the APN board and chief editor of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI. V. Milyutenko was appointed a deputy chairman of the APN board, even though two officials of the CPSU Central Committee apparat had been nominated for that post. Those appointed to board member positions and heads of leading subdivisions during those years included A. Yegorov (who was subsequently named a deputy chairman), B. Korolev, A. Krasnov, Yu. Lysenko, Yu. Pushkin, N. Fedin, N. Yakovleva, and A. Chibisov; I. Baranikas, V. Dunayev, M. Yefimov, and I. Sisnev headed main editorial boards. Some of them continue to head NOVOSTI Information Agency structural subdivisions, while others have been transferred abroad.

M. Khachaturova and R. Tsfasman are completely right, in my opinion, to raise the question of "finally, granting genuine independence to the agency's editorial boards, which have a rather high intellectual potential." But the fact is that this problem was first raised by the agency's leadership four years ago; V.M. Falin held special meetings with the editorial board heads, and their rights were significantly broadened. But the leadership's initiative met with very stiff resistance from officials of a number of main editorial boards, who saw it as infringing on their own, long-entrenched powers.

I must say that within the APN, I was struck by the efforts of officials of structural subdivisions to fence themselves off with an "iron wall" from the rest of the

agency and to become some sort of petty princes. I repeatedly spoke out about this and took all possible measures to destroy those artificial walls. Unfortunately, I was by no means successful in doing so.

And now as regards commercial activities. Needless to say, the NOVOSTI Information Agency hardly need engage in the resale of imported beer, as the young people's editorial board did, if we are to believe M. Khachaturova and R. Tsfasman. For that board was set up under V.M. Falin with completely different aims, and the young associate A. Loskutov, who was very active at that time, was appointed its head.

Earning both rubles and foreign currency is possible and necessary without exceeding the bounds of the information agency's normal activities, and without even entering "border territory." Incidentally, the APN has considerable experience in this. In 1988, for example, an agreement was concluded with the American firm National Geographic under which the APN prepared materials for the book *The Soviet Union Today*. The book was recently published in the United States, and the APN received \$100,000 for its work. Last year, the NOVOSTI bureau in the United States turned over to the state nearly \$20,000 in bank interest alone. And here's an example from another field. The NOVOSTI Publishing House's supplements to the series *Detective Stories and Politics* are in great demand today. They also produce sizable revenues. And yet V.M. Falin and I had to go to considerable lengths to initiate publication of those supplements, and to legalize generally in the USSR the activities of the Moscow headquarters, headed by Yu. Semyonov, of the Detective Story and Politics International Association (DSPIA).

As it turned out, I was supposed to deliver a report to the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat on the question of creating the DSPIA's Moscow headquarters. The question was included on the agenda, but the chairman, Ye.K. Ligachev, never gave me the floor; instead, he harshly condemned "this escapade" and withdrew the question from discussion. It should be said that we understood at the time that such undertakings would entail difficulties and would require considerable initial outlays. And yet we deliberately decided to press ahead. The DSPIA's first session in the USSR was held in Yalta and was completely financed by the APN, including travel and accommodations for foreign members of the DSPIA board.

The APN also helped V. Korotich, the new chief editor of the magazine OGONEK, to enter the international arena. The trip to the USSR, at his invitation, of U. Anderson, chief editor of the American magazine PARADE (with a circulation of more than 30 million), and his wife, and V. Korotich's reciprocal visit to the United States, were also completely financed by the APN.

It should be said that it was during those years (in March 1987, to be exact), that direct contacts were established

between APN and the American information agency USIA. True, those contacts were developed not without difficulty, but they ultimately led to the level of cooperation characteristic of today. V.M. Falin made a sizable contribution to the establishment of these business contacts.

In their article, M. Khachaturova and R. Tsfasman call for the sensible and prudent expenditure of funds, including foreign currency, that are appropriated to finance the APN's activities. A very timely reminder! But for some reason they forget to point out that some of that foreign currency is being wasted because the Moscow editorial board, headed by R. Tsfasman, of the magazine SOVIET LIFE, which is published in the United States in English on behalf of the Soviet Embassy, has for several years now been chronically behind schedule in sending to Washington articles for the magazine's issues. As a result, by American standards, the magazine is two months behind the normal production schedule. Thousands of dollars are being cast to the winds. R. Tsfasman is well aware of this and has repeatedly promised to get back on schedule, but the situation remains unchanged. I don't know what accounts for this—inability or a reluctance on R. Tsfasman's part to organize work in the very responsible sector entrusted to him.

The article also says that in the agency, "candidates for assignments abroad are being selected in an increasingly arbitrary fashion, and officials' perception that all is permitted them is exceeding all bounds." Isn't the authors' pen being moved here, too, by anger over the fact that R. Tsfasman's openly stated desire to go to the

United States to take up the post of managing secretary of the magazine SOVIET LIFE failed to win the support of the NOVOSTI Information Agency leadership and that another NOVOSTI employee—one who, incidentally, is no less suitable and no less professionally capable and has no less long-standing ties to NOVOSTI than R. Tsfasman—is being appointed to that post?

In conclusion, a few words about V. Voynovich's book *Ivankiada*, since M. Khachaturova and R. Tsfasman deemed it necessary to bring the book up. Those who have carefully read the book could not help but notice that in it, S. Ivanko is relegated to the role of some sort of whipping boy, while its chief protagonist is the author himself, V. Voynovich. The book is not only and not so much an indictment of S. Ivanko as a vehicle of self-expression and self-affirmation on the part of its author. The door of the sealed apartment is smashed open and the apartment entered without authorization not by S. Ivanko, but by V. Voynovich. And it is the latter who writes complaints about S. Ivanko to every conceivable instance—the USSR Writers Union, the party committee, the chairman of the State Publishing Committee. It is the author who sends prominent writers to the CPSU Central Committee culture department to complain about S. Ivanko. As we know, as a result V. Voynovich got the apartment. And the book is a kind of exercise in bravado, its message being, "hey, look at us, we sure showed them!"

The only thing is, it's hard to see just what all this has to do with the fate of the NOVOSTI Press Agency and its employees. It smacks more of the scruples of the yellow press, which are hardly becoming of employees of the Soviet information agency.

Supreme Soviet Atomic Energy Subcommittee Chairman on Scope of Radiation Problems

91WN0576A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 15 Jun 91 p 6

[Interview with Aleksandr Nikolayevich Penyagin, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Subcommittee on Atomic Energy and Nuclear Ecology, by Leonid Skoptsov in the "Ecology" column; time, date, and place of interview not given: "Our Population—the Most Irradiated in the World: A Conversation With the Man Who Knows More About Radiation Than Anybody Else in the USSR"]

[Text] This man—Aleksandr Penyagin—is chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Subcommittee on Atomic Energy and Nuclear Ecology and a former refractory materials specialist at the Chelyabinsk Electrometallurgical Combine.

The cabinets in his office are filled with files of unique information: Aleksandr Penyagin is possessor of the only data bank in the country and the world on our country's radiational condition. The map in his office is also unique and singular: "Radioactive spots" are scattered over it in all the colors of the rainbow—the Ukraine, Belorussia, Russia: Bryansk, Orel, Kaluga, Tula, and Arkhangelsk oblasts; the South Urals: Chelyabinsk Oblast....

[Skoptsov] Aleksandr Nikolayevich, the "Chernobyl Era's" sixth year has passed. How many "unknown Chernobyls" have there been?

[Penyagin] There had already been three of the most major radiation incidents before Chernobyl. All were near us in Chelyabinsk Oblast, at the now notorious "Mayak" PO production association] near Kyshtym, where the defense people had dumped nuclear waste into the small Tech River since 1949 and irradiated almost 140,000 people. Almost a thousand radiation diseases were officially registered on its banks alone—considerably more than at Chernobyl.

A container with radioactive contents exploded at "Mayak" in 1957. The radioactive emission was entirely comparable to Chernobyl—20 million curies, as opposed to Chernobyl's 50 million. The radioactive cloud carried another 2 million curies over Sverdlovsk and Tyumen oblasts.

Finally, Lake Karachay, a depository with a 120-million curie content, is a constant source of radioactive danger. Waste is being dumped into it even now. Radioactive dust from Lake Karachay's shoreline has already irradiated 41,000 people.

A great many other incidents—primarily on atomic submarines—fortunately have not had such catastrophic consequences.

[Skoptsov] Are you sure the powerful defense agencies have not concealed some "domestic Palomares [not further identified]" from the Committee on Ecology and

your subcommission [sic]? After all, there is a rumor that there was some kind of explosion—either nuclear or thermonuclear—in the Subarctic Urals at the end of the 1950's. And, in general, how do you find out about one or another nuclear incident?

[Penyagin] Atomic subjects have always been behind a thick security curtain. We, too, had difficulties at first in obtaining access to the necessary information. In 1989, however, the Supreme Soviet ordered all officials of all ministries, agencies, organizations, and enterprises to make all information concerning ecological problem areas available to us.

The ecological problems were declassified. The defense types are disciplined people. There is an order—they obey it.

Moreover, the Chernobyl catastrophe also brought about a drastic change in the thinking of the specialists from the defense complex. They are earnestly helping us.

More succinctly speaking, we are experiencing no particular difficulties in obtaining access to the necessary information. There is another problem in this regard: The information's volume is so great that we are drowning in it.

Now, about the "domestic Palomares...." Our committee has no information in this regard at its disposal. I doubt that it would have been possible to conceal an event of such proportions. In general, however, we immediately make official inquiries into every fact connected with radiation danger, or the threat of such danger, that has become known to us—and we have the potential to obtain a sufficiently complete picture. Here it is important that the questions be specific.

[Skoptsov] How many Soviet citizens have suffered from our peaceful atom? From test explosions? From all of those leakages and seepages?

[Penyagin] The exact number of those who have suffered is not yet known, just as there is no map of the USSR's radiation condition. It is known, however, that people are becoming ill in both the places where radioactive ores are mined and the places where they are processed, and where nuclear weapons are tested. In the areas contaminated after the Chernobyl catastrophe, 4.8 million people reside; in the South Urals—0.5 million; in the vicinity of the Semipalatinsk Proving Ground—0.5 million. We are now collecting data on the Novaya Zemlya Proving Ground and the condition of the contiguous regions—something will also be discovered. And the 117 peaceful explosions? These did not take place without a trace either.

On the whole, indeed, we have the most irradiated population in the world, thanks to roentgenography and fluoroscopy. Other, harmless, medical diagnosis technologies have long since been in use in the world. All of this, however, does little to rouse our public opinion.

Our citizens, in general, know very little about radiation. They calmly put radioactive metal in the scrap metal so that hundreds of work crews throughout the country may later pull "hot" metal out of the lot. And this is not occasional.

You understand, the country has been living in a state of nuclear lawlessness since 1949. There are no guarantees at all that a new mishap will not occur tomorrow, and the ordinary citizens will find themselves just as unprotected and without rights in its regard as the natives of my region 40 years ago and the Chernobyl victims in our times. We are now striving to present the draft of a law "On Atomic Energy and Nuclear Safety" at the fall session.

[Skoptsov] Do you think that a legal rein will be able to restrain the nuclear genie?

[Penyagin] It cannot be done without a law. The absence of a law also causes direct monetary loss. One example: Atomic energy production is now a battle zone. There are political rallies, referenda, and petitions. Construction is being frozen, and AES's [nuclear electric power plants] are being temporarily shut down. Have the agencies made peace? Behind their peacemaking, there is an ulterior motive: You freeze awhile and spend some time without electric power, and you will give AES's the go-ahead and forget about both the faults under the foundations and the unreliable reactors.

A law must rise between the people and the Minatomen-ergoprom [Ministry of the Atomic Energy Industry]. It must be decided on that law's basis alone whether an AES may be built, where it may be built, and what requirements it must meet.

[Skoptsov] In IZVESTIYA editions, Academician Sheydlin proposed that a 10-year moratorium be declared on the spread of AES's in order, at last, to create a safe domestic reactor during those years. What is your attitude toward this idea?

[Penyagin] I am for the moratorium. What is more, in order that truly safe and reliable AES's may appear, it is necessary to take atomic energy production out from under the wing of the defense establishment in all respects. After all, all of our reactors are dual-purpose—civil and military. Only purely peaceful plants will truly be safe.

[Skoptsov] And the final question.... It, too, is about safety and AES's. The country faces the threat of an outbreak of terrorism. What is being done in order that AES's will not become a target for terrorists?

[Penyagin] There have already been 50 terroristic acts with respect to AES's in the world. The danger is real, and thank God our government understands this well. Even Chernobyl has been strengthened. During the last year and a half the security system of AES's has been improved substantially. However, the problem nevertheless exists.

Ukrainian Ministry for Environment Organized

91WN0638A Kiev KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA
in Russian 24 Jul 91 p 3

[Article by Valentin Smaga, Kiev: "Ministry for Survival?" First sentence summarizes the action taken by the Ukrainian commission.]

[Text] A commission of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR approved the functions and organizational structure of the new Ministry for the Protection of the Environment of the Republic.

There is trouble in our common home, in our native land. The Ukraine has been identified as an ecological disaster zone. For the time being, concerns about our daily bread have overshadowed what should be the main problem today in the public consciousness: The necessity simply to survive in a so-called environment that is inimical to human health. The concern about our daily bread grew even stronger after the "original" idea of Valentin Pavlov, the country's Prime Minister. This idea was to force the population to pay for the disorder brought about by a bankrupt system through a number of step increases in prices.

Judging from the first communication from the press center of the republic's new environmental protection ministry, chances of implementing one of the main points of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Ukraine, namely, the right of people to ecological safety, have greatly increased. The new minister, Yuriy Shcherbak, took the bull by its horns immediately, as they say.

In the former Ukrainian SSR State Committee for Ecology, on which the new ministry is based, the resource principle for the protection of nature, a principle that was very useful to various departments, is being eliminated immediately. In its place will be subsections which will be involved in strategic uses of nature. But first and foremost, they will develop ecological programs for saving the land of the Ukraine.

The new ministry will have its own scientific research facility. The state environmental protection service will at last monitor the environment with the help of modern electronic instruments and will create an effective and expert service for evaluating new projects and technology. Its legal organization will actively participate in developing an entire package of laws directed at protecting the total environmental complex of the Ukraine.

A framework already exists for this truly titanic work. Legislative acts on local self-government and on transferring Union enterprises to Ukrainian jurisdiction give all of us the opportunity, more than ever before, to feel that we are masters of our own house, and to provide an opportunity to the new ministry to develop its own capability for inspecting oblasts and districts.

The Ministry has publicly declared that it will observe full openness and credibility of information about the

status of the environment. Its plans include the organization of its own publishing unit and the publication of an ecological newspaper.

Our lives are now so complex that good news are especially valued. If the intentions of the new ministry materialize into actions, we shall then live in a country where the sacred right of a person to have fresh air, clean water, and unpolluted earth will be guaranteed much more effectively than at present.

Let us wish many successes to the new ministry!

Scale of Environmental Degradation in Aral Sea Area Outlined

91WN0648A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 16, 21-28 Apr 91 p 4

[Article by Grigory Reznichenko: "The Aral: a Phantom Sea"]

[Text] The level of the Aral Sea has dropped, compared with last year, by almost a meter. There are actually two seas: the large Aral and the small one. The two seas contain just a little over 400 cubic kms of water.

Recent research data confirm that the degradation of the environment in the areas adjoining the Aral Sea, with a population of several million, is now on a huge scale. Out of a hundred inhabitants of the Karakalpak Autonomous Republic 70 are incurably ill with hepatitis, ulcer, typhus or cancer. Ninety to 118 babies out of every thousand die before they are one year old. More and more babies are born with deformities.

Tens of thousands of people in the area are unemployed. There are permanent shortages of food and drinking water. There isn't enough housing and medicines. Despite lavish resources of raw materials, local industry is underdeveloped. Agriculture oriented exclusively on growing cotton and rice is in desperate straits.

Over the past six years there have been as many as four government decisions supposed to improve the situation. The last one was headed: "On the implementation of the USSR Supreme Soviet's resolution: 'On urgent measures to rectify the country's environment' concerning the problems of the Aral Sea." But even this doesn't seem to be bringing any dramatic changes. Arable lands are exhausted and irrigation systems out of order. With up to 40 percent of the humus layer lost, the land can be made productive if it's given twice or even thrice as much water, plus fertilizers and chemicals. But this kind of technology will ruin the land, and thus agriculture, altogether. Nothing new is offered in the government's resolution.

Nor does it offer any ideas about how to save the sea and the people living nearby. Of course there are plans to salvage the sea, bit by bit. But to restore the sea's former level about 700 cubic kms of water are needed. This will required 50 years at best and 140 at worst. Meanwhile

the sea continues to be polluted—20-22 cubic kms of pesticide-polluted water are discarded in rivers flowing into the Aral Sea and there are no signs that the situation will change. That means that seven out of ten people will continue to drink polluted water.

Uzbek, Tajik Presidents Propose Return to Siberian River Diversion

91WN0648B Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 19, 12-19 May 91 p 4

[Article by Ak-Mukhammed Velsapar: "Short-Sighted Politicians Jeopardize Rivers"]

[Text] On 21 April 1991, in the Turkmenian capital of Ashkhabad, President I.A. Karimov of Uzbekistan and President S.A. Niyazov of Turkmenistan signed a treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the two neighbouring Republics.

The press conference was held upon the conclusion of the Treaty. "Our Republic is sick and tired of living the life of a beggar," Uzbekistan's President Karimov said, "and we are no longer going to beg for anything from the Centre. We're going to fix our own market prices on all raw materials taken out of the Republic. And the prices will match those of the world market."

The sore Aral Sea problem was raised at the press conference. And here the audience heard a proposal that called for a return to the project which would divert part of the flow of Siberian rivers to Central Asia. The water, they were told, will return to Russia in the form of cotton, vegetables, and so on. For this to materialize, there is a need to curb the "sharp-witted writers" who speak before the country's Supreme Soviet against the given project. May these writers come to Central Asia in August to get a sense of what life is like here in summer without water. They must see firsthand the needs of a region whose present population of about 32 million will double by 2005. The "sharp-witted writers" have suggested we more conservatively use our water. This will require investments running to at least 21 billion roubles. But with that much money we could divert part of some Siberian rivers to Central Asia. The audience responded to these utterances with tumultuous applause.

I can't accept such a idea.

It's taking us increasingly greater pains to depart from Great Power mentality. and this vice is widespread not only within the Kremlin. I venture to remind our two presidents of a Turkmenian proverb: "Guard whatever little you possess, and this will keep you from coveting other's possessions..."

There is plenty of water in Siberia, of course. But we'd do better to invest our money in drip irrigation and in giving a concrete base to all of our irrigating ditches and water conduits. It's worth considering that our Central Asian Republics switch to less moisture-absorbing crops—grapes, figs, persimmons, olives, apricots,

peaches... And it's time, at last, to stop increasing cultivation of cotton which robs us of so much of our water. After all, except for the few mountain streams at the foothills of the Kopet-Dag there's practically no clean fresh water left in Turkmenistan.

There are no royal privileges in ecology. And therefore even presidents shouldn't arrogantly meddle in God's affairs and try to repattern continents according to their liking. May the Earth remain what it was when it gave birth to all of us, uncrippled by various development and construction projects, may presidents resign themselves to the fact that they won't have any Siberian water if they don't learn to conserve their own. In this way they won't have to keep thinking about harming the Yenisei.

During the press conference, I became reconvinced that the newly-baked presidents of Central Asia lack constructive opposition. Without the latter it will be hard for them to properly handle their suddenly acquired omnipotence.

History of Disasters at Chelyabinsk Mayak Nuclear Plant Revealed

91WN0648C Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 19, 12-19 May 91 p 10

[Article by Andrei Borodnikov: "Chernobyl Wasn't the First!"—First paragraph is introductory printed in bold print]

[Text] There's no better way to fan passions around political issues than to offer construction of yet another nuclear power station now, after having experienced the Chernobyl disaster. The wave of these passions heaved, swelled to the size of a tidal wave, and, on its crest, carried many activists of the green movement into every level of government. In the case of Chelyabinsk Region, this fear has its reasons. People call the Region "The Urals' Hiroshima" because of its Mayak (Lighthouse) plant—the first of the Soviet nuclear industry. Nonetheless, it looks like the region will get the nuclear reactor after all.

The 'Lighthouse'

The story started back in the late '40s when the first Soviet nuclear reactor for the production of weapon-grade plutonium was commissioned in a place a hundred kms outside Chelyabinsk. The Plutonium went to fill the bombs, and the waste was dumped into the Techa River. Local residents didn't know it and continued to get water from the river, swim in it, catch fish, and herd their cattle down there to drink. Some obscure accident happened there in 1951. To every appearance, it was not a trifling affair, if an imposing team of experts from Moscow was rushed to that Urals backwater at that postwar time devoid of sentiment. Soon afterwards, villages in the vicinity of the Mayak integrated works were frequented by local bosses and ranking visitors from Moscow who proposed that local residents move elsewhere, for a 600-rouble compensation. No reason was given.

Now we know the reason: 124,000 people were exposed to huge amounts of radiation and got doses as high as 170 rems each (100 rems cause chronic radiation disease).

Another disaster happened in the fall of 1957: one of Mayak's waste capacities blew up, venting into the air an equivalent of almost half the Chernobyl dose. The resulting radioactive cloud covered an area of 23,000 square kms containing 217 villages and 270,000 people. This was dubbed the East Urals Radioactive Trail, EURT. Apart from the Chelyabinsk Region, it affected the Sverdlovsk and Tyumen regions. Once again the residents of areas in the upper reaches of the Techa got the largest doses.

According to rough estimates, 450,000 residents of the Region suffered from the Mayak works.

Camera Obscura

I heard some optimists say: "There were misdoings in the past. But now it's different. Over 10,000 people were resettled from the territory of the EURT. We're working to make the soil tillable again. We're studying mutations among plants and animals. As many as 7,500 people have been resettled from the upper reaches of the Techa. The river itself has been fenced off by barbed wire and is guarded by militia posts. The sources of the river, where Mayak dumped its waste, have been sealed off by several dams."

But I also heard pessimist voices. The Techa is contaminated not only in its upper reaches, but throughout. The contamination continues, partly due to underground seepage from Mayak's storage ponds and partly due to local bogs which absorbed a lot of radiation and are now feeding it gradually to the river. People continue to use the river and grow contaminated food which they eat themselves and ship to the city. Not a single large village has been evacuated, because it is too expensive to resettle large numbers of people. Only small villages were evacuated, and people were offered prefab flimsy constructions to live in. Many of these houses are decaying rapidly.

The unique region where people were exposed not only to outside irradiation, but where for 40 years radiation has been introduced to human organisms with food and concentrated in the body tissues, was studied in a way which precludes correct assessment of the extent of the catastrophe. How are the people to be helped, and what's to be done with Mayak?

Encounters With the Devil

Chelyabinsk-65 is the administrative centre of the Mayak integrated works, 100 kms outside the city of Chelyabinsk. The township is neat and prudent-looking, like the socialism we failed to build in the country. The percentage of people who have to share their apartments with others is particularly low here, but the percentage of people who have cars is almost as high as in the United

States. This town of 80,000 has three cinemas, three Houses of Culture, a splendid Drama theatre, a higher school, and ... two cemeteries.

Those who believe that atomic energy workers are a snooty and rich lot who are guilty of fouling up the land (and this is the belief of, perhaps, everyone in the Chelyabinsk Region) don't know the price these people have had to pay for their seemingly affluent lifestyle. The first batch of plutonium was produced almost with their bare hands. The workers were rushed, and the radiation safe dosage thresholds were simply ignored. As a result, about 20,000 workers with overdoses had to be replaced within the first five years of operation. When the matter of extra pensions for the Mayak veterans was discussed recently, it turned out that there were as few as one hundred-and-fifty of them still living.

Waste dumped into Lake Karachai and which has been seeping into the water table below (which can any time burst into Ob River tributaries) contains the radiation equivalent of two and a half Chernobyls. Almost 20 Chernobyls are contained in the capacities like the one which blew up in 1957. There are another 200 burials with 500,000 tonnes of solid waste, and half a billion cubic metres of contaminated water in a group of artificial ponds in the upper reaches of the Techa, and these will start spilling over in another year or two. In addition, there are 23 tonnes of now useless but nevertheless highly dangerous plutonium there.

The concentration of radioactive material there knows no precedent in the world's practice. The situation demands equally unprecedented steps to cope with it. But who must take the steps? The answer seems to be easy: those guilty of creating this mess. Mayak experts came up with a suggestion: let's build an APS there.

Like Cures Like

It was a shock followed by a fit of rage. The quiet and complacent residents of the Chelyabinsk Region have changed their attitude and started to protect, picket and show their anger. They seem to have no doubt that the ministry has yet another perfidious act in mind: "It is not enough for them to screw up the Region. They want to ruin it completely."

The "greens" were winning over their rivals in the elections hands down, using this simple argument, and the "greenest" of them got into the governments at higher levels. Stones were hurled at the APS project from rostrums of various parliaments of the country. The voices arguing for the project were drowned in the general hullabaloo. They were meek voices of the managers of the Mayak integrated works: "We want to have it built not in Chelyabinsk but near Mayak where we ourselves and our children and grandchildren live, which would preclude an adventurist approach or careless breakdown of the APS." And better argued voices from the expert commissions: "The APS will supply energy which will be used to evaporate water from the contaminated ponds, which would turn liquid waste into solid waste which, in turn,

could be used as fuel for reactors. Thus, the APS will be a 'furnace' to 'burn' the plutonium and will consume the fuel waste of APSs in the USSR and abroad. Besides, this station will bring 500 million roubles of profit annually, which can be spent for the general ecological and social rehabilitation of the area."

Only a year later when the passions subsided somewhat, the opponents of the APS project realized that they need not only protest against the project but also seek a solution. They searched for an alternative, but couldn't find one. What to do next? There wasn't any more time to be spent to continue the search. But to agree to the construction of the APS would mean to lose face. It was an impasse for the new regional administration and for the atomic energy department. However, a compromise had to be found, because neither party wanted to live "on a volcano." Both parties suddenly realized that the System should pay the losses. The demonstrations must be well coordinated. The weight of the opinion of the country's heaviest industrialized region and the weight of the opinion of the influential Ministry of the Nuclear Power Industry together will enable them to put out a demand, rather than a plea. But what is to be demanded?

The authorities put out a condition: first come the ecological and social rehabilitation programmes approved on the top, a law introducing a special status for the zone, monetary compensation for the victims, emergency investments into the social sphere of the areas hit by radiation, and only then come the actual construction of the APS and start of the reactors. The Ministry agreed to the condition, perhaps, grudgingly. As a result, drafts of these documents have been worked out and tabled for discussion at the USSR and Russian Federation parliaments.

Could we call it a happy end? Unfortunately not. Suppose, the parliaments pass the legislation and make the government pay the debt. What next?

I asked First Deputy Chairman of the Chelyabinsk Region Soviet executive committee, Lev Stobbe, author and ardent supporter of all the programmes and projects aimed at rehabilitation of the region: "Do you count on getting 32 billion roubles, 16 billion of which in hard currency, from the budget which, according to the calculations, the state must pay for the harm done to the environment and people?" I got no answer.

Chernobyl's fate was "luckier." That tragedy happened at a time when it couldn't be just swept under the rug and the victims just abandoned. Chernobyl got the universal sympathy, foreign relief aid, and even a rehabilitation programme worth 20 billion roubles. Those guilty (at least some of them) for that tragedy have been identified and punished. As for the catastrophe in the Urals, the matter of responsibility for it hasn't even been brought up. They are letting bygones be bygones. The present mistakes are written off as byproduct of the economic difficulties. So far, the future of the "lighthouse" is shrouded in a fog.

Soviets, Europeans Form New Medical Technology Association

91US0671A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Jul 91
Union Edition p 7

[Interview with I. Rybakov, chief engineer, president, Glavmedtekhnik association, by L. Ivchenko: "The Association Provides Medicine"; date, place not specified]

[Text] Yet another association, one for medical technology, has been added to the many which have emerged of late. It is an international organization called upon to foster the development, production, and marketing of the most modern medical apparatus, and it unites the enterprises and firms of six European countries.

On the Soviet side alone, over 20 of the country's leading organizations are participating, including Glavmedtekhnik of the USSR Ministry of General Machine Building, the "Medinstrument" NPO [scientific production association], the "Kometa" NPO, the "Kvant" NPO, and the all-union scientific research institute for medical apparatus.

[Rybakov] Previously, the majority of them collaborated in the area of creating medical technology within the framework of CEMA. But when CEMA ceased to exist, all the ties could not be permitted to be severed; we had many joint developments; we had created fairly good medical apparatus on the principles of cooperation, and even now it is being produced continually. That is how our association appeared; it comprises, in addition to ourselves, 20 foreign organizations, enterprises, and firms.

[Correspondent] So in effect, it works out that nothing has changed?

[Rybakov] No, our organization is not a substitution of the previous relations and traditions by hanging a new shingle; we are building our activity here on completely different principles, putting enterprises' economic interests at the forefront. How did it used to be? We worked according to the plan; we coordinated ourselves with it here, and the socialist countries among themselves. We fulfilled the plan, did the reckoning, received the money, everything was fine. No one was responsible for anything, but everybody was fed. And now we have to earn the money. The task of the association is to be the coordinator, the connecting link among the firms and enterprises producing medical technology, its clients, and consumers. We are creating a data bank in Czechoslovakia for all our production firms, in order to know not only what they are preparing now, but what they plan to produce in the future; with the union and republic ministries of health we work through the requirements for medical technology, keep them informed of opportunities, prices, etc.; in a word, we help the manufacturers and the consumers find each other. And we also offer our technology in the West.

[Correspondent] But do we have something to offer?

[Rybakov] Of course! For example, a leading member of the association, the Ministry of General Machine Building, produces prosthetic devices the level of which is second to none from among the most modern foreign developments. They are manufactured with new lightweight materials, designed for comfort; leg amputees can even run and dance with them...

[Correspondent] Yet we ourselves need these devices; it's an enormous problem among our handicapped...

[Rybakov] Naturally! Our own needs were counted in first of all! But the problem is the high price, even though our prosthetic devices are much less expensive than similar foreign types. Last year, the "Energiya" NPO put out about 20,000 of these prostheses, but couldn't sell them: They are expensive for the low-income handicapped, and the Ministry of Social Security is not in any condition to take these expenses upon itself. We have been trying to resolve this issue for an entire year now. They are looking for hard currency to buy foreign prosthetic devices, but they don't buy out our own for rubles...

[Correspondent] And are there buyers for our equipment?

[Rybakov] There are. Preliminary workups have indicated that our apparatus will make it; for example, they are prepared to buy it in Latin America. Our equipment is of fair quality and much cheaper than American. After all, with cars you have both the "Mercedes" and "Moskvich" marques; both are bought, but it all depends on the consumer's pocket.

[Correspondent] But what about our domestic market—won't our already poorly-equipped medical facilities suffer?

[Rybakov] Providing them with apparatus is one of our tasks. Our association comprises not only manufacturers, but consumers as well, the USSR Ministry of Health, in the form of its "Soyuzmedtekhnik," which makes us aware of the requirements of the entire country. The Ministry of General Machine Building, where I work, has become actively involved in manufacturing instruments and equipment for medicine; over less than two years it has managed to increase the output of medical equipment by 40 percent. For example, we have solved the problem of single-channel electrocardiographs; the need for them is now completely met. Gargantuan work is now being done in the production of single-use needles and syringes: capacity for an annual production of about 350 million syringes and 3 billion needles has already been created, and by the year's end the production capacity will be planned for 1 billion syringes. Now 49 defense institutes and KB's [design bureaus] have been drawn into developing medical technology; they are taking charge of very serious, principally

new instruments, in particular, those for treating oncological conditions. The science and technology potential of the Ministry of General Machine Building is quite high.

Moreover, we are aiding medicine by finding suppliers of the apparatus who are prepared to sell it under favorable conditions; certainly there is the opportunity to acquire equipment even without having hard currency, and without installments over several years. We have proposals from Western firms to sell instruments for credit with a 10 percent discount, and to add a 30 percent discount for wholesale purchases...

[Correspondent] So Western firms are also showing interest in the association?

[Rybakov] Yes, they are showing interest; after all, every manufacturing firm is interested in sales. We also have applications for membership from Finnish and Yugoslav colleagues, and informal contacts with certain Dutch firms continue. Our organization is open to all comers.

Health Ministry Official on High Infant Mortality

91US0680A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 31 Jul 91 p 3

[Ivan Aleksandrovich Leshkevich, chief of the USSR Ministry of Health Main Directorate for Protecting Mothers and Children, interviewed by correspondent Nataliya Gorobets: "Child Ecology: Path to Lost Hope"]

[Text] The statistics are grim: Child mortality in our country has remained at a very high level in recent years. The level is double that of the United States, France, Great Britain, the FRG, and Japan. The incidence of all kinds of child illnesses is growing as well. The number of handicapped children has nearly doubled.

Ivan Aleksandrovich Leshkevich, chief of the USSR Ministry of Health Main Directorate for Protecting Mothers and Children, answered our correspondent's questions as to what should be done about this situation and where to look for a solution.

[Leshkevich] Given the impoverished health care system, it's difficult to speak of any rapid specific actions. For there is a direct dependence between appropriations for children's needs and child mortality. I won't leave this statement unsubstantiated. In America, for example, 10 percent of the gross national product is spent on health care, and infant mortality is 10 per 1,000 newborns. In our country, by contrast, the mortality rate is high—21 percent, and health care spending is paltry—just three percent of the budget.

More frightening than those figures are data showing that many child illnesses are the result of nervous and psychiatric disorders. Children who cannot grow strong

as they should become mental cripples on account of our callousness and indifference. And this malady is a 100 times graver.

Medicine, especially the kind we have in our country today, is unable by itself to heal a child's heart. We need new services that can remedy the situation—such as a psychiatric care system. We should have psychiatrists working everywhere today, above all in kindergartens, schools, and polyclinics. Only then will anything really change. Alongside psychiatric services, we also need social services that could provide essential assistance to children and the family as a whole.

I have had occasion to observe how these services work in a child cancer clinic in America. The attending physician there never does anything on his own. He is always accompanied by a psychiatrist and a social worker. The latter seek to ease the suffering of not only the ailing child but also his parents. I will never forget how, during a talk with a psychiatrist, the face of a mother of one of the clinic's young patients changed before my very eyes. Her expression became clearer, and she smiled. Then the social service representative explained what kind of legal benefits were available to her and what kind of help she could obtain with respect to her child's illness.

The greatest, truly humane value of such services is that they succeed in not only easing people's physical and mental suffering. They restore their hope that everything will change for the better.

[Gorobets] And is there anything we can hope for? Will such services appear in our country?

[Leshkevich] They are supposed to. The Russian government, for example, has already adopted a resolution: "On Organizing a Social Assistance Service for Children and Young People." Now we at the union level are setting up such a service as well. But I know that experienced psychiatric specialists are already working in some children's institutions in Moscow.

[Gorobets] But there still aren't enough of them.

[Leshkevich] Because everything hinges on wage funds. We have calculated that organizing social services in the union as a whole would take nearly 20 million rubles. The government is now considering the question of allocating these funds.

[Gorobets] Needless to say, money is of no small importance. But even money can hardly solve all the problems. For at some point, our own bitter experience should teach us that safeguarding children's health is above all a purely human obligation, a moral duty. Especially where gravely ill children are concerned.

[Leshkevich] That is precisely the motivation behind the joint American-Soviet Children's Health Center that was recently set up. The idea for the center belongs to American physicians from the children's hospital in the city of Norfolk, Virginia. That hospital treats treats

children with extremely grave pathologies and cancer patients who need urgent and highly skilled care. The most complex operations, including heart transplants, are performed there. The hospital also has a maternity ward with a special department for newborns.

Much of what the doctors in that hospital do could very greatly help us today. Therefore, one of the center's chief purposes is to exchange specialists and mid-level medical personnel, as well as to exchange new medical technologies and train specialists. That training will take place in both our country and America. The first such meeting has already been held. The Americans came here, to Moscow. We worked out the most important areas of our joint efforts—cancer treatment, hematology, child cardiac surgery.

[Gorobets] I remember how a few years ago, our journals reported how the well-known American actor Paul Newman had opened a so-called "last chance camp" for children stricken with cancer and other incurable diseases.

[Leshkevich] To be more precise, it was not a camp but an entire picturesque little town, in some respects reminiscent of Disneyland. There wasn't a single attribute of a hospital about the facility. One was uplifted by the bright and cheery atmosphere of the rooms, which has been laid out by design artists. Children in the camp received the same kinds of treatment as in other American cancer clinics. But the atmosphere per se was fundamentally different from the atmosphere in those hospitals. Everything about Newman's little city was designed to make the children feel like patients as little as possible, in order to ease from their minds any thoughts about hopelessness and death. The result was a miracle—65 percent of the children from the "last chance camp" survived. Many of them, after growing a little older, later returned there to counsel and take care of other children. This example is not chosen at random. For us today, it is very important to not only introduce new medical technologies and organize new services, but also learn how to put one's heart into everything having to do with children. When this happens, I am certain that most of the problems will disappear in and of themselves.

[Gorobets] I would now like to turn to yet another sore subject. A child's health is inextricably linked with the health of his or her mother. But what can be done if our living conditions make no provision for seeing to mothers' health? Those same grim statistics show that as a result of hard working conditions, the incidence of anemia and pyelonephritis among pregnant women has nearly doubled. Maternal mortality is also high. The birth rate is declining. But the most alarming thing is the enormous number of abortions, in which we now have the dubious distinction of ranking first in the world.

[Leshkevich] Unfortunately, nearly 7 million abortions are performed in our country each year, which is tens of times higher than the figures in America, Canada, and other Western countries.

This is an indicator of not only the difficulties of our life, but also of women's elementary illiteracy when it comes

to contraception. Even many midwives and gynecologists take a skeptical view of these matters, which makes no sense at all. We have been trying to dissuade them of this for many years now. We make a point of inviting prominent Western scientists to our seminars. In the West, for example—in contrast to our country—people have long taken a positive view of hormonal contraceptives. Sixty to 80 percent of women there use them. In our country, the figure is just 1.8 percent. Nor are hormonal contraceptives counterindicated for teenagers. One need only obtain prior consultation from a physician. In general, everyone needs medical consultation in such instances.

Not very long ago, we drew up a special family planning program. The program is designed to remedy many difficulties that families face today. Eventually it will help women obtain any information about family relations.

The information will be dispensed by experienced specialists—doctors, legal experts, economists, and psychiatrists who will work at special centers set up for this purpose.

[Gorobets] But that's a subject for a separate discussion, and we will return to the program without fail. In the meantime, let's hope that among dedicated and resourceful people who are now prepared to invest part of their income in a noble cause, our own Paul Newman will appear. And if we already have such people, we ask them to respond. RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA pledges to support them. After all, as long as a last chance exists, we've got to use it.

Bureaucracy Obstructs Production of Radiation Sickness Drug

91UN2328A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Jul 91
Union Edition p 4

[Article by IZVESTIYA Special Correspondent Ye. Manucharova: "How We Are Our Own Undoing: a New Medicine Can Defeat Radiation, But Not the Bureaucrats"]

[Text] Everything in Leonid Georgiyevich Ivanov's story is very typical for the tragic muddle we have today. He was a military doctor, and his family was living not far from Chernobyl. He became irradiated while working to eliminate the effects of the atomic catastrophe, and his daughter was contaminated with radioactive rain. The beautiful little girl's hair began to fall out... Ivanov does not talk about himself at all, but he has this to say about the child: "It is nothing; now you can not see one bald spot at all..."

From the outskirts of Chernobyl the Ivanov's moved to the Far East. Leonid Georgiyevich became an associate at the Academic Institute of Bio-organic Chemistry. A pharmacist, pharmacologist and toxicologist, he works

in the bio-detoxicants laboratory. There they create preparations to counter the effects of poisons, radiation and heavy metals.

Currently his chief concern is a new medicine made from eel grass [*Zostera marina*]. Zosterin has helped his daughter, himself, and all those for whom the laboratory production of this medicinal preparation can suffice.

For many people it is not enough. You see, there is no industrial production of Zosterin. They are only setting up its manufacture. The new preparation was included in the Program of Urgent Measures for Eliminating the Consequences of the Chernobyl Catastrophe. Even the amount of financing was decided.

This decision was preceded by altogether astounding research. The research showed that Zosterin helps relieve the human body of radionuclides (cesium, strontium, rubidium and iodine), as well as the ions of heavy metals (lead, zinc, cobalt and cadmium). The preparation not only increases the overall stability of an organism—it is good for stress in general, as well as ionized radiation. Zosterin was tested in the Ukrainian Republic Interdepartmental Center of Clinical Immunology, and was subsequently approved by the Ukrainian Health Ministry.

Children were given Zosterin at the Chernobyl Secondary Boarding School. Prior to the treatment most of the children had elevated amounts of iron in their thyroid, and obvious immuno-deficiency. After treatment, the level of immunity rose, and the level of radionuclides in the children's bodies declined.

Zosterin was also used for treating workers at the (Rudnaya Pristan) lead plant, the majority of whom (61 percent) were in a state of chronic stress. After the Zosterin they went into a state of quiet activity. The preparation also helped rid the body of lead, and the state of the cells which transmit heredity became normal.

After the Chernobyl Committee promised its support, the scientists took out a bank loan and erected a building for large-scale production of Zosterin. They had thought that they could count on the bank and would be able to equip the building with apparatus on the money that had been deposited for the program.

But the institute did not receive the promised funds. Moreover, it became impossible to find out who was truly responsible for the new business and for receiving the funds. Vladivostok sent off requests—and Moscow did not respond.

Ivanov travelled to the capital. Here he learned that his was a borderline case between the Union and the republic. One could (on the one hand) look at it thus: the people stricken with the "Chernobyl particles," were suffering in various regions; that means the entire country has an interest in the production of Zosterin. The Academy of Sciences, in which the laboratory operates, also belongs to the entire country. However, one might also look at the matter from another aspect: the

institute itself is located in the Far East; that means, the organs of the RSFSR are responsible for its operation. Therefore, the Union believes it has the right to cast off responsibility onto the republic.

On my desk is a list of the people whom Ivanov visited, trying to achieve some kind of results. The list includes high-ranking and the highest-ranking officials: the heads of the Chernobyl Committees (Union and RSFSR). But neither of them said, "I will take responsibility." Each managed to palm the matter off on the other. And together they attempted to describe a vicious circle of irresponsibility.

It is striking that in Ivanov's tales of his ordeals, not once did the names of the people who head the Health Ministry and the Pharmacological Committee come up, nor that of the new state corporation, "Farmindustriya." According to normal logic, it would be precisely these structures for whom it would be important to embrace the new development and trade in it. But no, that did not happen.

In spite of the Chernobyl disaster, and regardless of the medicinal poverty of the country, everything followed the old bureaucratic logic—first, push it away. And let the scientists pound on the walls of this indifference with their vitally-needed invention. At the same time, one could always say that the value of this very medicine had not been reliably determined: is it needed more than others? You see, the screening institute, which decides such things, had simply been closed.

The new Chernobyl ailment in our body politic gets along quite well with the old, indecent ailment of bureaucracy. And therefore, the "State Union-Republic Program of Urgent Measures for 1990-1992 for Eliminating the Consequences of the Accident at the ChAES [Chernobyl Atomoc Power Plant]," which had been worked out to the last detail, must be worked out anew.

And that means, Ivanov will once again have to draw up the technical-economic basis for Zosterin, in order to include it—if only for next year—in a program of purely republic significance.

After 20 days of haunting their doorsteps, he received the following promise: (If he manages to draw up the new documents according to a strict timetable.) At the same time, they indicated to him that he should especially single out the effectiveness against cesium—against the disaster of the Chernobyl zone. The disaster of Chelyabinsk (which is that of 20 Chernobyls) is—strontium. The "justification" indicated the effectiveness of the preparation against strontium. But is it really a matter of the spectrum of a preparation that removes all radionuclides? Of course not. It is simply the activity of the new bureaucratic structures, at the very same zero mark as the old one—that which we have become accustomed to call "the stagnation."

Ivanov flew back to his Vladivostok from Moscow, and we, having taken his old "Justification," sent it to the official who was supposed to decide, "To be or not to be," for Zosterin. That is T.A. Marchenko, head of the department for working out social problems in the republic Chernobyl Committee. And so we joined those waiting for an answer on Zosterin.

But grass also grows up through asphalt. After all, one cannot say that no one required the new preparation. The largest metallurgical combine in the country is equipping the Zosterin laboratory. It is willingly paying the scientists in order that it might be possible to heal the workers at its plant. There everyone is threatened by an accumulation of heavy metals, and Zosterin removes these ions.

And here is what is interesting. The Far East pharmacologists, it turns out, might be able to get along without the help of the state. Let's say that Alma Ata does not want to wait until the unresolvable problem of centralized supply of Zosterin is resolved; therefore, the "Broker" Association has offered the laboratory a profitable deal. It will take up the farming-out of the production of Zosterin, will pay all expenses and, will repay to the bank the amount the laboratory had borrowed. It is possible that "Broker" will also achieve its own end—monopoly rights to production of the medicine. The institute, like the unlucky Biblical hero, will "sell its birthright for a mess of pottage." The pharmacologists understand that the Chernobyl victims' urgent need for taking Zosterin will not abide any delay.

There is yet another reason for seeking a non-traditional, rapid solution. Divers can harvest the seaweed only during the warm season—until 5 November. After that the winter blizzards begin. We must foot the bill for the divers' labor right away.

One may be distressed over the persistence of private capital. But one can also understand its inevitability; and even more, rejoice: Here is a way out of the impasse.

In addition to "Broker," there are other (foreign) firms willing to pay for production of Zosterin. They too need both our valuable raw materials, and our new effective technology. Pharmaceuticals is a profitable business throughout the world.

Only with us, riches falls through our fingers—if any effort is required to get it. Just like a bankrupt person who has lost a great deal, we are no longer capable of determining the priceless value of our new losses: nor even to be distressed about this.

Pharmaceutical Production Decline Endangers Citizens Health

91US0673A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 26 Jun 91 p 2

[Article by N. Ragimov under heading: "Publication Follow-Up: Save Yourselves, Whoever Can! But What If You Can't?"]

[Text] Our people have been abundantly informed by the entire mass media of the medicinal boom [sic] that has

been building up since 1988. Our paper reported about the underlying causes of this deplorable state of the country's pharmaceutical industry on 29 September 1990 in the article: "Limit of Life." However, the ministries and departments that manufacture medicinal preparations, as well as the USSR Ministry of Health, have so far failed to react in any way to that publication, as, incidentally, to many others.

So what has changed over the past nine months? Our correspondent once again addressed this question to Ye.M. Starobinskaya, deputy general director of the Moscow city association "Farmatsiya."

"Things have gotten worse. Much worse," Yekaterina Mikhaylovna said with pain in her voice. "We have approached the line beyond which there will no longer be anything to distribute. The miserable crumbs we had in reserve are evaporating with each passing day like snow on a hot frying pan. The problem of medical supplies—a problem of life and death—has acquired ominous dimensions. If the government does not urgently find the funds and take resolute action the lives of millions of our people will be in jeopardy."

Does this require any comment? Judge for yourselves. As of 1 June 1991, only 53.7 percent of Moscow's requests were met. In the first quarter of this year alone deliveries of medicines to Moscow fell short by as much as 20 million rubles. Our main foreign supplier, Hungary, has failed to deliver a single package of vitally needed drugs such as veroshpiron, no-shpa, panangin, cavinton, micozolon, nittifor, etc., worth more than R6,000,000. Deliveries from Poland have fallen short by more than two million rubles'. Undelivered drugs include relanium, redadorm, tazepam, berotek, corticosteroid rubbing cream, and much else. Nor is Bulgaria lagging behind its neighbors, having failed to deliver 1.5 million rubles' worth of medicines. And they, too, include such vitally needed drugs as pyronal, indometacin and cinarizin.

Our so-called production capacities, because of their unique antiquity, are incapable of resolving a single problem. Output has been declining year after year even at leading enterprises of the country. For example, the Kiev Chemico-Pharmaceutical Plant defaulted on deliveries of corvalol and validol; the Leningrad Oktyabr Production Association, on vitamin B-6 and decamevit; the Latvian production association Olainfarm, on remantadin, phencarol and bebicar; the Batum Chemico-Pharmaceutical plant, on aloe juice, colanhoe, and so on. As for other drugs, we don't produce most of them at all. The government decree, "On the Construction of 37 Plants for the Manufacture of Medicinal Drugs," which was passed four years ago, has remained a hollow declaration, the same, incidentally, as most other decrees.

Not a single plant has been built; more, construction hasn't even begun! One can only wonder why issue decrees which no one is responsible for implementing.

Why fool the people and waste much-needed paper? Why create an illusion of activity without doing a thing? Wouldn't it be better to gather all those unfulfilled degrees passed over the years, recycle the paper and use the profits to build dozens of plants?

And one more thing. The Farmatsiya association annually pays 15 million rubles from its profits into the state budget. No one knows where the money goes. One can imagine how the industry would flourish if it were invested in developing its own facilities.

The total disregard for the construction of capacities, which we have not been building over the last few five-year-plan periods, limiting ourselves to cosmetic repairs, is a cause of great concern. Raw materials have been wasted. Because the absence of purification facilities at virtually all plants has ruined the ecology to such an extent that it has become dangerous to use natural raw materials. Meanwhile, as before, the chemical industry completely ignores the needs of health care, preferring to produce fertilizers, paints and plastics. And finally, equipment. It is not manufactured in the country and there is no hard currency to acquire it abroad. So much for that. So save yourselves, whoever can and wants to. And no one cares a bit.

Still, even in this apparently hopeless situation the Moscow city association Farmatsiya is trying to find a way out of the crisis. However, here, too, the administrative-command system that has formed over the decades shackles initiative hand and foot. So why is the All-Union Association Soyuzfarmatsiya, which has demonstrated its clumsiness in practice, still the only monopoly distributor of both soviet and foreign-made drugs?

The medicinal boom [sic] has entered a new phase of development the consequences of which are easily predictable. Tens of millions of people are anxiously awaiting change.

AIDS Increase in Nizhniy Novgorod Viewed

91US0662A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 19 Jul 91 p 2

[Article by A. Fortunatov, correspondent: "A Racket Growing Out of AIDS?: Disease of the Century Poses Problems Not Only for Medical Personnel"]

[Text] In Nizhniy Novgorod people have come to think about AIDS solely in connection with the imminent opening up of this city for visits by foreigners and its inevitable consequence: the emergence of "international brigades of girls" in the Volga region.

However, lectures on sex education, which make a smooth transition to mandatory testing for AIDS, have begun to be attended by significantly more people. At one of these lectures I had occasion to become

acquainted with R. SHEVETS, a senior scientific associate of the Nizhniy Novgorod Scientific Research Institute for Traumatology and Orthopedics. He explained his interest in this subject—which is "out of his field"—as follows:

"We have a standing order: Everybody entering our clinic must be tested for AIDS. But, at best, we do not obtain the results of the analysis until two or three weeks later. Moreover, the reliability of these results is only 82-84 percent."

"Suppose a person has a hemorrhage—he needs blood; if there is an intestinal rupture, we need to operate right away; suppose a person has collapsed on the street—we must render emergency first aid: mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, chest massage.... In such a situation the physician will never inquire whether the emergency patient has a certificate showing the results of his test for AIDS.... We've heard of gloves made of a cord fabric which cannot be pierced by a needle. But I have never seen them in my own practice."

"But aren't we whipping up passions excessively here? In recent times our country has all-too-little grounds for pride. But at least AIDS does not seem to have 'flourished' in the Soviet Union."

"Here too we have broken certain 'records.' We were the first in the world to discover a 'domestic' method of transmitting the HIV [?] infection from a diseased child to its mother, and then to dozens of other small children. It was only a year and a half ago that Hospital No 20 in Rostov-on-Don discovered three children who were carriers of this virus. How much indignation and how many scoldings were poured upon those persons who brought in the ill-fated virus! How those persons responsible for testing repented demonstrably! How the repressed administration grieved! How much effort and energy was expended on discovering and catching those persons who have come in contact with the infection! They were discovered and caught, and some we sent to Moscow. No expense was spared: some 1.5 million rubles was spent on them—after all, they were children! Just as much, by the way, as had been allocated for basic research to the Interdepartmental Council on the Scientific Problems of AIDS for all of 1990! But within a year's time there were already 90 children with the deadly virus in their blood in this same hospital, and 10 adults were added to them."

As reported by specialists from the World Health Organization, the number of virus-carriers doubles every eight months throughout the entire world. But in our country this figure or indicator has risen—albeit episodically—by a factor of 30 or more annually!

Here's an "eloquent" example: In Nizhniy Novgorod people have been undecided for four years now whether to publish a booklet for the population bearing the title: "If the AIDS Virus Has Been Discovered in Your Child's Blood"—an ordinary enough title (at least, for those persons "beyond the cordon").

The time is not far off when AIDS-type rackets will also begin to appear in our country (in America a persons with a hypodermic needle causes panic in a crowded place)—with threats of infect people with the virus by spitting in their eyes or piercing them with a needle even through an overcoat. Who and—the main thing—when will be the first to apply a law about...the premeditated place of a person under conditions of possibly being infected with AIDS, and entailing a punishment of a five-year sentence? Or doesn't everybody yet know that if the surface of one's skin has been broken in a fight, there is no protection or defense against this virus?

Together with some specialists from the Nizhny Novgorod Scientific Research Institute of Radio Physics, we recently drew up a forecast concerning the development of this disease, as extrapolated to the year 2080. If the trends of the 1980's continue, then—the computers predict—the entire population will be infected with HIV as early as the year 2000, with an ensuing reduction in its number throughout the entire world. And even if we assume a five-fold increase—as compared with the present-day situation—in the efforts of all mankind aimed at prevention, the extinction or perishing would be postponed, let's say, for our country, by approximately 80 years....

The world now has a newly registered disease—FRAIDS—a term derived from the first two letters of the name of the British psychologist, Robert Frierson [?]. Persons who have become convinced that they are carrying the virus [whether they really are or not] have subsequently undergone all the stages of this disease and...have died.

In my opinion, we are already being impacted at present, but not by Frierson's disease, but rather by that active imitation of a fight against AIDS which is seething at various levels. Recently Nizhny Novgorod witnessed the holding of a solemn action entitled the: "Russian Assembly for Human Health." One of the numerous symposiums was devoted to the fight against AIDS. However, the term "symposium" is putting it too strongly. It was simply a gathering of persons who had been affected—in one way or another—by this problem, and who were sharing their impressions....

"But what about a positive program?"

Here's one example. At present, according to Western statistics, for every 2,000 blood transfusions, six or seven portions are infected with the AIDS virus. Who receives such portions is unknown. We have proposed quite a simple method for solving this problem. What we did was as follows: Before the operation, approximately 1/5 of the total amount of blood was drawn from the patient's organism, and we replaced it with a liquid substitute in a slight lesser amount. During the operation this substitute, naturally, lost its "purity" because of the blood flow. Then the patient's own blood was returned to him.

A liter of this substitute costs only 1/10 as much as a liter of donor blood.

But it is very difficult to speak about the global concept of fighting AIDS with reference to our country.

To sum up briefly: What we must do is the following: create genuine funds of material, i.e., fiscal, and legal protection for AIDS victims; develop new laws pertaining to the legal situation or status of medical personnel, "first-aid" specialists, and other persons who come in contact with HIV-infected people; provide measures for fighting the emerging AIDS-type rackets, introduce responsibility for injuring skin [i.e., epidermal] surfaces and mucuous membranes which are capable of being infected; reorient industry to prepare for a genuine AIDS epidemic by expanding the production of glass hypodermic syringes, medications, high-quality gloves, and preservatives....

Poll Shows Citizens Strongly Oppose Homosexuality

91US0685A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 30, Aug 91 p 5

[Article by V. Gushchin and V. Buldakov: "Sex, AIDS ... and Human Rights"]

[Text] Point of Information. A sociological survey carried out by a group of independent sociologists at the request of the organizing committee for a conference of sexual minorities, provides evidence that about 30 percent of Soviet citizens favor the death penalty for homosexuals. Thirty percent said they were in favor of imprisonment for them; 30 percent were for forced medical treatment, and only 10 percent were in favor of their free existence. In the Central Asian republics the number of those supporting the death penalty for homosexuals exceeds 85 percent of all respondents. "Interfaks"

We gave considerable thought to the question of whether to publish this material or not. After all, there are enough problems which disturb our readers today. But because sexual minorities are one of the groups at risk for the disease AIDS and because these people often fear going to the doctor (and a disease which is driven inwards represents a far greater danger for one's associates), we decided to describe one unusual conference.

The first Soviet-American Conference of Sexual Minorities held in the Soviet Union took place in Leningrad and Moscow between 24 July and 1 August. The Movement of Homosexuals and Lesbians in America and the Association of Sexual Minorities in the USSR organized it.

A small group of curious onlookers gathered at the entrance to the Novorossiysk Movie Theater. Admission was strictly by invitation; however, there were no problems for the press.

The conference was well organized: there were delegates, guests, interpreters and the press. Registration of the guests took place in the foyer, where the program was available in Russian and English. Propaganda literature, condoms and chewing gum were being distributed free of charge there, while badges (5 rubles) and T-shirts (30 rubles) with the corresponding symbolism were being sold.

About 50 representatives of the mass media and 250-300 conference participants and guests gathered in the smaller theater.

R. Kalinin, president of the Moscow Union of Sexual Minorities opened the conference. Here are just a few fragments of his opening speech: "Our conference coincides with the Moscow visit of U.S. President Bush, and the attention of the press, unfortunately, has been diverted to this regrettable fact. However, presidents come and go, while homosexuality remains... Two years ago we raised our heads and started to fight for our rights. Previously people tried not to notice this problem, but after all, Moscow alone has about one million homosexuals and lesbians. At last we ourselves must say to ourselves that we are not second class people..."

After introductory remarks in defense of the honesty and dignity of gays and lesbians, the delegates got down to work. The conference program contained reports and discussions on such subjects as: "Psychiatry and the Mental Health of Lesbians and Gays," "The Gay and Lesbian Movement Among Students," "Venereal Diseases of Gays" "AIDS and Health," "Marxism and the Gay and Lesbian Movement," "One Cannot Live Without Money," etc.

The official part of the sessions concluded with a regular showing of films from the first international film festival on the subject of homosexuality. For example, the film "Maurice" tells the story of a young man who is discovering that he is different. Maurice finds love, but he encounters the hostility of family and friends. Another film, "Izgoi," depicts the life of sexual minorities in Moscow. An American documentary video "Choosing Children" tells the story of six lesbian pairs who have become mothers.

In the foyer and corridors of the movie theater the discussion of gay and lesbian problems was no less intense than the discussions at the congress of people's deputies. We asked D. Teyvsa (USA), co-chairperson of the International Commission on the Rights of Lesbians and Gays to answer some questions.

How do you judge the attitude of the official authorities to sexual minorities in the Soviet Union and United States?

Of course, it differs significantly. In America the public's position has changed sharply in recent years in the direction of tolerance. I hope that the same will happen soon in the USSR as well.

Were there difficulties in organizing the conference?

There were no difficulties because we did not appeal to the official authorities.

How widely represented is your movement in America?

It is expanding every year because people are recognizing that they have the right to be who they are. According to data from American researchers, 10 percent of the U.S. population consists of homosexuals and lesbians. The situation is approximately the same in the USSR.

Questions for the president of the Union of Sexual Minorities, R. Kalinin.

How many people are in your association?

We do not have firm membership in the organization. We consider ourselves as defenders of rights and we help people, but we do not count heads.

What kind of relations do you have with the authorities?

We love each other.

How much did this "event" cost?

Of course it is very expensive. All expenses were paid by the American side.

Point of information. Every American participant at the conference (there were 70 of them) paid \$3,000 for the trip to the USSR.

Commentary from the (English radio station) BBC.

"A world conference of lesbians and gays is taking place in Leningrad. The Fund for Cultural Initiative and Defense of Sexual Minorities imeni Chaykovskiy is acting as the organizer of this forum, so unusual for the USSR."

"Two old ladies, lovers of symphonic music who came here because of the name Chaykovskiy, learned from the policeman on duty at the entrance what was actually taking place; they turned and began to run away. There was no reason for fright, of course. The meeting here, although completely unusual, was quite civilized."

Academician for Stringent Measures To Fight Alcoholism

*91US0641A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 13 Jul 91 First Edition p 4*

[Article by Academician F.G. Uglov: "Won't we Swap Russia for Drink! From the Position of a Relentless Struggle for Sobriety"]

[Text] They say that Fyodor Grigoryevich Uglov will be the first physician whose name will be entered in the Guinness Book of Records as the oldest surgeon who continues to perform operations. True, at the age of 86, he still performs surgery sometimes six hours on end in a state of maximum physical and emotional tension. An

academician of the Academy of Medical Sciences, and a member of prestigious scientific and medical societies abroad, Fyodor Grigoryevich is considered by right one of the leading lights in modern world medicine.

But he is no less known as a leader of the movement for people's sobriety. The well-known law about the struggle against hard drinking and alcoholism was passed in May 1985. Fyodor Grigoryevich was among those public figures who insisted on a consistent implementation of that policy. More than once he sent letters and articles full of passionate arguments to our editorial office. Here are his thoughts at present.)

I ask myself: is it true that the law on the struggle against hard drinking and alcoholism has turned out to be so unpopular that the whole society suffered as a result? No. That law has given us something no one expected. For example, the birth rate in Russia has gone up for the first time in 46 years. Half a million more babies were born in 1986 and 1987 than usual. Infant mortality has been reduced. Male life expectancy has increased by two and a half years. Not within ten years but during those two years alone! Work absenteeism dropped by 34 percent. The curve of industrial injuries and accident rate has fallen sharply. Take the criminal statistics, for instance. It is common knowledge that the number of committed crimes is directly proportional to the volume of consumed alcohol. Thus, the number of grave crimes dropped by 14.3 percent in 1985, and in 1986 by 29.7 percent.

But the main thing is that the psychological atmosphere in society began to change. Peace and happiness came to many families for the first time, perhaps. People breathed with more easily: drunkards were afraid to show up in the streets.

Why did the country's leadership waver and begin to curtail the planned measures so quickly? I think that not the least of the reasons was the pressure from those groups and strata connected with shadow economy, one way or the other, for whom the liquor business is one of highly important income items. The liquor Mafia puts an average of about ten billion rubles a year in its pocket. And, naturally, having begun to lose profit, the shadow capital put all of its connections into action, and pushed on all the levers.

I think that the halfway character of the steps undertaken at that time helped it as well. Thus, it was not specified how long we would be involved in the struggle against hard drinking: a year, two, ten years or one hundred? How much per year, specifically, would we lower the production of wine and vodka? No mechanism of control was determined either. These weaknesses of the anti-alcohol legislation were immediately used by its opponents.

Take notice, the anti-alcohol propaganda was gradually cut back after 1985. As a matter of fact, they did not make very much of it earlier either, but now they have practically stopped writing and telling the truth about

alcohol. Enthusiasts of the sobriety movement felt it right away: as if at the command, their access to the mass media was cut off at once. Instead, at first little by little, and then louder and louder, the press started to write about the amount of losses sobriety cause to the treasury. And the figure of 37 billion rubles started to go from one newspaper page to another: saying that the state did not receive that much because of the restricted liquor sale. There appeared a diversity of reports by journalists, painting vivid pictures of gigantic lines to liquor stores.

But let us tell the truth. For those lines were created for a purpose. While in general the liquor production was reduced by one third, the number of liquor stores was reduced by three to four times. In our Leningrad, for example, they left only one supermarket selling liquor in a huge microrayon with a population of over a quarter of a million. Or take Moscow. When today's President of the RSFSR was at the head of the CPSU city committee of the capital, he fought against liquor sale so actively, that he threatened to shut down all liquor stores in the capital. That type of ardor could stir up nothing else but universal animosity.

As for the holes in the budget allegedly caused by the restricted liquor sale... 45 billion rubles more than usual were put in the savings banks during those years. This sum alone covers all those liquor arrears. And if we take into account the fact that labor productivity in industry went up by one percent every year, which totals an additional nine billion rubles that went to the country's budget, it will turn out that sobriety is much more profitable for the state than vodka sale.

However, take notice, history shows that the worse things are going with the powers that be, the more actively they impose alcohol on the people. A sober person, that is, a reasonable patriotic person, who doesn't think only of his own interests, is dangerous for rulers in general. For it was exactly when the Russian people sobered up after the 'dry law' in 1914, that they accomplished a revolution, endured the civil war, restored and raised the national economy from the ruins.

Having sobered up just a little during the two years of the effect of the anti-alcohol legislation, our people saw in what state the country is. Forests have been ruined. Oil has been sold abroad. The Volga has been turned into a swamp. They are building canals no one needs... They saw and understood that one can't live like this any longer. What's the matter, didn't they notice all that before?! They were indifferent because they drank. And look what conformity with the established laws there is: as soon as the foundations of socialism began to collapse, a many-voiced choir of 'civilizers' started to shout right away about the ruin of the country caused by the reduction of vodka consumption. From 1988 on, we began to make up for the volume of liquor sale very quickly, and now we have already exceeded the level of 1984. It is amazing, vodka is the only item not affected by the price increases of 2 April 91. This is how it is!

Civilized, or moderate wine drinking is the most dangerous thing, because one does not notice how he gradually acquires a strong habit of drinking alcohol. By the beginning of perestroika the majority of all high-ranking leaders—political, economic, scientific, and so on—turned out to be drunkards to some extent.

I remember a case, to which I paid no attention at the time, but which I see differently now, after having thought about it well enough. One of the major professors, the rector of an Institute, the bearer of all kinds of titles, awards, and prizes, a deputy of various levels of soviets, Aleksander Aleksandrovich Vishnevskiy, used to hold various scientific conferences which always ended with banquets. Sometimes it was difficult to understand what was primary, the conference itself or the banquet after it. Vodka and cognac flowed like water. I did not drink, all knew that, and therefore did not even offer me a drink. But once, having had a couple, Vishnevskiy said to me in a friendly manner: it's a pity that you, Uglov, do not drink. If you drank like everyone you would have been both a deputy, and a hero, and the Institute would not have been taken away from you, and, in general, you would have become a big shot. Otherwise, you are like *rara avis*, one can't even talk to you openly... This is how it was! If I drank like everyone, the way would have been clear, they would have helped make my career, and would have showered me with awards. But if you are a sober man, then you are not fit for being a leader. Because one can't control you: they will order you to do something, but you may understand that it should not be done. Having poisoned the mind with alcohol, having ruined the intellect of the intellectuals, having sapped their will, we became hostages of the incompetent leadership.

There is an indicator, a coefficient of intellectualization of the youth. Under Khrushchev we were proud to be the second in the world. Now we have slid to number 42. Besides, the Russians as a nation have an even lower coefficient, they occupy the very last line among all nations and nationalities who live in Russia.

If there were patriots in our government, they would not have allowed, for example, the receipt of 55 billion rubles from alcohol sale in 1990. Would those, thinking of their people, have bought alcohol abroad, spending a billion dollars which one can't get to buy medical supplies and equipment? Would they have sanctioned a swift restoration of the vodka production in the volume exceeding the one prior to the law of 1985?!

They would have concentrated all efforts and all money to save the people, and, first of all, the Russian people, from extinction caused by alcohol. We are on the verge of a global catastrophe, and if the most resolute and effective measures are not undertaken now, degeneration of people will become inevitable. Because today over 50 percent of the country's population are sick people, three fourths of babies are born sick. The situation is even critical in some oblasts of Russia. Here is, for example,

information on Pskov Oblast: while the average life expectancy for men in the country is 62 years, here they die at 46.

In my view, it is necessary to approve a state program for sobering the people. It should be continued for, let us say, no more than three to five years, but it should be accompanied with the most strict sanctions.

The resistance to it will be awful. If, speaking from the rostrum of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, economist N. Shmelev calls for opening up all the locks for alcohol, what is there to say! But our country has no other way. Common sense and the interests of the Motherland require that the alcohol production be stopped. Yes, I am a convinced proponent of reinstating the 'dry law', approved in Russia back in 1914, and confirmed by Lenin's decree of December 19, 1919. But I am a realist and I understand very well how difficult it will be to convince people to give up alcohol now. But it is necessary, and that means it is possible. First of all, it is necessary not only to ban propaganda of alcohol in the mass media, but also to reorient the press, radio, TV, the movies, and so on, by inducing them to tell the truth about alcohol, about the catastrophe to which it will lead not only an individual, but the state, Russia, and the Motherland.

The Russian people certainly have love for the Motherland at the very bottom of their heart. The Motherland is more precious to them than their own life. If one says to a person: if you don't stop drinking, you will die, it is quite possible that he will wave his hands—he doesn't care! But if one explains to him: you drink, and that is why your Motherland is dying, Russia is dying, he will fall into deep thought. It is possible to sober up people only by arousing their sense of national dignity. Having sobered people up, you should make them into patriots.

Further. The state and the government should assist people in every possible way in providing them with information about the existing methods of getting rid of the addiction to alcohol, and in organizing the use of these methods to improve people's health. I, personally, would suggest using the method developed by Leningrad physician G.A. Shichko.

Now we have about 40 million alcoholics and hard drinkers in the country. True, study groups and courses based on the Shichko method work in all cities, and about half a million people attending them get rid of the addiction to alcohol every year. But, unfortunately, the ranks of alcoholics are growing by the same number annually as well. Therefore, all schools, higher educational establishments, factories, and offices should be obligated to conduct this liberation from alcoholic addiction. The state should fight not for 'moderate', 'fine', 'civilized' drinking, but for total sobriety, which alone can save our people. This is what should be the ultimate goal both for the government, and for public movements.

CPSU Officials Meet on Social Protection for Women

*91US0681A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Aug 91
Second Edition pp 1-2*

[CPSU Central Committee Press Center Release: "Defending Social Guarantees: From the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat Meeting"]

[Text] The first CPSU Central Committee Secretariat meeting after the July (1991) CPSU Central Committee Plenum has taken place. While opening the meeting, CPSU Central Committee Secretary O.S. Shenin proposed discussing the draft plan of measures to realize the decisions of the July Party Central Committee Plenum as the first item on the agenda.

Specific comments and proposals were expressed during the exchange of opinions. It was specifically stressed that Party organizations need to take, not quantitative parameters but, effective, results-oriented actions as the basis for the impending great deal of work in their activities. It is important that information-explanatory work adequately reflect the results of the Plenum and their constructive direction and that it is linked with the real interests and concerns of the people. The Party press and communists who work in the mass media sphere are called upon to play an especially significant role during the forthcoming all-party discussion of the draft new Program. Successful preparation for the extraordinary 29th Party Congress depends to a great degree on their professionalism. It was decided to put the finishing touches on the submitted draft in a short period of time while considering the comments that had been expressed.

Thorough, concerned, and emotional. This is how you can characterize the conversation which occurred later on the role of Party organizations in implementing social protection measures for women under conditions of the shift to the market. Essentially, it became the continuation of the discussion of the primary directions of Party work with the women's movement at a Secretariat meeting at the end of March 1991. Several months have passed since that time. However, the problems associated with the situation of women under conditions of the transition that has begun to the market and first of all of the issues of their social protection continue to worsen. Today women make up the majority of those who have lost their jobs. Additional expenditures for purposes of a social nature that are associated with women's labor and with motherhood and raising children are making them an "unprofitable" work force. Reorganization of the management staff is turning out to be the dismissal of primarily women. Hundreds of thousands of wives of servicemen, miners, seamen, and women-refugees do not have jobs. The growing process of excluding women from the national economy is leading to a drastic reduction of the standard of living of millions of families. We are observing a dangerous trend toward worsening working conditions for women. The situation in the

everyday life and spiritual spheres is becoming complicated. The scope of construction of school and preschool institutions that offer free social and cultural services has sharply decreased.

The memorandum prepared by the CPSU Central Committee Commission on Women and Family Issues discusses these sad trends. The speakers illustrated these trends with specific facts and figures. So, for example, women total an average of 60 percent of those people dismissed from work. And in Moscow their share among those who have been reduced reaches 80 percent. Four out of five of those who turn to capital job placement bureaus are women. Commission Secretary E.Ye. Novikova noted that women's forced return to the family is accompanied by a noticeable reduction in the standard of living and with the processes which must qualify as the "feminization of poverty."

Concern about improving the situation of women and families must be at the center of the CPSU's attention. This idea permeates the draft recommendations for implementing measures for the social protection of women under conditions of the shift to the market that have been submitted for discussion by Party committees. It was heard in practically every speech.

USSR Deputy Minister of Labor and Social Issues L.I. Bezlepkina talked about the nationwide significance of the problem of social protection of women. Concern about women is inseparably linked with the need to conduct a strong policy in the protection of workers from the extremes of the market element, that is, of those people who compose the social foundation of the Party. Among the most important tasks of communists in this matter—is specific, practical assistance in the resolution of women's employment problems and provision of professional training and retraining, and increasing their social and political status on the whole.

In the opinion of S.I. Stulovaya, department head of the Ivanovskiy Oblast Party Committee, communists must be the disturbers of the public tranquility and persistently conduct a policy for the protection of women's social rights in Soviets of various levels and actually promote the solution of numerous problems. The Ivanovskiy Oblast Party organization is not a bystander from these issues. It is rendering practical assistance in the activities of a local independent organization—the union of women with whose help small enterprises are being opened and training is being established for women-entrepreneurs who are starting out. The union is publishing its own newspaper-especially for women.

KRESTYANKA magazine Editor-in-Chief A.V. Kupriyanova described another positive example—the creation of a women's social self-protection system in Staritskiy Rayon of Tver Oblast. The situation of rural women is unenviable. Single women with children are not being hired at kolkhozes and they are not giving them land. Many are being degraded and humiliated by the fear of discharge or dismissal. How do we remove the fear of

unemployment which is frequently being groundlessly stirred up in the mass media? How do we give women a chance for self-realization? Here there is no end to Party organizations' practical work.

We need to stop treating housekeepers as a category of "social dependents." Deputy Chairman of the Committee of Soviet Women G. N. Galkina talked about this. Housework, especially raising children which requires a great deal of time and nerves, must be recognized as socially significant and guaranteed by the state. We have completely forgotten about women of pension age and little girls-adolescents who are looking for their path in life. And these groups of socially vulnerable people need attention and care.

CPSU Central Committee Secretary, CPSU Central Committee Committee on Women and Family Issues Chairman G.V. Semenova stressed the need for the active participation of communists in the creation of social services, employment centers, and other information-consultative structures that are called upon to assist women to become oriented to developing market conditions. Party organizations need to conduct specific information-education work in this direction. It is important to return to a woman a sense of her own dignity and minimal confidence to tomorrow. Party committees must exercise more initiative and participate in preparing draft laws and programs for social protection of women and act as the consolidating force in soviets of all levels, while considering the concern of the deputies group with the situation of women and families under conditions of the transition to the market.

CPSU Central Committee Secretaries A.S. Dzasokhov, P.K. Luchinskiy, I.I. Melnikov, V.M. Falin, and other meeting participants spoke about the significance of a differentiated approach to the resolution of the problems of social protection while considering the specific features of various groups of the population, for example, wives of servicemen, the inadmissibility of violations of labor laws, and the important role of the mass media in forming favorable public opinion surrounding these issues.

While summing up the results of the discussion, O.S. Shenin noted that they expect the CPSU to take extraordinary steps to solve the urgent problems of social protection of women in the current situation. Naturally, the Party should not copy the trade unions. But is it really not a party matter—assistance in the creation of employment centers, not additional bureaucratic departments, but effective organizations that are concerned about people and that the people need? The Party must conduct a strong policy for the social protection of workers, first of all of women, through the Soviets while closely cooperating with the trade unions, other mass movements, and newly formed parties. The realization of the recommendations submitted to the Party committees for the implementation of measures for the social protection of women under conditions of the shift to the

market will increase the Party's prestige and its real influence among the workers.

A decision was adopted to finalize the draft plan based on the comments heard and to publish the recommendations and the memorandum to it in IZVESTIYA TSK KPSS AND PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN magazines.

The CPSU Central Committee Secretariat approved the new provision on the CPSU Central Committee Administration of Affairs.

The editorial staff charter of SOVETSKAYA KULTURA newspaper has been reviewed and approved.

CPSU Central Committee Press Center

Yakunin, Patriarch Dispute Russian Orthodox Church Jurisdiction

*91UN2178A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 9 Jul 91 p 6*

[Article by Aleksey Chelnokov: "A Church Conflict Becomes a Parliamentary One. Gleb Yakunin Still Does Not Get Along With the Patriarch"]

[Text] A certificate of registration of the Suzdal Diocesan Administration of the Free Russian Orthodox Church (RPSTs), which is under the jurisdiction of the Russian Church Abroad, was officially awarded on 14 July at the RSFSR Ministry of Justice. Therefore, the existence of a parallel hierarchy of the Orthodox Church was legalized for the first time in Soviet history (congregations of the Catacomb Church existing since 1927 still do not indicate their desire to be legal).

The registration was preceded by many months of struggle between adherents of the Church Abroad and the episcopate of the Moscow Patriarchate, together with representatives of local and central authorities. The deputy chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Freedom of Conscience, Father Gleb Yakunin, known in the not-so-remote past as a church dissident and a prisoner of conscience, played a notable role in resolving the situation successfully in favor of the former group. By all signs, the advocate of the rights of believers will once again have to pay the bill produced by the stung patriarch of Moscow and all Russia—this time, however, by changing his status rather than by years of imprisonment. Of course, this should bring about reassignments inside the parliamentary committee and, therefore, changes in its political course.

The first sign of a looming scandal surfaced on 23 May at a meeting between members of the Committee for Freedom of Conscience and the patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, Aleksey II. At the time, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church demanded that Father Gleb "finally take a stand with regard to his jurisdictional affiliation." In turn, in the opinion of the priest, "the sense of democracy is in defending a religious minority."

A letter from Father Gleb addressed to the authorities of the city of Kuybyshev, Novosibirsk Oblast, was discussed at a meeting of the committee on 31 May. Father Gleb stated in the letter that the transfer of the congregation of the Church of John the Baptist to the jurisdiction of the RPSTs "is a purely church affair because it does not entail a change in denominational affiliation." Members of the committee disavowed the letter of the deputy chairman and drew up another letter with the opposite meaning. Yakunin believes that "as a matter of fact, this letter became a call to smash the congregation." The arrival of two RSFSR people's deputies in Kuybyshev by decision of the committee provided a pretext "for comprehensively conditioning the believers with the participation of KGB and MVD city administration chiefs." It was communicated to the citizens that the clergy of "the American church" are CIA hirelings.

The events in the remote Siberian town apparently exhausted all the patience of Father Gleb Yakunin. He stated: "I may have to cancel the moratorium on speaking against Patriarch Aleksiy II. I have already told Chairman Polosin that the patriarch is pressuring our committee."

The deputy chairman of the parliamentary committee believes it is impermissible to transfer Orthodox churches built before the revolution to the exclusive possession of the Moscow Patriarchate, as Aleksiy II demands. In his opinion, this would trample on historical justice and democratic principles.

The old conflict between former dissident Father Gleb and members of the Orthodox Church hierarchy, which was swept under the rug at one point, is threatening to spread to the Russian Christian Democratic Movement. Other leaders of the Committee for Freedom of Conscience, Father Vyacheslav Polosin and Viktor Aksyuchits, who are faulted for "yielding to the patriarch," belong to the central organ of the movement, along with Father Gleb himself.

For now, Father Gleb Yakunin is engaged in negotiations with the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Human Rights, Sergey Kovalev, concerning the creation of a subcommittee for defending the rights of believers within the parliamentary structure reporting to Kovalev.

Patriarch Discusses Orthodox Church Concerns

91UN2293A Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
22 Jul 91 pp 126-131

[Interview with Patriarch Aleksey II by Jorg R. Mettke and Andrej Batrak; place and date not given: "Thanks to Perestroika, We Can Criticize the State"]

[Text] Aleksey M. Ridiger was considered a man of the middle of the road, when he was elected to be the supreme head of the Russian Orthodox Church after the death of his predecessor, Pimen, last year, and when, as patriarch of Moscow and all Russia, he assumed the name Aleksey

II. Born in 1929 in Tallinn, the son of an Orthodox priest who had emigrated to Estonia, this man, who held a doctorate in theology, showed himself to be a loyal conservative on the one hand, while on the other hand, he supported citizens' initiatives against the destruction of the environment, and he publicly demanded the return of nationalized church property. The patriarch is taking increasing political advantage of the authority of his office. Aleksey II condemned the demonstration of Moscow's power in the Baltic [republics] early this year: "The use of military power in Lithuania was a sin." He was the first representative of the church to congratulate Russian President Yeltsin publicly.

[DER SPIEGEL] Your Holiness, the Russian Orthodox Church is now considered by many to be the only institution that has preserved the national traditions, the spiritual and moral values of Russia. Can the church live up to these expectations of salvation?

[Aleksey II] Our country is now, indeed, in search of its basic spiritual and moral values, and we are prepared to transmit our views of what those values should be to the people. That is at once an obligation and a challenge. Seventy-three years after the October Revolution, it has become clear that the recipe that calls for the destruction of the world so that it can be rebuilt was fundamentally wrong. Without historical experience, the future cannot be shaped.

[DER SPIEGEL] In concrete terms, what has perestroika changed in the relationship between the church and the state?

[Aleksey II] In the first years of perestroika, I once said publicly that we were treated as second-class human beings. After that, many people wrote: just second class would be nice. Today, by contrast, the faithful, as well as the clergy, are truly citizens with equal rights. The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] law pertaining to freedom of conscience and freedom of religion, gives our congregations, our cloisters, our religious seminaries, and the sees all the rights of juridical persons. Now the church can finally go to court if it feels it has been dealt with unfairly.

[DER SPIEGEL] But for the time being, you are still barred from the schools.

[Aleksey II] The law does not expressly prohibit the teaching of religion, but neither does it contain any general authorization, despite our express application for such authorization. The deputies simply could not overcome their misgivings.

[DER SPIEGEL] Would you be in a position to leap into the ideological breach?

[Aleksey II] We are ready, but at the present time, we would be overextended. In Moscow alone, there are 1,286 schools. We do not yet have that many teachers of religion.

[DER SPIEGEL] What does the church think of the market economy, consumer ideology, and the concomitant promises on the part of the politicians?

[Aleksey II] The market economy is not all that new to us. But in this return to market conditions, we must take care that souls and fates are not trampled under foot. We shall take greater pains to assure social protection, but that, too, places too great a strain on us at present. We are once again receiving custody of hundreds of churches and dozens of cloisters from the state, and they are in a shocking state of disrepair. They must be restored; and that, too, will occur at new prices, under market conditions.

[DER SPIEGEL] Where will you get the money?

[Aleksey II] Since our church has neither profitable enterprises nor tax revenues at its disposal, our sole source of income is donations from the faithful. From these meager resources, at a time when a major portion of our population has sunk below the poverty line, and at a time when our economic system has gone completely off track, we shall have to build up what it took centuries to create and decades to destroy.

[DER SPIEGEL] Would you welcome state support?

[Aleksey II] If such assistance were forthcoming, we would gladly resort to it. We would also welcome financial aid from Christians in the West—at least for the sake of salvaging particularly valuable church buildings.

[DER SPIEGEL] A year ago, when you were installed upon the throne, you made no mention of the oath of allegiance that Archbishop Sergei swore in 1927. None of your predecessors in the Soviet period ever dared such an omission. What was the sense of this political demonstration?

[Aleksey II] The declaration has its origins in a time in which the existence of the church was at stake, and when saving the church was the issue. Many classes and social strata were exposed to concerted repressive measures in those days—scholars, the military, the intelligentsia, even the Bolsheviks themselves. The church was to have been completely destroyed. According to the law, the clergy were considered counterrevolutionaries...

[DER SPIEGEL]...and they had to choose between martyrdom and adaptation.

[Aleksey II] All that Archbishop Sergei said was the church was not the political opponent of the state. His declaration says verbatim: "We want to remain orthodox and we consider the Soviet Union to be our home; we consider its joys and successes to be our joys and successes, and its sorrow is our sorrow." An atheistic state was not the issue; our homeland was the issue.

[DER SPIEGEL] Has this declaration lost all its meaning for you today?

[Aleksey II] Now we are independent, and we no longer need to assert our loyalty to the state. The position of the

church at the time of Archbishop Sergei's declaration, and thereafter, was without rights and humiliating. Thanks to perestroika, we can now criticize the state, if need be.

[DER SPIEGEL] The condition and the future of Russia, as well as that of the [Soviet] Union—does that give you just cause for criticism?

[Aleksey II] It was a mistake that the central government imposed its will upon the republics while paying no heed to its own national interests. The future can belong only to a federation of sovereign states, but there must be transitional periods for those republics that do not wish to remain in the union. The economic intricacies are too strong, the human ties too close.

[DER SPIEGEL] In the history of Russia there have always been, time and time again, periods of openness to Western Europe—and massive resistance from the church against it. Does the present tendency in Russia, to orient itself once more toward the West in everything from music and clothing to economic models and political concepts find approval in your church?

[Aleksey II] Unfortunately, the noble and truly European intellectual heritage finds its way to our door most slowly. A Western Sovietologist recently said that the Soviet Union confused the faucets, and instead of hooking up with the life-giving water pipe, it hooked up with the sewer line.

[DER SPIEGEL] The West as a moral sewer; that was a Communist stereotype for a long time.

[Aleksey II] The subculture of rock, drugs, a superficial posture raised so much by the media—are these the things we should strive for? The Westernization of Soviet lifestyle that is going on at the present time has little to do with humanization or Christianization. Like all attempts to achieve a breakthrough to Europe that were inspired by Peter the Great, and were then practiced once more by the Marxists in the years of the Revolution, the one of the present day is associated in the case of some with an abhorrence of everything that smacks of the history of the nation. Perhaps this radicalism and the historical nihilism are a part of our national mentality, but many perceive such tendencies to be extremely negative.

[DER SPIEGEL] But in many cases, only because conservatives from the left as well as from the right have such a hard time bidding farewell to superpower thought patterns.

[Aleksey II] That is a second major reason. In an integrated economy of a united Europe, our country could easily be consigned to the role of cheap supplier of raw materials and dumping ground for technologies that are harmful to the environment. At the present time, who can be sure that Russia would really be regarded as

an equal partner in the West? As a Christian, as well as in my capacity as patriarch, I notice: We Russian Christians will be open to an approach to the West in exactly the same degree in which the West remains faithful to its Christian destiny.

[DER SPIEGEL] Are there nevertheless not many within your church who espouse a policy of the closed door and the closed window, who would be most happy to thwart all contacts with the West?

[Aleksey II] They exist, but above all, it is the Russian Orthodox Church in the foreign countries that makes an engagement of all ecumenical contacts the chief prerequisite for dialogue with us. But in today's secularized world, one must know what one wants: dialogue at the Roundtable, or more crusades.

[DER SPIEGEL] The Orthodox Church in exile seems not to believe that the patriarch of Moscow is no longer being dangled on a Soviet string. It demands statements of contrition on your part.

[Aleksey II] Now is not the time to cast aspersions at one another. We could say many unpleasant things about the Russian church in exile, as well: collaboration with the Hitler regime, prayers for a German victory over the Soviet Union, the message to President Johnson of the United States wishing him victory in the war in Vietnam.

[DER SPIEGEL] Many priests want to become politically active, and they bear witness to the considerable need for reform within the church.

[Aleksey II] We advise our clergy to eschew affiliation with any party. Those reforms that the West has already implemented are not necessary in our church. We have been able to survive the last very difficult 73 years only because we have remained faithful to our traditions. That does not preclude our involvement in new forms of service—the things that are referred to in the West as social ministry: religious instruction among the people, pastoral visits in hospitals, old-age homes, penal institutions. Until now, that has been prohibited.

[DER SPIEGEL] In the Ukraine, you are engaged in a quarrel with two churches that do not want to bow to your authority: the Greek Catholics and the Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalics. There has even been bloodshed outside church doors.

[Aleksey II] We are adhering to our agreement with Rome: A commission of representatives from the Vatican, our church, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which is affiliated with us, and the Greek Catholics should decide, in each individual case, whether a congregation belongs to the Catholic or the Orthodox Church. It will not do for all the faithful to be driven into the arms of the Greek Catholic Church automatically.

[DER SPIEGEL] But the Greek Catholics in the Ukraine were not asked after the Second World War whether they wanted to belong to Orthodoxy.

[Aleksey II] Reunification with the Russian Orthodox Church was decided in 1946 at a great council of Greek Catholics in Lvov—not without pressure from the outside, to be sure, but, in keeping with the wishes of many Greek Catholics. In the 50 years since then, two generations of the faithful have received their Christian armor from us. For this reason, the physical building should, in each case, belong to the majority, who will guarantee at the same time, that the minority will not be forced to hold their services out in the open air.

[DER SPIEGEL] How are your relationships to the Vatican developing?

[Aleksey II] We adhere to the old Christian principle, "one town—one bishop." High officials of the Roman Catholic Church have assured me that the Russian Orthodox Church, which is over 1,000 years old, bears the sole responsibility for preserving and propagating the faith within Russia's borders. Before the Revolution, the Archbishop of Mogiliov bore sole responsibility for all the Catholics living in the country.

[DER SPIEGEL] And now there is the threat of more competition?

[Aleksey II] The pope has, in the meantime, appointed archbishops for Moscow, Novosibirsk, and Karaganda, although for the approximately 200 Catholics living in Novosibirsk, a parish would suffice. We must be fearful that with the establishment of bishoprics, proselytizing among the Russian Orthodox populace will be attempted. If such attempts at conversion persist, the relationship between the Patriarchate of Moscow and the Vatican will suffer.

[DER SPIEGEL] Can you unify more easily with the Ukrainian Autocephalic Church?

[Aleksey II] The Ukrainian National Church came into being as a counterbalance to the Greek Catholic Church, and it did so in a way that was not altogether legitimate. A retired bishop declared he was its head. It is our fervent hope that reason and Christian awareness will prevail in the three religious communities in the Ukraine. Peaceful coexistence is very much called for there, not nationalistic emotions and aggressive confrontation.

[DER SPIEGEL] Confrontation threatens the Russian Orthodox Church from within as well with reform splinter groups such as the True Orthodox Church, the Independent Orthodox Church, and the so-called Church of the Catacombs, all of which are calling for repentance and atonement from the Patriarchate.

[Aleksey II] Some priests claim, in point of fact, that Russian society and our church have given up their Christian values. Obsessed by partisanship, they do not seek the truth, but rather conflict.

[DER SPIEGEL] After decades of a symbiotic relationship with the Communist Party, has the Russian Orthodox Church nothing to repent?

[Aleksey II] There are always reasons for repentance and atonement, but we never see our errors where our critics see them. I have served the church for 41 years. In this time, the faithful have no longer been shot or banished just because they were faithful, but they were exposed to a good deal of trickery. As recently as the mid 1970's, young people who wanted to study at a seminary often had to hide out from the militia for days. And now people come forward casting aspersions, and demanding repentance who have lived in safety for 73 years and who were not prepared to share our hardship.

[DER SPIEGEL] Isn't it understandable that the church's cooperation with the authorities, even with the KGB, arouses mistrust?

[Aleksey II] In matters of the faith, there were no compromises, but the State Council of Religious Affairs had a comprehensive veto right until only recently. It could refuse every appointment we made. All the personnel policies of our church practically depended upon the decisions of this council. Today we are independent on this point as well.

[DER SPIEGEL] And you really have no need to come to grips with the past?

[Aleksey II] It happens, but always in conjunction with the problems we must deal with today. The church is going through a process of renewal, it must do justice to new generations and classes within the population. Today three times as many are being baptized as just a few years ago. The number of church weddings has increased by twenty-fold.

Many of these people have never held the Gospels or a Bible in their hands. The catechism for our church is a monstrous chore if we want these Christians to be more than Christians in name only. If in this situation, in two churches on the same street, the priests do not preach the Word of God, but try to convince the people: don't go to the church next door, it is red or it is white—then we'll have the schism of the orthodox family.

[DER SPIEGEL] When, in Russia today, monarchists gather around the Tsarist flag, the clergy are always among them. Do you hope that you will one day be able to crown a Russian Tsar again?

[Aleksey II] Each time has its own appropriate form of government. When the State Duma—a kind of parliament—was established in Russia before the October Revolution, that was already a step away from the monarchy. I do not believe that it could be restored in present-day Russia....

[DER SPIEGEL] ...Nor should it?

[Aleksey II] It is all in God's hands.

[DER SPIEGEL] Your Holiness, we thank you for this interview.

Interview With Young Millionaire

91A50186A Moscow RYNOK in Russian No 13,
Jul 91 p 5

[Interview with German Sterligov by Olga Vasilyeva: "Portrait of a Millionaire, German Sterligov: Money Ahead!"]

[Text] Legends are circulating about German Sterligov, president of the recently-established Young Millionaires' Club, and co-owner of the "Alisa" Building Materials Exchange. And how! This 24-year-old fellow without a "higher" education founded a private exchange, the real monetary turnover of which for something like five months was about 20 million rubles. Unbelievable, but it's a fact! The press has not let this phenomenon go unnoticed. But the interviews and television broadcasts have only poured oil on the fire. "How did you achieve such success?" "No problem; if you have the desire to work, the millions will pour right into your hands. And Alisa, our German Shepherd, brings us luck..."

Is it really all that simple: If you want to be a millionaire—just become one?!

If you have a commodity (but not less than 100,000 rubles) and you truly want to sell it or to buy something, go to the Alisa Exchange. They greet you cordially and inquire about what you brought with you, and how much and at what price you want to sell or buy. They immediately call up a broker, and you reach an agreement. No problem.

But before the data on your commodity appears on the electronic tableau, you must make a security posit—8.0 percent of the cost from a seller, and 100,000 rubles from a buyer. This is a guarantee of the sincerity of your intentions. And this is the whole secret! It is precisely the security deposit system that permits Alisa to operate so successfully. And this is precisely how it differs from the other exchanges in the country.

[Vasilyeva] German, is this your personal invention, or did you borrow from someone else's experience?

[Sterligov] Our exchange is the only one in the Soviet Union in which a deposit is taken both from the seller and from the buyer. The security deposit system exists in Western exchanges also, but there it is more strict—100 percent of the cost of a contract; and that means, the reality of the business deal is also 100 percent guaranteed. However, in the Far North one cannot apply the experience of raising bananas in Africa. One has to devise something that will work in our conditions.

Our basic task is to make monetary turnover a reality. We are not interested in how many contracts are concluded among the brokers. We will never publish this figure—they are necessary only for advertisement. If information appeared that the daily contract turnover at RTSB [Russian Commodity Raw Materials Exchange] amounted to, for example, 127 million rubles, all this would mean is that the brokers had agreed on the

purchases and sales at this figure. How much the business deal really amounts to—is unknown.

For reasons of principle we do not provide information on contract turnover, but we do publish the real turnover. Say, perhaps our figures appear to be one-tenths as much—something like 12-18 million rubles in all; but they are real, and are actually tens of times higher than the turnover of any exchange in the country. What is important for us is our exchange's reputation for reliability. Loss of one's reputation is more costly than one's satisfaction—the clients will not come.

[Vasilyeva] And if, nevertheless, a contract is not backed up by money, what does this mean for the partners in the business deal?

[Sterligov] Serious fines: 50,000 rubles at a minimum; and sometimes it goes up to several hundred thousand—for the time lost, for example. To this day, we have only eight business deals remaining on paper. For us this is a lot, but for any other exchange it's only a little.

How can a fine operate, and a 28-percent deposit from the seller, if he meets pre-payment conditions? We've introduced it recently, after learning from bitter experience. There were two instances in a row: the client offers a commodity, for example, at 30 million rubles, for annual delivery; the deposit is 8.0 percent, and the pre-payment is 100 percent. But it turns out he does not have the commodity. He receives 30 million from the purchaser, and a year later returns only 8.0 percent. Clever? In order to avoid such tricks, we have had to establish a security deposit of 28 percent for such deals. In the future it will be adjusted according to the maximum bank rate. Thus, it would be easier for a person to go to the bank and take out a loan, than to come to us with such a proposal.

[Vasilyeva] What percentage goes to the exchange as a commission on the deals?

[Sterligov] From 0.42 to 0.8 percent. Twenty brokers have privileges. They are the ones who first had faith in us and purchased seats on the exchange—at that time they still cost 300,000 rubles. On the whole, they are enterprises, but there are also private persons who took a risk borrowed money, and might not get their money back. For these, you see, we established an advantageous rate. In addition to paying the minimum rate per deal, they are exempted from the 170,000-ruble annual extension [prolongatsia] for the services of the exchange.

The rest of the brokers, who purchased a seat for 750,000 rubles, pay 0.8 percent. But they too think they are lucky. Right now we are preparing to sell another ten seats, but the price is now 1.5 million rubles each.

[Vasilyeva] Alisa specializes in building materials. But judging from the ads, you are also prepared to sell goods not directly related to construction?

[Sterligov] Under conditions of total deficit, it is impossible to limit oneself to the sale of only one kind of

commodity. In the West, the sole task of the seller is—to make money. With that money he can purchase what he needs. We do not have the capability to rapidly realize the money we've earned. In most cases, the seller not only tries to set the maximum price for his commodity, he also wants the broker to help him find another commodity in exchange. And so a contract is concluded for a business deal with a condition. The broker gets a large income from it, but he does not receive anything until he buys what the seller needs—moreover, within a limited period of time.

[Vasilyeva] How is this done?

[Sterligov] Every broker represents about 120-130 trade firms. He has his own set of programs in the computer. Exchange of programs and contacts goes on—they're all playing the same game. In 90 cases out of 100, the commodity needed is there. If not, it will be there tomorrow. It is a kind of multi-faceted barter. Moreover, it is fast. The first and last deals are brokerage deals, written into the contract. Between them, as a rule, are several stages—the turnover outside the exchange. Rarely is one able to exchange one commodity for another directly. Ordinarily one has to build a complex combination, as in "preferans" [a card game]. The more experienced and successful the broker, the better it turns out for him. Therefore, we select those with a predilection for: "the more deals, the greater our income."

We do not keep records on transactions outside the exchange. All the exchanges in the world struggle with them, but for the time being this is not the greatest problem for us. We do not have thousands of brokers making deals in vast halls, as on the New York Stock Exchange, who often do not know one another in person. We have about 25 brokers working at one time. It makes no sense to them to risk their own reputation; they come in themselves and register deals made outside the exchange.

[Vasilyeva] But what about playing with stocks, speculation? How do the leaders of Alisa feel about that?

[Sterligov] Speculation in the sense of re-selling? That is hard work. It is one thing to buy and re-sell a pair of boots, but quite another to sell them in 100,000-pair lots. That means transportation, warehouses, guarantees, a system for transferring money, and so on. That is much different from speculation in the Riga market.

Personally I see speculation as a positive factor of trade. The faster it goes—the faster the turnover, and the faster the commodity gets to the purchaser. It does not rot under the open sky, and does not fill up the warehouses... And finally, speculation stimulates production: the more a commodity is sold for, the fewer middle-men there are on its way (and it is namely the exchange which tries to carry out the function of the only middleman between the seller and the buyer), the more money the producer makes, and consequently, the more goods are produced.

[Vasilyeva] Could you compare Alisa with a Western exchange?

[Sterligov] In the West, a broker could make 150 deals before lunch! We cannot imagine that for ourselves. In the West, the exchange means—a fast, guaranteed deal. With us, it is fast and guaranteed only in comparison with our other middleman organizations. We have no computer communication, and a primitive telephone system. But even with all this it would not be possible to run a full-fledged operation without having confidence in tomorrow. After all, we do not yet have any legislation on exchanges. But even if that comes soon, one cannot talk about normal exchange activity, without private ownership of the means of production. It is simply from impudence that we permit ourselves to call what we have an exchange. It is more aptly a parody of an exchange.

We are literally suffocating in our 100 square meters, each of which has been paid for 100,000 times. If our accommodations were even twice as large, our turnover would double. We are knocking on all sorts of doors, and we are prepared to purchase any suitable accommodations, but thus far have had no real success. Strange as it may seem, our very fame hinders us: the functionaries are afraid to meet us halfway, so that no one could hold them in suspicion for anything. Now there is a paradox for you.

While this question is being decided in Moscow, we have organized similar exchanges in four cities in the Union. These are entirely independent organizations, but are part of a single system. We help them to stand on their feet, and share our know-how. And they will play according to our rules: in Tallinn—"Violetta;" in Donetsk—"Donetskaya Alisa;" in Petrozavodsk—"Severo-zapadnyy brokerskiy kontsern" [Northwest Brokerage Company]; and in Dmitrov—"Alisa-D." All four have the same emblem—the face of our dog, Alisa. All these exchanges will have the same list of commodities and the same system of security deposits. All the operations are speeding up rapidly, and the turnover is expanding. This is the first ring. We are preparing a second, made up of seven exchanges.

There are also plans [for expansion] outside the Union. We want to organize a trading house with foreign partners in California. There it would be possible to sell commodities purchased on our exchange.

[Vasilyeva] In our country it is not so hard for enterprising people to earn money as to spend it. How are you coping with that problem?

[Sterligov] We have a mass of projects, and if no one hinders us, there will be no problems whatsoever. We have decided, for example, to organize a system of free dining halls in Moscow for pensioners. But no, Obshchepit [state public-catering system] sees us as a threat here. Now there is concern for the poor for you!

[Vasilyeva] In OGONEK, you were describing the grandiose project of a Millionaires' Club: to build a kind of "oasis of developed capitalism" in a rural area not far from Moscow.

[Sterligov] Yes, that will be a grandiose deal! We want to realize a number of projects in Ryazan Oblast along with Western firms who know how to do what they set out to do. The essence is in creating conditions for foreign investors in which they would practically not risk their own capital, and the owners of the land would still be those who live on it. There are plans to build greenhouse farms, small brick factories, houses, hospitals, schools, roads, bridges, everything necessary for a normal life. All this requires a large input of manpower, and we will help many hundreds of people escape unemployment. And we can choose on a competitive basis those who want to work conscientiously.

We could create this entire fantasy in a year, if the oblast authorities would decide to give their OK right away. But so far only a protocol on intentions has been signed. Now, construction could only begin next Spring at best.

Ours is a private firm. We consider it our duty to help those who need help in this. Every day we receive dozens of letters with requests for assistance, and we try to do everything in our power. But we do not wish to advertise this side of our activity. I can name only the basic directions: the Church; old-people's homes, sick children, maternity homes, and invalids. The more we earn, the more we can help people.

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